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This dissertation examines the construction of “Indonesia” among 
young people (age 15 to 27) in Jakarta, Kupang (East Nusa Tenggara) and 
Banda Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) using photo-elicitation interview 
method, coupled with participant observation. Expanding on Benedict 
Anderson’s notion of “imagined community”, the thesis proposes that the 
imagination about the nation is not homogeneous: there are conjunctures and 
disjunctures between the ideas of “Indonesia” of people in Jakarta, Kupang 
and Banda Aceh. The analysis employed is mainly drawn from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of hegemony, and the construction of the nation is framed as 
an open and unstable chain of equivalence formed by the emphasizing of 
similarities and the de-emphasizing of differences. Overall, the main points of 
divergence that have emerged in this thesis are in regard to the perceptions of 
the center-periphery disparity, the emphasis on ethnic versus pragmatic ties of 
nationhood, and salience of the international community. Patterns of 
conjunctures and disjunctures are perceptible on several levels: between 
Jakarta (the centre) versus Kupang and Banda Aceh (peripheries), between the 
peripheries, and between people who do not see their belongingness to 
Indonesia as problematic versus those who do. This latter is represented by a 
group of youth  in Banda Aceh who construct Indonesia as an antagonistic 
force. This complexity of ideas of Indonesia supports the initial assertion of 
heterogeneous constructions of nationhood.This thesis aims to contribute to 
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the existing and expansive body of literature on nationhood that have 
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1 ON IMAGINING A NATION 
 
This country, the Republic of Indonesia, does not 
belong to any group, or to any religion, or to any ethnic 
group, or to any group with customs and traditions, but is 
the property of all of us from Sabang to Merauke!1  
(Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, in a speech 
given in Surabaya on September, 24th, 1955) 
If we say “from Sabang to Merauke”, the song goes “from 
Sabang to Merauke, that is Indonesia”. But in the daily 
life, there is no Sabang, there is no Merauke. Not many 
people know where Sabang is, where Merauke is. They are 
just part of the song.2 
(Nana, 20 year old, female student of a secretarial and 




In 1955, a decade after Indonesia’s proclamation of independence, 
Sukarno, in the typically moving way that earned him fame as a charismatic 
orator persuaded people to stand as a united collectivity that owns and, at the 
same time, belongs to the all-embracing new nation. The phrase “dari Sabang 
sampai Merauke” (from Sabang to Merauke) refers to the two geographical 
extremities of Indonesia, the town of Sabang on We island in Aceh, and 
Merauke, the easternmost point in West Papua. The space between the two 
towns, covering thousands of kilometres, is filled by Sukarno with an 
                                                 
1 “Negara Republik Indonesia ini bukan milik sesuatu golongan, bukan milik sesuatu agama, 
bukan milik sesuatu suku, bukan milik sesuatu golongan adat-istiadat, tetapi milik kita semua 
dari Sabang sampai Merauke!” 
2 “Kalau kita bilang ‘Sabang sampai Merauke’, Dari lagunya aja ‘Sabang sampai Merauke, 
itulah Indonesia’. Tapi dalam kehidupan sehari-hari nggak ada Sabang, nggak ada Merauke. 
Bahkan jarang orang ada yang tau Sabang itu dimana, Merauke itu dimana. Mereka hanya 
ada dalam lagu, gitu” 
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imaginary seamless body named Indonesia. The metaphor “from Sabang to 
Merauke” is one of his most favourite rhetorical devices and was repeatedly 
used to frame and justify West Papua’s controversial inclusion. Tellingly, the 
idea of a unitary Indonesia that stretches from Sabang to Merauke is traceable 
to the Dutch General J.B van Heutsz (Vickers 2005) who defeated Aceh after 
a protracted war. “From Sabang to Merauke” in both instances, erases the 
violence and force behind the unification and replaces it with an image of a 
completed, pre-destined unity.  
 
Figure 1. The map of Indonesia3 
 
                                                 
3 (copyright Geoatlas from www.geoatlas.com retrieved 28 May 2015) 
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Throughout the years, this image continues to be reproduced. Every 
person who has gone through elementary school has been introduced to the 
song “Dari Sabang sampai Merauke” with the same title, categorized by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture within the group of “compulsory national 
songs” (Lagu Wajib Nasional), i.e. “songs which glorify the nation or voice 
official ideology and as such form part of a larger indoctrination campaign” 
(Van Dijk 2003).  It is to this song that Nana referred to in the excerpt above. 
Unlike Sukarno or Van Heutsz, Nana is not a public or historical figure. She is 
a twenty year old student in a secretarial and administration college, living 
with her family in Kuta Alam, on the outskirts of Banda Aceh. As we chatted 
in a coffee house near Museum Tsunami, she and her boyfriend did not come 
across as holding a grudge against Indonesia or even particularly interested in 
politics or social movements –unlike a significant number of young people I 
have talked to. Yet, she effectively deconstructed the metaphor “Sabang to 
Merauke”. In reality, according to her, it only exists symbolically in songs. 
Her statement is not only a move of dissociation from the state’s narrative, but 
also an unravelling of the signifier “dari Sabang sampai Merauke” as 
irrelevant to the “real” lives of people. The one city does not imply the other. 4 
Sabang and Merauke are separate localities. In other words, Sukarno and Nana 
have different imaginations about Indonesia. This is the starting point of the 
dissertation: an interest in the unfixed construction of the nation as an 
imagined community. 
                                                 
4 The fact that there is a monument in Sota, Merauke named “Tugu Kembar Sabang Merauke” 
(twin monument Sabang-Merauke) and a sport stadium in Sabang named “Stadion Sabang 
Merauke” suggests that both cities are imagined by the government to imply each other.  
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1.1.1 Research Statement 
This dissertation examines the heterogeneous constructions of 
Indonesia in Jakarta, Banda Aceh and Kupang. It aims to contribute to the 
scholarly discussion about the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 
[1983] 2006) by  providing empirical grounds to the argument that the 
imaginings are not singular. This thesis will show that young people (age 
between 18 and 27) in Jakarta, Kupang and Banda Aceh have different 
imaginings of Indonesia 5  that show various patterns of conjunctures and 
disjunctures from official state discourses of Indonesia.  
While most studies on nationhood have focused on the perceptions of 
the prominent members of society, whether they are politicians, academics, 
activists or artists, my informants on the other hand are not public figures and 
largely non-activists, although they are educated, relatively affluent youth with 
a middle class background. In a way, my informants are metaphorical 
descendants of the apolitical of young people subjected to the New Order’s 
“normalization of campus life” 6  that prohibited university students from 
engaging in politics (cf Manurung 2005). Given that this is the largest group in 
comparison to the progressive and conservative youth groups (Manurung 
                                                 
5 Indonesia is a country Benedict Anderson himself is familiar with, having spent years of 
research in the area. The theoretical formulation of the nation as imagined community is based 
partly on his analysis of Indonesia.  
6 Also known in Indonesian as “Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus” (NKK), this is a set of 
policies to stifle student activism introduced after large scale anti-Suharto student 
demonstrations in 1977-78. It involves the replacement of existing student councils with 
student organizations with members appointed by the university, an increased load in the 
curriculum and the banning of student publications (Aspinall 2005). 
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2005),7 their notions of Indonesia represent the general youth’s imaginings of 
the nation. By focusing on this group, I align this research with Hobsbawm’s 
emphasis on the importance of studying the nation “from below” (Hobsbawm 
1990: 11).8  
Studying the nation from below also means that it is imperative to 
focus on how the nation is imagined in the realm of everyday. Fox and Miller-
Idriss (2008) have identified four modalities through which the everyday 
nationhood is discursively constructed: daily conversations in interactions, 
decision-making practices, performance and consumption. The emphasis of 
this dissertation is on the imagining of the nation as constructed in 
conversations. I employ photo-elicitation interview method as the main 
instrument, using a set of photographs depicting scenes and issues that are 
relatively familiar to the informants, with the aim to encourage informants to 
engage in discussions and conversations.  
In this thesis, the differentiating variable that informs plural imaginings 
of Indonesia is geo-political diversity.9 Jakarta, Kupang and Banda Aceh are 
chosen because of their different positions in the power configuration of 
Indonesia. In a trajectory that stretches back to the colonial period, Jakarta is 
the political, economic and socio-cultural centre while the two other cities 
                                                 
7 Manurung (2005) identifies three youth groups during the New Order: the progressive (e.g. 
political activists), the conservative (largely religion-based groups) and the apolitical majority. 
This distinction seems to hold ground in the reformasi era. 
8 Here, I would emphasize that I am not studying national identity per se, but the perception or 
idea about a nation (in this context, Indonesia). The presence or absence of national identity, 
that is, the extent to which one identifies itself with the nation (thus, as an Indonesian), can be 
implied in one’s perception of the nation. 
9 In other words, among the practically limitless options of variables that might inform 
different imaginings (e.g. gender, age, generational cohort, religion, political affiliation), I opt 
to focus on geo-political diversity. 
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belong to the so-called “Outer Island” i.e. all the other islands aside from Java, 
the centre. In recent periods, after decades of separatist insurgencies, the state 
granted Aceh the right to implement Shariah Law aside from the state’s civil 
law. In terms of religion, the province symbolizes the ideal(-ized) Islamic 
community, the major religion in the country. Kupang, by comparison, is more 
peripheral. It is one of the least developed regions in Indonesia. The 
predominance of Christianity adds another minority identity to the province in 
the national context. The different situatedness of the three cities10 produces 
different knowledge and imaginations about Indonesia.  
Overall, the main points of divergence that have emerged are in 
regards to the perceptions of the center-periphery disparity, the emphasis on 
“ethnic” versus pragmatic ties of nationhood, and salience of the international 
community. Patterns of conjunctures and disjunctures are perceptible on 
several levels: between Jakarta (the centre) versus Kupang and Banda Aceh 
(peripheries), between the peripheries, and between people who do not see 
their belongingness to Indonesia as problematic versus those who do. This 
latter is represented by a group of youth  in Banda Aceh who construct 
Indonesia as an antagonistic force. In comparison to this group, for people 
who do not reject their belongingness to Indonesia, the center- periphery 
disparity is acceptable (either ignored or naturalized) and there is preference 
for a strong, controlling yet dependable government to one that guarantees 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that I do not assume that every young person in Jakarta, Kupang or 
Banda Aceh thinks alike, or that geo-political situatedness is the only deciding factor in the 
construction of nationhood that overrule gender, age, ethnic group, class, etc. However, in this 
dissertation, I am privileging geo-political situatedness and I am focusing on differences 




individual freedom and right. Importantly, the image of Indonesia remains 
open: Indonesia can be imagined positively as well as negatively. This cluster 
of ideas that are similar, but not identical is framed using the concept 
“regularity in dispersion” (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001), as a configuration 
of elements that are similar and contiguous to each other in contradistinction 
to a particular exteriority. This concept provides space for nuanced 
understanding of the heterogeneous elements. 
This thesis is an extension of Benedict Anderson’s work. Despite its 
indisputable insightfulness in appraising collectivities, in particular, the 
nationhood, Benedict Anderson’s theory on the nation as an imagined 
community could be refined by taking into account the unstable, open and 
heterogeneous nature of imagined communities. I employ Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory on the construction of hegemony in confluence with the 
assumptions of Standpoint Theory. 11  According to Laclau and Mouffe, 
hegemony is formed by temporarily fixing meanings through practices of 
articulation that construct sameness and difference out of a heterogeneous 
terrain (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001). Applying this framework to the 
context of nationhood, the imaginings of a nation are formed by temporarily 
fixed notions of what the nation is and what belongingness to the nation 
means, in contrast to what the nation is not.  
                                                 
11 In line with Standpoint Theory, it is necessary for me to state my own position vis a vis the 
three research groups. Although my parents both grew up in Central Java (Solo and 
Banjarnegara), I was born in Jakarta and spent my childhood there and in Belgium. 
Throughout most my adult life, I stayed in Jakarta, with the exception of one year in 
Yogyakarta, and the past five years in Singapore. I have very little understanding of the 
Javanese language and my first language is Indonesian. This does not stop other people in 
Jakarta from assigning the Javanese ethnic identity to me. Although in terms of ethnicity and 
place of residence I am part of the “dominant” group, in terms of religion, I am a minority. My 
parents are Catholics and although I am not practising, this is still the category I belong to 
according to my identity card. 
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Standpoint theory maintains that people’s understanding of the world is 
bound to the particular social context wherein individuals are situated, e.g. 
position in the power structure, culture and political values (Stoetzler and 
Yuval-Davis 2002; Harding 2004). As Harding states, “the grounds for 
knowledge are fully saturated with history and social life rather than 
abstracted from it” (Harding 2004). Epistemologically, knowledge (Haraway 
1988) and imagination (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002) are embedded in 
particular positionality of the subject. As a collorary, this would mean that the 
knowledge and imagination of a nation is informed by the situatedness of the 
subjects. Marginal positions generate constructions of Indonesia that diverge 
from or challenge the dominant discourse or the governments’ official 
narrative. 12 Aligned with standpoint theory, this dissertation is based on a 
multi-sited research that seeks to “...do justice to differences and to point at 
unities that exist across differences” (Saukko 2003: 178). In general, I find it 
especially suitable to question the supposed homogeneity of the nation 
because “(T)he juxtaposition among sites embedded in multi-sited strategies 
of following leads and making connections tend to offset naturalizing 
categories and their bounding of the world commonsensically” (Marcus 1998: 
17). 
Before embarking on a more detailed exposition of the multiplicity of 
imaginings, I will first provide a more extensive explanation about the existing 
                                                 
12 An example of a work on Indonesia that shares the same assumptions with standpoint 
theory despite not making explicit connections, is Watson’s “Of Self and Nation” wherein he 
used a selected set of autobiographies to trace the growing saliency of “Indonesia” as a 
possible identity and its negotiations with various other identities such as religion, political 




body of theories of nationhood, especially Benedict Anderson’s theory of the 
nation as an imagined community. 
1.2 The Production of the Nation 
Classic theories of nationhood are usually categorized into two 
paradigms, depending on their premise regarding the genesis and nature of 
nationhood. The first paradigm is termed primordial theories of nationhood, 
while the second one is called constructivist theories of nationhood. To 
different extent, both paradigms focus on the homogeneity of nationhood. 
1.2.1 Primordial Theories of Nationhood 
The first paradigm is considered to be “primordialist” due to their basic 
argument that the nation is an organic continuation of earlier, pre-modern 
collectivities that share “givens” such as physical features, language, ethnicity 
etc. The degree of essentialism offered in primordial theories varies 
significantly; from socio-biological stances proposed in the work of Pierre van 
den Berghe13 (1995) to less essentialist ones like Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-
symbolism. 14  
                                                 
13 According to van den Berghe, the nation is an extension of smaller kin units, e.g. nuclear 
family, extended family, lineage, clan, and so on. The nation is bounded by the same 
biological proximity that binds family members. He used the term “biological nepotism” to 
describe an essential trait of social organism, that is, the tendency to display favorable 
behavior towards others that is in direct correlation with the perceived shared kinship (van den 
Berghe 1995). 
14 Primordial theories, especially of the socio-biological strand, have been casted in a negative 
light, as Nairn noted, because of its proximity with the essentializing ideology of race that 
“was defeated alongside the Third Reich in 1945” (1997: 10). More moderate versions, like 
Smith’s, need to stress that they disavow the essentialization of race, and consider ethnicity to 
be a cultural artefact in itself (Nairn 1997). As “primordial” theories shed the race-ideology, 
the difference with modernist theories of nationhood become more about a difference of 
emphasis than anything else (Nairn 1997). 
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 According to Smith the nation is an approximate continuation of what 
he called ‘ethnie’, defined as “a named human community connected to a 
homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or 
more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among 
the elites.” (Smith [2001] 2010:13). In nations, the shared memory has been 
codified into national history, the shared culture becomes a public culture and 
the solidarity has been turned into official laws and customs15 (Smith [2001] 
2010: 14). The idea of ethnie does little to explain Indonesia’s emergence as a 
nation. Despite the way that it is presented by the state, the country is not a 
continuation of any clearly defined collectivity that shares a common myth 
and ancestry. Indonesia’s formation should be attributed to the territory under 
the administrative rule of the Dutch in early 20th century. 
Another theory that is often categorized as primordialism is Clifford 
Geertz’s dual framework (1963). He proposed that to understand the nation 
state, one should distinguish the civic tie from ethnic/primordial tie. Civic tie 
is a future oriented desire for progress and development, while “primordial 
tie” stems from the “the assumed (italics mine) “givens”- of social 
existence....These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on are seen 
(italics mine) to have an ineffable, ..., coerciveness in and of themselves...” 
(Geertz 1963: 109-110).  Due to this latter definition, his theory is considered 
as primordialist. This is a categorization I disagree with; the use of the word 
“assumed” and “seen” suggest that it is about the perception of the factuality 
of primordial ties than about the essential importance of bloodline. In this 
                                                 
15 Although ideally, nations would be developed out of ethnies, Smith warns against such 
simplifications, and accepts the possibility of poly-ethnic nations and diasporic ethnies.  
11 
 
dissertation I will frequently draw from Geertz’s distinction between “civic” 
and “ethnic” tie to refer to the different modes of attachment or engagement of 
my informants with Indonesia as a nation-state.16 
1.2.2 Constructivist Theories of Nationhood 
Constructivist theories reject the essentialist assumption that the nation 
is a continuation of pre-existing communities. According to them, the nation 
does not have a primordial ground and, on the contrary, is constructed by 
historical and political forces. Thus, one of the main characteristics of this 
strand of theories is its emphasis on modernity. Proponents argue that nations 
are modern formations, caused by shifts and changes of Enlightenment, 
industrialization and capitalism. While primordial theories accentuate the 
continuation of pre-modern entities in nation-states, constructivist theories 
concentrate on how modernity causes a break from earlier forms of 
collectivities 17  with nationalism as one of its excesses. The formation of 
Indonesia is more in correspondence with this strand of theory where 
particular national identity, culture and history had to be constructed and 
disseminated through various institutions, or akin to what Althusser (2009) 
                                                 
16 In other words, whenever I employ “civic tie” as well as “primordial tie”, I refer to how my 
informants perceive the ties that bind the nation, and not my analysis about what binds the 
nation. 
17 It is not because modernist theorists are unaware of pre-modern embryonic collectivities of 
the nation, but they prefer to focus on the modernity and the formation of nations. In the 
famous Warwick debate titled “Nation: Real or Imagined?” between Gellner and Smith –who 
was his student-, Smith accused Gellner of only telling “half of the story” (Smith, 1996) by 
solely emphasizing on modernity. Gellner subsequently responded that some nations are 
conceived out of ethnic collectivities and are cultural communities, while some others are not, 
but “in any case, it’s inessential” and the other half of which modernist theories do not talk 
about are “redundant” (Gellner 1996). 
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identifies as “ideological state apparatus” like education, family, law and 
literature. 
A prominent constructivist theorist of nationhood is Ernest Gellner. 
According to him, the workforce in an industrial society needs to be prepared 
by a standardized, universal and generic education, provided outside one’s 
kin-based community (Gellner [1983] 2006). A massive scale of educational 
infrastructure is required and can only be provided by an organization as large 
as the state (Gellner [1983] 2006). Shared culture becomes necessary to this 
endeavour, it is the “...minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the 
members of the society can breathe and survive and produce....it can no longer 
be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture or tradition” (Gellner 
[1983] 2006: 38). This engenders a new form of organization, that is, the 
nation. Gellner depicts the nation as a singular entity: the “key traits” of 
nationalism is the triumvirate of “homogeneity, literacy and anonymity”18 
(Gellner [1983] 2006: 138). Inequality is mostly a problem in the “early” 
stages of nation formation, and the failure of “entropy-resistant” groups to 
assimilate with the rest of the nation poses a serious problem (Gellner [1983] 
2006). So, despite taking into account the inequality engendered by 
homogenization, Gellner sees divergence as problematic exceptions.  The aim 
of this thesis is precisely to counterbalance this overemphasis on homogeneity 
in the theories of nationhood. By comparing three different sites, the 
dissertation shows that there is more heterogeneity than what Gellner 
proposes. 
                                                 
18 Individuals are anonymous because they belong to the nation state, and not to the kin 
groups like in an agricultural society. 
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Another constructivist theorist, Hobsbawm (1992) focuses on the 
construction of continuity between the pre- and the modern era. According to 
him, industrialization generates new political institutions and ideological 
movements that were so “unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be 
invented (1992: 7).  This happens through “invented traditions”; a ritualized, 
symbolic set of practices that are repeated in order to instil certain values and 
imply continuity with the infinite, faraway past. These “traditions” are 
invented as a response to rapid changes that threatens established social 
patterns and “old” traditions. The traditions often symbolize social cohesion, 
legitimize authority or inculcate beliefs and values (Hobsbawm 1992). As I 
will elaborate in a later section, the invention of tradition is a significant part 
of nation-building in Indonesia. The idea of the Majapahit kingdom as the 
mythical proto-Indonesia, for instance, erases the newness of the nation. 
Despite the inculcation of these invented traditions through many state 
institutions, young people perceive and appropriate these invented tradition 
differently. It is these differences that this thesis aims to highlight. Thus, as the 
data from Aceh show (see Chapter 6), some youth believe in a different set of 
“invented tradition” altogether, one that supports the idea of Aceh as an 
independent nation.  
Although Gellner and Hobsbawm have to a certain extent acknowledged and 
discussed the fact that industrialization did not happen evenly across the globe, 
this is not the focal point of their analysis. This leaves out a significant factor 
in post-colonial nationalism that was driven by the desire to be as modern as 
the former colonizers. In my data, this drive was especially identifiable among 
the youth in Jakarta who constantly look towards the developed countries to 
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grasp how nation-states should be, and to compare Indonesia’s performance 
against the benchmark set by them.  
Postcolonial nationalism, including Indonesia’s, could be more 
comprehensively framed through Tom Nairn’s theory of nationhood. For 
Nairn, it is precisely the unevenness that is the drive behind nationalism 
(Nairn [1977] 1981). Although industrialization did not take place in all 
societies simultaneously, yet the discourse of progress is overarching, 
instilling the belief that every society will eventually reach the same level of 
advancement. For the elites in the peripheral regions, like Sukarno, who are 
knowledgeable of the development in the centre, yet with little capital or time 
to re-enact the same -slow and gradual- process of development, there is little 
option but to mobilize their societies. “All that there was,” Nairn argues, “was 
the people and peculiarities of the region: its inherited ethnos, speech, folklore, 
skin-colour and so on. Nationalism works through differentiae like those 
because it has to” (Nairn [1977] 1981: 340). This corresponds with Sukarno’s 
speech at the beginning of the chapter, wherein he aimed to mobilize the 
population by highlighting at once the diversity of the people that are at once 
subsumed under a unitary Indonesia. Nairn concludes that the nation is a 
“modern Janus”; it looks simultaneously forward and backward, driven to 
progress and regress. This Janus-faced nationalism could be identified to 
different degrees in Jakarta and Banda Aceh (in this regards, ethno-
nationalism). Perceptions of unevenness, either as a result of injustice or as an 
accepted “fact”, solidify nationalist sentiments in both places. Interestingly in 
Kupang, this has not been the case. The awareness of uneven development has 
not led to (ethno-) nationalism. 
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Although this dissertation will continue to make references to the 
aforementioned theories –primordial as well as constructivist-, this work is 
concentrated on another constructivist theory, that is, Benedict Anderson’s 
idea of the nation as an imagined community. Forming the basis of my thesis, 
Anderson’s work will be explained more expansively than other theories of 
nationhood. 
1.2.3 The Genesis of Nationhood According to Benedict Anderson 
In one of the most influential works on nationhood, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Anderson attributes the 
formation of nationhood to paradigmatic shifts brought about by the 
Enlightenment ([1983] 2006: 12-22). Changes weakened the two prior forms 
of collectivities; the religious community and the dynastic empires. Along 
with this, the mode of temporality shifted from the pre-industrial “Messianistic 
time” 19 (Anderson [1983] 2006: 22-23) to the secular “homogenous, empty 
time”. In the latter, events are not considered divine instances, but 
coincidences simultaneously unfolding in different places ([1983] 2006: 22-
36).  The following is an elaboration of the various forces involved in the 
construction of nationhood, according to Anderson. 
                                                 
19 “Messianistic time” and “homogenous, empty time” are terms adopted from Walter 
Benjamin. An often cited example of the former is the visual artworks of the medieval period 
where cosmic-universal elements like Christ or Mary are juxtaposed to worldly-particular 
elements like the public figures of the community in which the artwork was created. This is in 
stark contrast with the current period’s nativity scenes that depict the universal image of the 
characters in dresses and accessories common centuries ago, because we sense them to belong 
to the past. The medieval works of art implies a temporality that perceives all events as linked 
vertically to a divine power, what Benjamin calls the “Messianistic” time (Anderson [1983] 
2006: 24). A clearer definition of “homogenous, empty time” is provided by Dipesh 
Chakrabarty : “Time is empty because it acts as a bottomless sack: any number of events can 
be put inside it; and it is homogenous because it is not affected by any particular events; its 




A concrete institution that is influential to the spread of nationhood is 
print capitalism (Anderson [1983] 2006; 1998).  Driven by the basic principles 
of capitalism, publishers began to issue prints in vernacular languages to 
maximize market and profit. 20 Similar oral vernaculars were grouped together 
as one print language. This move facilitates the communication between 
speakers of various vernaculars. The awareness that there is a large but limited 
group of people who read the same daily in a particular print language is the 
embryo of national consciousness (Anderson [1983] 2006).  
In the revised edition of Imagined Community (2006), Anderson 
expands (and corrects) his explanation on the formation of the “last wave” 
nations, 21  states formed in the aftermath of World War II. Whereas he 
previously considered these new states to be similar to dynasties in 19th 
century Europe, he argues that, on the contrary, they are isomorphic with the 
territories ruled by colonial forces. 22  The “grammar” employed in the 
construction of nationhood in the last wave nations is inherited from the 
colonial rule. Three powerful institutions receive ample attention. These are 
the census, the map and the museum (Anderson [1983] 2006: 163-186). These 
                                                 
20 This effectively demoted sacred, elite languages, like Latin, from their privileged status, 
thus, the weakening of pre-Industrial communities based on religion and kingship.  
21 Anderson identifies four types of nations, based on the particular historical circumstances 
that had precipitated their formations. The first nations to take shape were creole nations 
formed from  the many administrative units in the Spanish-American empire (Anderson 
[1983] 2006: 47-65), followed by the linguistic nations in Western Europe due to the 
“lexicographic revolution” of print-languages (Anderson [1983] 2006: 67-82), and official 
nationalism in the Eastern part of Europe, spurred by the awareness of nation-states as a 
growing mode of organization and the wish to retain empires while also forming nation-states 
(Anderson [1983] 2006: 83-111). The fourth type is the “last wave nations”, a category to 
which Indonesia belongs. 
22 This shift was considerably influenced by the works of Hirschman on British census 
practices and Winichakul historical treatise on how maps and various other symbols 




institutions, made possible by the logic and actual practices of mechanical 
reproduction, shape the state’s imagination of “the nature of the human beings 
it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry” 23 
(Anderson [1983] 2006: 164). Although they were initiated by the colonial 
government, they were subsequently adopted and appropriated by 
independent, post-colonial states.  
In a later work titled The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, 
Southeast Asia, and the World (1998), Anderson explores other pre-conditions 
of nationhood, using mostly materials from the post-colonial experiences of 
Southeast Asian nations as illustrations. Aside from the above mentioned 
“cultural roots” brought about by print language, he identifies two logics of 
serialities: the unbound and the bound seriality. The unbound seriality 
conceives the world as a universal space, where what takes place half a world 
away is experienced as part of, or related to, one’s own life-world. On the 
other hand, the bound seriality constructs nations as discrete entities; totalities 
clearly defined by geographical boundaries, its people categorized and 
classified according to race, ethnicity, religion, etc. (1998: 29).  
Modernization and capitalism caused paradigmatic shifts that are 
materialized, reproduced and perpetuated through newspapers and novels, 
census, museums and map that in their turn made the conceptualization, or the 
                                                 
23 The census is driven by the need to quantify, to label and categorize each and every subject. 
It is a way of “knowing” and imagining the subjects under rule who live within a delineated 
territory, represented by the map. The map serves not only to mark the unity of the region in 
question, or as a means for spatial orientation, but becomes a logo in itself, a sign standing in 
for the nation ([1983] 2006: 175). Returning to opening excerpts of this chapter, “dari Sabang 
sampai Merauke”, is a logo standing in for Indonesia. The third institution, the museum, 
asserts historical legacy and legitimacy. Like the map, it becomes a logo that can be infinitely 
reproduced, spreading the imagination that the nation has always been there and was always 
meant to become sovereign and independent.  
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imagining, of the nation possible. Anderson thus proposed that the nation is an 
imagined community. It is imagined, because despite never having had direct 
encounters with each fellow member, people feel that they all belong to the 
same community. The nation is imagined as being limited, sovereign and 
based on “deep, horizontal comradeship” ([1983] 2006: 7), regardless of the 
inequalities and injustices that might take place.  
While agreeing that a sense of belongingness does not necessitate 
direct face-to-face encounters, or that any collective entity is by definition 
limited, and a nation is imagined to be sovereign (or at least, destined to be 
so), it is mostly the “community” aspect of Anderson’s argument that this 
thesis will address. The type of imagination of the community, as proposed in 
Anderson’s theory –and shared by Gellner- puts emphasis on homogeneity. 
However, the “deep, horizontal comradeship” ignores, or at least elides, the 
possibility of status differences between groups within a nation-state, that 
according to Standpoint Theorists give rise to different imaginations.  
According to Cheah (2003), Anderson’s main interest is the 
paradigmatic style and the material conditions that generate the idea of the 
nation, not so much the thematic contents of the imaginations per se. 
Transposed to Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole, of language 
as an abstract system in contrast to language as expressed in actual speech and 
other practices (Saussure [1986] 1989), one could frame Anderson’s theory of 
nationhood as focusing on the grammar of the langue of nationhood. In 
contrast, this research explores the parole of nationhood, or the ways that 
“actual” people, based on their daily experiences and practices, conceptualize 
the nation.  
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Critiques of the “Imagined Community” 
Benedict Anderson’s proposition that the nation is an imagined 
community is one of the most widely accepted theories of nationhood. 24 His 
work has instigated a plethora of other studies, that “incessantly noted and 
rarely interrogated” the relation between nation and imagination (Redfield 
1999). Although “rare”, according to Redfield, Anderson’s theory has been 
interrogated by a handful of scholars.  The authors are often grounded in 
postcolonial and/or critical theory perspectives and argue for heterogeneity in 
nationhood.  
Posing one of the most famous critiques, Partha Chatterjee (1993) 
questions Anderson’s proposition of the postcolonial nation-making as based 
on the model already provided by the colonizers. In an essay titled titled 
“Whose Imagined Community?”, he argues that there are two different 
domains in anti-colonial nationalism: the material (that of the colonial) and the 
spiritual or “inner” domain 25  (of the colonized) that are reciprocally 
                                                 
24 The impact of Anderson’s seminal work extends beyond studies on nationhood. Countless 
studies focus on the institutions involved in instilling the imagining of particular nation (cf. 
Foster 1995), like the press (cf. Adam 1995), political events and public figures (cf. Elson, 
2008) or popular culture (cf. Edensor 2002). Anderson’s “imagined community” clearly 
influenced Billig’s notion of “banal nationalism” (1995), defined as the reproducing of the 
nation through the “flagging” or “reminding of nationhood” embodied in the small, seemingly 
insignificant practices of daily life (Billig 1995).  
In recent years, the notion is applied to other forms of communities aside of nationhood, e.g. 
international community (cf. Malkki 1994; Cayla and Eckhardt 2008) or the virtual 
community (cf. Gruzd et al 2011). Some studies take into account mobility and focus on the 
imagined community of the diasporic population (Chavez 1994; Kanno and Norton 2003), 
while others focus on the presence of diasporic population on the host nation’s imagination 
(Graeme 2003; Gavrilos 2002). Most of these studies are inspired by the idea that the 
formation of a community does not necessitate direct face-to-face encounter between its 
members. 
25 The outer or material domain is exemplified by the economy, statecraft, science, 
technology. Spiritual or “inner” domain is, for instance, the family, the growth of Bengali 
language in printing, drama, etc (Chatterjee 1993). 
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responsible for each other’s emergence. Anti-colonial nationalism is not 
modelled on imaginings of the colonial state but predicated on differences 
with the latter (Chatterjee 1993). Anderson only focused on the former that is 
more contiguous with colonial discourses, while neglecting the latter. In 
another work, Chatterjee (2005) argues that  homogenous, empty time is 
“utopian”, as people’s understanding and experience of the national history is 
not uniform. As Chatterjee concisely states, “The nation, even if it was being 
constituted through such events, existed only in heterogeneous time (2005: 
933).”  
Similarly, Homi Bhabha argues that there is another narrative aside 
from the dominant and official. The nation moves on a “double-time 
narrative”, that is the “pedagogical” and the “performative” (1994). The 
pedagogical is the narrative of the state and its various embodiments; the 
government, the education system26 etc, while the performative narrative is 
embedded in routine practices through which people give meanings to nation 
and destabilizes the nation’s pedagogic narrative (Bhabha 1994).  
Chatterjee as well as Bhabha examine the multiple layers (using the 
term domain and narrative respectively) that co-exist simultaneously, either in 
one particular group of people, or in one text. 27 My research on the other 
                                                 
26 The pedagogic finds its authority in the “immemorial past” and stretch out to a “limitless 
future” while the performative “…the signs of a national culture…” is made from “…the 
scraps, patches and rags of daily life” (Bhabha 1994: 145). Nana’s response to Sukarno’s 
grand narrative could be seen as exemplifying the tension between the performative and the 
pedagogic narrative. 
27 Other scholars that have criticized Anderson’s emphasis on homogeneity are Akhil Gupta 
(2004) and Prasenjit Duara (1995). In an argument resonating Nairn’s, Akhil Gupta points out 
that the modularity proposed by Anderson presupposes a time-lag between the first nations 
and the later ones that induces a sense of lack. For the third world country, the utopian ideal of 
their nation lies in the promise of a better future, when they have once and for all reached the 
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hand, is focused on the imaginings formed in spatially dispersed groups of 
young people. Moreover, I give more attention to the sociohistorical and 
political situatedness that informs the construction of the nation. In this sense, 
my work is closer to anthropology than to history or literary theories. 
An example of a research that takes into account the sociohistorical 
context in the conception of the imagined community, is Bowman’s “A 
Country of Words”, 28 although he uses literary text to infer about the authors’ 
imagination of Palestine. Depending on whether one is a refugee, an expatriate 
or resident of the Occupied Territory, the construction of “Palestine” differs. 
From the point of view of a writer-refugee, the community of Palestinian 
people is first and foremost those who share the experience of having been in a 
refugee camp while the “Others” 29 are not only the Israeli, but also the “Arab” 
and anyone who exploited them in their exile. On the other hand, for an 
educated author who flees before the war with Israel started, the Palestinian 
community is marked by loss and a sense of being away from home. Here, the 
Other that needs to be defeated are forgetting and misinformation. For the 
third author, who remains in the Occupied Territory, the Other is Israel, and 
                                                                                                                                
same stage of development as the western nations. This forms the cornerstone of many 
nationalist projects in third world countries. (Gupta 2004). 
Prasenjit Duara (1995) argues that the nation is “polyphonic”. The break by modernity that 
eventually formed national consciousness as assumed by theorists like Anderson or Gellner 
did not take place. The same dynamics of boundary construction responsible for the sense of 
community as a coherent unit have always been at play, in the pre-modern period as well as in 
the modern times. Duara asserts the significance of perceived “Others” and the interplay with 
other identities  in the continuous drawing and redrawing of the boundaries of communities 
and nations (Duara 1995:15-16).  
28 See also Smith’s and Jackson’s (1999) longitudinal study on Ukrainians in Bradford, UK 
and identified generational and gender differences regarding the idea of “Ukraine”. 
29 Drawing from Laclau and Mouffe, Bowman uses the term “antagonist” and “antagonism” to 
refer to the constitutive other. More on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory later. 
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the contrasting “us” consists of a wider range of people ; women, peasants, 
academics, professionals, etc. Bowman shows that there are multiple 
imaginings of a nation. 
 Anderson’s work has concentrated on homogeneity, whether it is 
within a nation (through “horizontal comradeship”) as well as between nations 
(e.g. with last wave nations modelled on earlier, colonizing nations as 
models). A number of scholars have pointed out that the imagining of the 
nation is much more heterogeneous, complex and dynamic. The dissertation is 
in line with this latter argument. Throughout the chapters, I will address how 
young people in Jakarta, Kupang and Banda Aceh have different imaginings 
of Indonesia. In many ways, the thesis resonates with Bowman’s research. I 
also argue that the imagining of a community is heterogenous and context-
bound. Significantly, I am also using Laclau and Mouffe’s theory about the 
construction of hegemony to theorize about the unfixed imaginings of the 
nation. 
1.3 The Hegemonic Construction of the Nation 
Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, I propose that the construction of the 
nation could be better understood as the workings of hegemony. Torfing 
(1999: 302) defines hegemony in the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theory as “The achievement of a moral, intellectual and political 
leadership….It involves the expansion of a particular discourse of norms, 
values, views and perceptions through persuasive re-descriptions of the 
world.” The process of re-describing the world involves temporarily fixing 
meanings out of heterogenity and undecidability. This means the these re-
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descriptions are marked by contingency and incompleteness (Glynos and 
Howarth 2005).  The focus of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony on the 
contingency of hegemony is useful to understand that hegemonic 
constructions of nationhood can not be absolute. 
The works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe can be situated 
within a post-structuralist and post-Marxist line of thought. Their intellectual 
trajectory can be traced from a Gramscian critique against structural Marxism, 
to a critique of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony for its failure to shed 
Marxism’s essentialism and privileging of class (Torfing 1999; Critchley and 
Marchart 2004). Hence, Laclau and Mouffe offer an understanding of 
hegemony that is not overdetermined by a privileging of class, and is more 
open and complexly constructed than the theory of Gramsci’s hegemony.  
Laclau and Mouffe, as mentioned earlier, postulate that hegemony 
involves articulatory practices that partially fix meaning and in so doing form 
discursive structures. In “On Imagined Communities” (Laclau 2003), an 
article in Grounds of Comparison around the Work of Benedict Anderson 
(2003), a multiauthor volume specifically dealing with Anderson’s theory, 
Laclau points out that the imagination of the nation is a relatively coherent 
image formed by totalizing, homogenizing forces out of a heterogeneous 
terrain. 30 The workings of creating relative coherency out of incoherence is 
the central interest in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory. 
                                                 
30 Laclau’s response to Anderson is not included in the previous section because the latter is 
limited to works that specifically challenges the singularity of Anderson’s theory. In “On 
Imagined Communities” Laclau focuses more on the importance of empty signifier in 
constructing the imaginary and also argues that the “community” should not be understood 




The construction of hegemony involves articulating sameness and 
difference. 31  Articulation involves the working of two logics: the logic of 
equivalence and the logic of difference (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001). The 
logic of equivalence highlights sameness between different elements and so 
construct a chain of equivalence. This is the logic of the hegemonic discourses 
that structure the idea of Indonesia as a coherent unity (as exemplified by the 
idea of “Sabang sampai Merauke” in Sukarno’s speech at the opening of this 
chapter). Differences between the elements are subsumed by privileging 
difference with the exterior, “they are equivalent not insofar as they share a 
positive property…but, crucially, insofar as they have a common enemy” 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007: 144). This “common enemy”, the constitutive 
outside, is also known as “antagonism”. Throughout Indonesia’s history, the 
antagonists have shifted depending on the context. The Dutch colonizers, the 
western imperialist, the communist party, all have been positioned as the 
antagonists at some point. As the subsequent chapters will show, in the recent 
period, Malaysia has become the antagonism for youth in Jakarta, while for 
some in Banda Aceh, Indonesia is the antagonist element.  
Other than by distinguishing itself from the constitutive outside, the 
chain of equivalence is often drawn by an “empty signifier” (Laclau 2003; 
2007), that is, a signifier that does not refer to a particular signified but 
                                                 
31 The important role of an externality in the construction of a subject has been proposed by 
other theorists as well, e.g. Fredrik Barth, Anthony Cohen and, in the context of national 
identity, Michael Billig. In a classic work on ethnicity and boundaries, Barth argues that the 
boundaries of ethnic groups “defines the groups, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 
1982: 15). Similarly, Cohen (1985) proposes that symbolic boundaries are constructed to give 
substance to belongingness to a community. Billig (1995) poses a theory of national identity 
that is not only as an extension of Anderson, but also drawn from Social Identity Theory that 
postulates that an identity is formed by categorizing the “self” as different from “them”.  What 
differentiates Laclau and Mouffe from Barth, Cohen and Billig is that the former’s account of 
the unstable and open character of these social formations is relatively more elaborated. 
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represents an (illusive and absent) totality. It means “everything and nothing” 
at once (Torfing 1999).  In the context of Indonesia, “progress”, “anti-
colonialism”, “independence”, and recently, “reformasi”, are some examples 
of empty signifiers that have been crucial in the construction of the chain, In a 
way, this dissertation treates “Indonesia” as an empty signifier. The signifier 
“Indonesia” does not refer to a particular signified (hence, the different 
imaginings of Indonesia among its people), and yet represents some sort of 
totality. As with most theories of nationhood, in Anderson’s imagined 
community (constructed, as we recall, through homogeneous empty time, a 
sense of comradeship and two modes of serialities) the chain of equivalence 
predominates. The logic of difference on the contrary, is the force that disrupts 
this chain of equivalence by drawing on other, alternative discourses (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007). One could argue that ethnicity, religion, or even 
cosmopolitanism could impose the logic of difference in a particular society. 
In instances where the logic of difference overrules the logic of equivalence, 
the alternative discourse to Indonesia is more salient than the nation. This is 
for instance the case in Banda Aceh. Among a group of young people, Aceh 
becomes the logic of difference that disrupts the hegemonic discourse of the 
state (this means of course that Aceh in itself becomes the main chain of 
equivalence that erases intra-Aceh differences). In the two other cities, the 
logic of difference is present in various forms (stronger in Kupang than in 
Jakarta), but these are not strong enough to provide contending discourses. 
To sum up, hegemony is constructed by the tense interplay between the 
logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Applying this framework to 
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“imagined community” opens the possibility for a more detailed examination 
of the instability and openness involved in the workings of the imagination. In 
this dissertation, the term “homogenizing” force will be used to refer to the 
processes in the construction of the logic of equivalence (e.g. the invented 
history regarding Majapahit as proto-Indonesia), while “heterogeneity” is used 
to refer to the alternative discourses proffered in the logic of difference (e.g. 
dissents, reactions, resistance from the ground up).  
1.4 Tracing the Discursive Production of Indonesia 
This section will outline a number of important studies that have dealt 
with the discursive production of Indonesia. The trajectory of the formation of 
Indonesia as a nation-state is well chartered in an expansive body of work, 
grounded in the understanding of Indonesia as a modern invention: “modern” 
in the temporal sense, as well as of a particular paradigm that have made 
nation-state a universal mode of organization and of expression of collective 
sovereignty. Given the relatively short genealogy of Indonesia, many studies 
concentrate on the interplay of various forces involved in the invention of 
Indonesia, or the process of what Ali Moertopo, one of the ideologues of the 
New Order termed, “Indonesianizing Indonesians”. 32  
Aside from this shared interest in the discursive formation of 
Indonesia, the studies diverge in many aspects: some provide general 
                                                 
32This was a speech given in 1980 in Moertopo’s function as information minister. He argued 
that the purpose of P4 (“Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila”, roughly 
translatable as “Guideline to the Internalization and Implementation of Pancasila”) is “to 
Indonesianise Indonesians”. In this speech, he reasoned that Pancasila is at once the nation’s 
philosophy, the state’s ideology and the outlook and way of being of every Indonesian. Due to 
Pancasila, “…conflict is impossible, quarrels are impossible, differences in values are 
impossible” (Hadiz and Bourchier 2003: 111). This is one example of the homogenizing force 
that was particularly prevalent during the New Order. 
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overviews of the collective history of Indonesia while others focus on the 
personal as the political or on particular events, regions or discursive 
institutions. In accordance to the argument of this thesis, in outlining the 
existing literature, I will make a distinction between those that concentrate 
mainly on the hegemonic forces in unifying Indonesia, and those that look at 
the various ways in which these forces are negotiated and appropriated, or in 
the terms of Laclau and Mouffe, the logic of equivalence (unifying forces) and 
the logic of difference (negotiation and appropriation) respectively. I will start 
with the former. In a way, the following works can be seen as chartering the 
dominant forces to which my informants are exposed to. My own research 
however, is more interested in how people actually negotiate and appropriate 
these dominant ideas, thus more in line with the second type of works. 
A prominent form of work on Indonesia is the historical account 
covering the nation’s trajectory over a long period of time. Authoritative in 
this genre is Ricklefs’ “A History of Modern Indonesia” ([1981] 2008) that 
covers a span of eight centuries.  Less extensive than Ricklefs’, but 
considerably more centred on the processes that have led to the formation of 
Indonesia and the continuous reproduction of the idea of a nation-state are the 
works of numerous authors, like Vickers (2005), Taylor (2003) and Elson 
(2008). 33 These writings provide a broad overview of the trajectory of the idea 
                                                 
33 Despite the similar overview of Indonesia given, each author tries to juggle between the 
need for clarity of writing and the realization that there are multiple historical narratives of 
Indonesia. Vickers combines the larger-scale narrative of Indonesian history with personal 
insights from the novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Taylor impressively interweaves histories 
of regional communities prior to the formation of Indonesia and traces how they become a 
nation-state. Her “capsules” often contain stories of individuals situated in a particular 
historical context. Taking a different perspective, Elson clearly state upfront that he chose the 
point of view of political leaders and thinkers. 
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of Indonesia: the various colonial policies that sedimented into nationalist 
ideas in the later years of Dutch colonialism, 34 the debate between nationalist 
and Islamist factions in formulating the preamble to the constitution, 35 
Sukarno’s anti-colonial nationalism, 36  the invention of the pre-colonial 
Majapahit kingdom as the embryo of Indonesia, 37 the Youth Pledge as the 
birth of modern Indonesia, communism as the New Order’s antagonism, 38 and 
the latter’s politicization of culture and the silencing of dissents. 39 It is in these 
                                                 
34 For instance, Taylor pointed out how modern institutions like transportation, post offices, 
schools, banks, clinics, research stations and government offices “...introduced uniformity in 
many aspects of life” in the late 19th century (2003: 238).  
35 The debate revolves the first principle asserting that adherence of Islam should oblige to the 
Islamic law.  The assertion was eventually not included in the preamble, due to pressure from 
non-Muslim regions (Elson 2008; 2009), a decision that created discontent among the Muslim 
groups and proscribed animism and polytheism (Hefner 2000). 
36 An example of Sukarno’s anti-colonial nationalism is the “Konfrontasi” or “confrontation” 
against the formation of Malaysia. He saw the move as a means for the British force to 
continue its presence in the region. For Sukarno, “Konfrontasi” was a chance to fire up the 
revolutionary spirit again (Ricklefs [1981] 2008). Comparing this historical fact with the 
antagonism of Malaysia in the narratives of youth in Jakarta (see chapter 4) reveals the shift 
regarding the attitude towards the “West”. Whereas Sukarno’s antipathy was a statement of 
anti-imperialism, Jakarta’s youth’s dislike of Malaysia is embedded in the desire to be 
recognized by the “West”. 
37 In the official historiography, the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom Majapahit (13-15th BC, centred 
on East Java) is presented as the proto-Indonesia. The historiography is based on the 
Nagarakertagama, a long poem from 1365 that described Majapahit’s rule over yawabhumi 
(Java) and nusantara (other, farther islands), a territory imagined to be coextensive with 
current day Indonesia (Wood 2005). Muhamad Yamin, one of the most important figures in 
the early independence period asserted that Indonesia is a ‘heirloom’ of Majapahit (Elson 
2008). Both Sukarno as well as Suharto used the myth of Majapahit to advance their interests. 
Sukarno projected a version of Indonesia as modern-day Majapahit, while Suharto used it to 
justify the (Javanese) domination (Taylor 2003). 
38 Authors who concentrate on the New Order’s government, like Vatikiotis (1998) note how 
communism continued to be presented as a threat, for instance, by the screening of family 
members of ex-communists. 
39 The New Order employs a stronger control of the society. Anderson (1983b) proposes that 
the New Order could be understood as a “resurrection of state and its triumph vis-a-vis society 
and the nation” (p. 487). Many strategies were employed to keep dissent under control, i.e. 
through the “normalization” of campus that prohibited students from demonstrating, the 
compulsory attendance of P4 sessions for students and civil servants, the censorship of the 
press, etc (Vatikiotis1998). 
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works that the hegemonizing forces involved in the construction of a unitary 
Indonesia are most extensively outlined.  
Other authors focus on how particular institutions play part in the 
construction of Indonesia. Adam (1995) closely follows Anderson and 
explores the development of print capitalism in the colonial Indonesia and its 
relation to the emergence of “Indonesian consciousness” in the early 20th 
century, following earlier publications by Europeans, Eurasians and Chinese. 
For a small group of native literati, vernacular press signified modern values 
like progress, enlightenment, civilization and respect from the non-natives 
(Adam 1995). 
A number of other scholars turn towards the study of history itself. 
Wood (2005) examines the invention of the Hindu kingdom Majapahit in 
national history and the privileging of Javanese norms and traditions at the 
expense of alternative histories, like that of the Muslim community. 40 
McGregor (2007) concentrates on the construction of Indonesian history and 
argues that the military has used history to strengthen its legitimacy and to 
create a sense of perpetual threat in the form of communist ideologies. 
Another homogenizing strategy of the New Order that has attracted 
significant academic attention, and substantially emerges in my data, is the 
New Order’s politicization of culture. Pemberton (1994) argues that the New 
Order –inspired by longstanding Javanese strategies to face the Dutch’s 
occupation- used the discourse of “culture”, “tradition” and “ritual” to portray 
a sense of stability, while at the same time downplaying repression, including 
                                                 
40 Thus, the imagined geography of Indonesia as consisting of “Java and the Outer Islands” is 
not only caused by different economic experiences during the colonial period (cf Dick 2002), 
but continues to be perpetuated through the idea of Majapahit as proto-Indonesia. 
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the violent string of events in 1965 through which the New Order seized 
power. “Tradition” and “diversity” erase local particularities and practices 
(Pemberton 1994) became the empty signifiers. A folklorizing and 
essentializing definition of culture was employed, reducing the richness and 
fluidity of various practices to mere tangible arts and performances that are 
fixed and originated in the times immemorial. Aside from erasing memories of 
violence and dissent, this is also a strategy to pre-empt the divisive potential of 
cultural differences among various ethnicities in Indonesia. Schefold (1998) 
calls the strategy a “domestication” of culture that ensures that culture no 
longer contains the potential power to disrupt unity. This discourse of culture 
was exceptionally visible in Jakarta, while contesting discourses of culture 
were identifiable in Kupang and Banda Aceh. 
Historically oriented and focused on economics, Dick et al (2002) 
study the emergence of a national economy and implicitly show that the 
division between Java and the Outer Islands could be retraced to pre-colonial 
political economic systems in the area. While the trade of Java and the 
Moluccas have been under the auspices of the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) since 1619, the trade systems of other islands were more integrated 
with the other parts of South-east Asia, concentrated on current day Singapore. 
It was only in the early 20th century after the complete conquest of the 
archipelago, that the leaders of the Outer Islands ceased to give concessions to 
Singapore-based traders and reallocated them to Dutch shipping lines and 
banks based in Java (Dick et al 2002). 
Implied in the discussion of these works is an outline of the hegemonic 
construction of Indonesia. The modern nature of country is concealed in a 
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narrative that portrays the nation as originating in the faraway past of the 
mythical Majapahit. People from this nation share a common “tradition” and 
“culture”. Politically, it is a sovereign nation, distinguishing itself from the 
Dutch, Malaysia, and the more general “communists” (often overlapping with 
“atheists”). Culturally, politically and economically, Java is a dominant power 
vis a vis the so-called “Outer Islands”, to which East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa 
Tenggara Timur, or NTT) and Aceh belong. These are the foundations of the 
chain of equivalence that construct “Indonesia”. The hegemonic discourse of 
Indonesia is touched on in a number of photographs that I have used to elicit 
responses (e.g. through photographs of people wearing batik, children saluting 
the flag, Jakarta’s skyline as potential symbols of progress, etc.) to see 
whether and how these are perceived by individuals. 
Despite the aforementioned homogenizing forces, the official narrative 
of Indonesia is not unproblematically shared by all inhabitants of the territory 
and form a coherent “imagined community”. This is in line with what I aim to 
show in my dissertation. Anthropological studies that concentrate on particular 
communities (whether defined by territory and/or ethnic identity) reveal how 
they negotiate with the –often imposed- supra-identity of being an 
Indonesian.41 This is where the logic of difference becomes visible. Kipp’s 
“Dissociated Identities” (1996) looks at the shifts in Karo identities in the 
larger social dynamics of Indonesia. Kipp provides many examples to show 
how the New Order’s politicization of culture, its policies regarding religion 
                                                 
41 Other studies that have been done are for instance, MacRae (2010) study on “ajeg Bali”, a 
campaign to protect Bali from outsiders, the latter including migrants from other parts of 
Indonesia and the Indonesian state. Wee (2002) examines the politicization of ethno-historical 




and prohibition to discuss particular differences work for some Karo (the 
upper class, urban-dwelling Karo) but less for others (e.g. those who stay in 
the more homogeneous Karo region). 42  
Other studies focus on other groups that have been marginalized by the 
New Order. Beginning to Remember, a multi-author volume edited by 
Zurbuchen (2005) reveals the ways that the forgotten past (e.g. the anti-
communist massacre, the separatist movements in the 1950s in Celebes), 
necessary for nation-building, lingers in the Indonesian present. 43  Despite 
homogenizing efforts through the official historiography or the politicization 
of culture, diverging memories remain, whether in personal stories, as well in 
performances or writings for public. 44  
A more extreme response to the state’s homogenization has taken place 
in Aceh. Indonesia’s nation building did not override allegiance to Aceh. If 
anything, the Special Status granted to Aceh, as a strategy to maintain the 
country’s unity, backfired because it reinforced the ethnic identity without 
fulfilling the regional demands, and so strengthens the idea that Aceh is 
                                                 
42 Thus for instance, prominent display of ethnic identity, in compliance with the New Order 
folklorizing fashion, is more often done in Jakarta than in the Karo region, precisely to show 
the distinctiveness of Karo-Batak vis a vis the more famous Toba-Batak people. Similarly, 
Karo weddings in the big cities, like Jakarta, have become a means to showcase one’s 
“cultural identity” despite most urban Karo people no longer upholding traditional kinship 
rules. 
43 Thus, a number of chapters address how the New Order’s concealment of the 1965 anti-
communist massacre, partly through the constructed importance of “ritual” and “tradition”, 
does not completely erase the memories. They remain in the Indonesian present: in an 
individual’s memory, in art performance, etc. 
44 Similarly, Conroe (2012) shows that despite the very strong New Order narrative on 
communism, the transmission of memory about the imprisonment between the former 
prisoners and their children take place in various ways: at times it can be precisely instigated 
by embodiments of the New Order’s narrative (e.g. the G30SPKI film that school children 
were compelled to watch) while often, it is also the opacity and the silences about the parents’ 




entitled to be a nation in itself (Aspinall 2007). In chapter 5, I will present how 
this narrative continues to be reproduced at the time of fieldwork. 
These latter works from the point of view of the marginalized indicate 
that homogenizing forces generate heterogeneity in the form of responses (in 
forms of negotiations, rejections, resistance etc.) to the unifying force. To 
return to Anderson’s thesis, these works show that there are multiple 
imaginings of a nation, partly precisely because of the forces that aimed to 
construct a singular imagining.  
It is this heterogeneity of imaginings that I wish to draw attention to 
through my thesis. Like these studies, my work aims at examining the 
construction of the nation-state. Taking a different direction than most existing 
works that engage in historical or political analysis, I have opted to frame the 
idea of the nation as a cultural imaginary.  
I have also opted to engage with non-elite young people instead of elite 
social actors. My informants do not occupy the visible positions of public 
figures; they are not well-known political activists, scholars or artists. In so 
doing, I wish to capture, however fleetingly, the way Indonesia is imagined by 
“ordinary” people. In a way, this is a response to Elson’s (2008) calling for a 
much needed study on “...the popular reception (or otherwise) of the idea of 
Indonesia among Indonesians themselves (p.xxiv).” 
 
1.5 Outline of Work 
Following this introductionary chapter, Chapter 2 addresses the 
methodology of the study. The imagining of the nation is highly abstract and 
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taken for granted: it is safe to assume that most informants do not reflect on it 
independently on a day-to-day basis, apart from specific contexts, such as 
from the compulsory civics classes. To stimulate thoughts about Indonesia 
while at the same time avoiding replicating the civics education setting, I 
conducted photo-elicited interviews. The photos were pre-selected by me 
based on a prior observation of the issues in the public discourse that are 
related to nationhood. Photographs, and images in general, have a polysemic 
quality. They are at once anchored in concrete objects but are open to various 
interpretations and associations to many different things. This accommodates 
discussions about abstract concepts. A brief outline of the history, assumptions 
and advantages of this method is provided in the first part the chapter. The 
subsequent part details the data collection process, including the list of the 
photographs used and the demographic data of the interviewees. In total, I 
interviewed 70 young people and conducted five additional “conventional” 
interviews with adults working in fields related to youth culture. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the analysis and findings of the study. 
The framework for the analysis is Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony. 
The data suggests that there are shared and divergent conceptions of 
Indonesian nationhood. Young people in the three sites share the idea that 
belongingness to Indonesia is, or should be, defined by cultural and natural 
characteristics, and by membership of a group (i.e. the Indonesian state) that 
should aim to ensure the fulfilment of the members’ common interest. While 
these are the shared framework of Indonesia as a “community”, diverging 
imaginings of Indonesia are found. The chain of equivalence is not constructed 
identically in the three places; “Indonesia” is a seamless entity in Jakarta. 
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Antagonism is provided by Malaysia that is positioned as the main nemesis in 
vying for recognition by the international world. From Kupang, the logic of 
difference is relatively more visible. “Indonesia” is perceived as consisting of 
many sub-national groups each with their own culture and customs. 
“Indonesia” is mostly perceived in terms of an organization.  In Banda Aceh,  
Indonesia is imagined as an entity different from Aceh, at times even 
positioned as the antagonistic other. In other words, some imaginings of 
Indonesia are shared, while others are not. 
The next three chapters discuss in more details the imaginings of 
Indonesia as produced by situated interpretations of the photographs in the 
three sites. Chapter 4 focuses on the construction of Indonesia by Jakarta’s 
youth. For the inhabitants of the seat of economic and political power, 
Indonesia as an unquestionable entity is self-evident. Interregional differences 
and disparities are less salient. People are aware of interregional discrepancies, 
but frame it less as a form of inequality than as an accepted and acceptable 
condition. The central concern of youth in Jakarta is Indonesia’s standing in 
the international community: this is the source of an overwhelming sense of 
inferiority and anxiety. Imaginings of Indonesia (especially negative ones) are 
based on the imaginary gaze of the international community. The latter could 
hence be framed as a desirable Lacanian other that plays a significant force in 
the construction of Indonesia. 
Chapter 5 details the imaginings of Indonesia as perceived by youth in 
Kupang. Interregional difference is more salient for them. Kupang is 
positioned between the developed Java and the underdeveloped Papua. The 
nation contains many entities, based on race, ethnicity, economic 
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development, religion etc. The interrelation between these identity-groups are 
not necessarily harmonious as each struggle for their own survival. For youth 
in Kupang, “Indonesia” as a state seems to be more relevant as their 
interactions with state institutions and government officials is a key to 
survival. Neo-patrimonial ideas and practices can be identified, as the various 
forms of capital obtained from dealings with state bodies are used for and 
redistributed through smaller groups of network. 
Chapter 6 gives an elaboration of the imaginings of Indonesia by youth 
in Banda Aceh. Significantly different from narratives from Kupang and 
Jakarta, “Indonesia” in Aceh is a considered as another entity outside of Aceh, 
the belongingness of the latter to Indonesia is optional and debatable. There 
are two co-existing narratives of Indonesia’s relation to Aceh, what I term as 
“Indonesia as antagonism” and “Indonesia as compromise”. The first one 
argues that Aceh should be independent, while the second one sees the current 
inclusion with Indonesia as acceptable. Both narratives could be seen as 
different means to the same goal, that is, Aceh’s development and prosperity. 
The conclusion to the dissertation is given in Chapter 7. The points of 
conjuncture and disjuncture in the imagination of the nation among young 
people in the three research sites support the initial argument that there are 
plural imaginings of the nation. As any other constructed social entity, 
imaginings of the nation are unstable and open. In line with standpoint theory, 
the dissertation will show that the geo-political situatedness of the sites plays a 
part in how Indonesia is imagined by its young inhabitants. To return to the 
quotes at the beginning of this chapter, “Dari Sabang sampai Merauke” is not 
imagined uniformly by the people living within the stated boundaries. 
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2 METHODOLOGY: THE PROBLEM WITH THE 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
While the research question itself is simple and straightforward, 
delving into the conceptualizations about Indonesia and/or Indonesians by 
young people is a more challenging pursuit. Nationhood is a highly abstract 
concept. Between the everyday hassles that being on the transition to 
adulthood entail, the average young person living in a peaceful period in a 
relatively established country would not find “the nation” a relevant or 
important object to consciously reflect on. Yet, it does not mean that concepts 
and imaginaries about Indonesia are absent. As Bowman (1994) stated in his 
study about different imaginations of Palestine, studying national identity as a 
discursive production implies that one should recognize it as connoted by the 
everyday experience although it is “never actually evidenced in full” (p.141). 
Even though reflections and articulations about the nation are embedded 
within these daily concerns, relying on observations of "ordinary" young 
people's daily lives and looking for patterns and “evidence” that imply their 
understanding of Indonesia might not be achievable in one year (October 
2009-Sept 2010).  
A logical resolution would be to employ a more straightforward 
method where people are asked direct questions. However, in the context of 
Indonesia, posing direct and overt questions in the vein of "tell me what 
Indonesia means to you?" risks eliciting repetitions of standard and official 
narratives, drawn from the dominant and state-sanctioned reservoir of notions 
of nationhood. In the educational setting, questions about nationhood were 
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posed to youngsters by authoritative figures like teachers and, more often than 
not, expected to be responded to by a set of normative answers. I was 
determined to avoid the replication of this experience during fieldwork as my 
main interest was not in the official discourse per se. In other words, the main 
challenge of the fieldwork was to maintain the balance between explicitly 
requiring informants to formulate their understanding about Indonesia, and 
avoiding mere repetitions of official discourses due to interviewee bias.  
It is with these issues in mind that I decided to generate data using 
photo elicitation interviews in addition to conventional ethnographic methods 
of participant observations. Realizing the popularity of photo sharing 
applications on social media, and the easiness by which people comment on 
each other's photographs, I opted to imitate this virtual activity in the data 
collection process. Employing a less conventional means of data collection, it 
is only necessary that a large part of this chapter is spent on addressing this 
less known method.  
The next part will cover the theoretical assumptions and history of 
photo-elicitation interview, followed by a detailed account of the fieldwork in 
the three different cities.  
2.1 Photo Elicitation Interview Method 
At its core, photo elicitation interview method involves the use of a set 
of pictures as points of references on which interviewees are asked to 
comment. The method was first developed by Collier, a photographer and 
researcher who used photographs in a study on mental health and changing 
communities (1957). He and his team employed photographs in two ways: as 
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means to survey the environment, and to conduct interviews (Collier 1957). 
For the first task, Collier took photographs of houses in Stirling County, 
Canada, and concluded that the use of pictures resulted in a higher reliability 
of the accounts of the visual impressions across different research team 
members. Furthermore, to study the effectiveness of photographs for 
interview, Collier divided the interviewees into two groups: an experimental 
group was interviewed using photographs, and the control group underwent 
“traditional” interviews. He concluded that photo-elicited interviews could 
divulge “spontaneous revelations of highly-charged emotional nature” (p. 858) 
and at the same time, generate more specific and concrete information. 
Traditional interviews, on the contrary, generate responses that are less 
structured and “freer in association” (Collier 1957). Even though Collier 
seems to argue that photo-elicitation interview provides less space for free 
association, I disagree with this. Visual cues could lead informants to draw 
from a rich repertoire of knowledge, beliefs and opinions that might not be 
readily recalled using “traditional” interviews.  My own use of photo 
elicitation interviews is partly due to the possibility of free association. 
In the subsequent development of the method, the photo elicitation 
interview is considered to be an effective instrument to delve into the 
“subjective” realm. In an authoritative treatise on photo elicitation method, 
Harper (2002), proposes that the photographs in photo elicitation method can 
be spread along a continuum; from a visual inventory as a form of scientific 
data, to a tool to collect the “intimate dimensions of the social” (p. 13). An 
example of the latter is a “photo-novella” or “photo-voice” research where 
subjects are asked to provide photographs regarding a particular theme 
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(Hurworth 2005) and so revealing “what matters” to them and their 
interpretation of the world.  Between the two extremes of this continuum is the 
use of pre-selected images in the interviews. These images depict events from 
a collective past, thus not necessarily experienced by the actual subject 
(Harper 2002). This is where my method is situated. I have collected a set of 
photographs that depicts events or issues related to nationhood and youth, and 
subsequently asked my subjects to comment on them. The following 
elaboration addresses the use of photographs that does not aim to obtain 
“objective” and “scientific” data, unlike Collier’s initial use of pictures.  
One of the underlying assumptions of the use of photographs is that 
people interpret new, visual cues according to pre-existing dispositions; 
knowledge, beliefs, attitudes etc. In this regard, photo elicitation method 
shares similarities with projective techniques mostly used in the setting of 
clinical psychology. Harper draws similarities with Rorshach inkblot test 
(2002) while Hinthorne (2012), who used drawings to elicit opinions about 
democracy in Madagascar, professed that her “Visual Interpretation Narrative 
Experience” (VINE), is inspired by modifications of the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT) where subjects’ underlying psychodynamics are 
assessed based on stories they create about a set of images. One major 
difference between photo elicitation method in sociology and anthropology, 
and projective tests employed in the field of psychology lies in the assumption 
regarding the relation between culture and interpretation. In psychology, it is 
assumed that there are normative, culture-blind interpretations to the visual 
cues (in comparison to which one can assess the “normalcy” of the individual 
tested), whereas in anthropology and sociology it precisely the contrary 
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assumption that holds ground i.e. that images and the interpretation of them 
are embedded in a system of knowledge and beliefs that are specific to 
particular cultures and societies. 
Advantages of Photo Elicitation Method 
As mentioned earlier, the decision to use photo elicitation method was 
driven by a concern to convey the research question in such a way that it aids 
the interviewees to articulate and formulate a highly abstract notion, while 
steering clear of hollow repetitions of the official discourse. There are a 
numbers of aspects regarding photo elicitation interview that facilitate this. 
The first two advantages of photo elicitation method are related to the 
nature of images: they are concrete, and yet, polysemic. Photographs depict 
actual objects around which discussions about abstract notions can be spun 
(Hurworth 2003; Hinthorne 2012). 45  In the context of my own research, 
instead of asking the informants “tell me what Indonesia means to you?” they 
were asked “tell me what you think this photograph is about”, thus shifting 
from a direct question about the notion of Indonesia, to one that is about a 
particular photograph. 
The second advantage of photo elicitation interview is due to the 
polysemic nature of images. Although the question seems to be limited to a 
particular photograph, theoretically the actual boundary is that of the 
interviewee’s imagination. As in projective tests, the nature of images entails 
that people interpret them according to pre-existing beliefs and current 
                                                 
45 This quality of photographs makes it possible to use them as aid for interviews with young 
children. Hurworth (2003) noted that photo elicitation method has been employed in studies 
where the subjects are as young as three years old. 
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preoccupations. Whereas asking about what one thinks about present day 
Indonesia subtly imposes an expectation that interviewees should already have 
an opinion on the matter, this is less the case with photographs. Subjects are 
free to interpret the images and do not necessarily have to relate them to the 
research question.  
Because there is more than one way through which a photograph could 
be interpreted, this interview method minimizes social desirability bias. The 
research question is less apparent to the informants, making it harder for them 
to adapt their answers to what they presume I want to hear. Thus, I have kept 
the instructions to a minimum. Like Hinthorne in her study about non-elite’s 
perception of democracy in Madagascar (2012), the first instruction I gave my 
informants were slight variations of “tell me what this is” while showing a 
photograph to the subjects. More often than not, subjects would start with 
topics related to the actual images on the pictures but subsequently would 
elaborate with other, related topics that reveal issues that are important to 
them. 46  
A third advantage of photo elicitation method is the impression of 
distance it gives between interviewees and their opinions. Because the 
discussions are about photographs, topics that are sensitive can be discussed in 
a less straightforward way. As Hinthorne (2012) recounts, this was the reason 
she shifted from using surveys and focus group discussion to VINE. Surveys 
                                                 
46 An example, a discussion around a photograph of a man holding an electoral ballot have led 
to stories of experiences with how to outwit the police, another representation of a state 
institution with which youth might have more frequent direct interaction with (interview with 




and focus group discussions were ineffective because her informants were 
reluctant to discuss democracy, let alone share their opinions about it. Once 
she changed her strategy and employed VINE, it turned out they were not 
averse to discussing caricatures that portray various aspects of democracy. 
This was also a major consideration in my research. Talking about Indonesia 
also means talking about what is not-Indonesia, embodied not only in other 
countries but also regions that have vied for independence. Wary that 
separatism might still be a taboo topic, especially in Banda Aceh, I included a 
photograph of the Timor Leste flag with a man in a traditional costume. This 
photograph turned out to be one of the most productive in eliciting notions of 
the conditions of belongingness to Indonesia. 
A fourth advantage of photo elicitation method is the shifting power 
structure between the interviewer and interviewee (Parker 2009). The 
interviewer no longer occupies the position as the party who is more 
knowledgeable. This is especially the case in photo-voice or auto-driven photo 
elicitation where the informants are in charge of taking pictures. In these two 
methods, the degree of agency of the informants is greater as they decide 
which images to bring to the table to represent particular themes. However, the 
emancipatory potential of photo elicitation method has been questioned. Photo 
voice method does not necessarily put the interviewer and the interviewee on 
equal grounds as some structural differences are harder to overcome (Packard 
2008). In his fieldwork that focuses on the lives of homeless people, he 
provided his subjects with cameras and requested them to take photographs. 
Packard noted that some subjects lack the mastery of photography techniques 
and many displayed uneasiness in explaining their images (Packard 2008).  
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In my own research, I did not conduct photo-voice method mainly due 
to logistic reasons and to maintain a degree of comparativeness between 
research sites. Providing informants with cameras was not a viable option. 
Assuming that everyone owns a mobile phone with camera features is not 
reasonable, and the act of asking whether they own mobile phones with the 
necessary level of sophistication would already be a potential cause of 
insecurity on the informants’ part that I did not want to risk. Thus for my 
fieldwork, I pre-selected the photographs. A common critique against this type 
of photo-elicitation method is the argument that by having authority over the 
selection of the pictures, the researcher frames the reality for the subjects. 
However, Becker (1979 in Emmison and Smith 2000) argues that this is not 
more biased than any other means of data generation like “conventional” 
interviews, where the questions are decided by the researcher. Moreover, I 
tried to treat the subjects as experts who are more knowledgeable about the 
images. This is done, for instance, by starting with photos that depict scenes 
typical to the research site, thus in Kupang I started with a photo of a bemo, 
the local transport, and in Banda Aceh with a photo of a coffee shop. Based on 
observations and conversations with locals prior to starting the interview 
phase, I realized that the local youth are proud of these objects and consider 
them to be unique to their regions. By using these pictures at the start of the 
interview, their position as “the expert” is established. 
2. 2 Data Collection 
This section focuses on the factors that played part in the data 
collection process. It is divided into four sections. The first one addresses the 
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images used in the interviews and the remaining three are accounts of the 
demographic background of the informants in each research site; Jakarta, 
Kupang and Banda Aceh. In the three places, fieldwork typically consists of 
an initial phase of observation and network building, followed by interviews 
along with participant observations. In the process, I also collected secondary 
data such as relevant news paper articles or products of local pop culture.  
 
2.2.1 Choice of Images 
The importance of the selection of photographs cannot be overstated. 
The photographs must be connected to the informants’ lives, either as part of 
the collective memory or individuals’ experience. Yet, they have to stay 
anchored to the research question, and contain elements that suggest, but not 
enforce, discussions of nationhood. In short, the photographs need to be 1) 
able to elicit attitudes/beliefs/opinions/perceptions of Indonesia that people do 
not often reflect on, and 2) minimize social desirability bias that might inform 
informants to merely repeat the official discourse. Ideally, the photographs 
should initiate discussions that, in terms of content, are parallel to everyday 
talks. As Fox and Miller-Idriss argue (2008), everyday talk is one of the 
domains through which “everyday nationhood” is constructed. To be able to 
have a set of photographs that could “speak” to the informants as well as 
making the informants talk, prior observations to obtain a sense of local 
knowledge/beliefs/concerns/interests are required. 
There were three realms from which I draw ideas for the photographs: 
the everyday local lives, popular/youth culture and historical landmarks in the 
46 
 
Indonesian history. For each research site, I took photographs of scenes that I 
consider to be iconic of the local youth’s culture, which means that the set of 
photographs used in the three sites are not identical. These “local” 
photographs need not to be explicitly related to the idea of nationhood, 
although in Kupang and Banda Aceh, they did elicit discussions about the 
local habits in contrast to the imagined national or international outside.  
A second domain was popular or youth culture. Based on initial 
observation, it was apparent that in 2009, especially in Jakarta, nationalism 
was running high; the first National Batik Day was celebrated widely, various 
brands organized promotional events taking up nationalism as its theme, the 
komodo dragon was shortlisted for the “New 7 Wonders of the World” 
competition, and the ASEAN Football Federation Cup between Indonesia and 
Malaysia saw people lining up at ticket booths for whole days prior to the 
match. A number of photographs were aimed at delving into these new 
expressions of nationalism and how they are constructed.  
I was also interested in a number of current events that did not attract 
as much attention from the young population because I perceive them to be 
able to open up discussions about nationhood and being Indonesian. Examples 
of this are the 2009 Miss Indonesia and Putri Indonesia beauty pageantries. 
The winner crowned as Miss Indonesia 2009 was an American-Indonesian 
with little ability to speak Indonesian, and the Putri Indonesia 2009 was a 
Jakarta-born Acehnese who caused controversy in Aceh for not covering her 
hair with a veil (jilbab). Although the latter created furore in Aceh, the 
former’s crowning of the title went uncontested across Indonesia. 
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A third strand was photographs that depict historical, national markers 
that played out during the informants’ lifetime. These are events that in the 
“elite” discourse- maintained by national and international politicians, 
academics and the media- are considered to be milestones in the trajectory of 
Indonesia. To maintain relevance to the informants’ lives, I tried to select 
photographs that depict events/activities/ideas that in some ways are relatable 
to the youth, like the portrait of Suharto that used to hang in every classroom, 
the 1998 students’ demonstration and the 2009 electoral ballot.  
There were a number of photographs that I considered using, but 
eventually refrained from doing so mainly because they do not portray scenes 
that the informants can relate to,47 are too directly related to particular themes 
regarding nationhood, 48  or due to the difficulty in obtaining a photo that 
sufficiently depicts a potential theme. 49 Although one could imagine that 
another set of photographs would lead to different of discussions in terms of 
content, the main research was less about youth’s perceptions of particular 
events/objects than about how these perceptions reveal their imaginings of 
Indonesia. In other words, the analysis was less about what young people think 
of the Komodo dragon, for instance, than about how, or whether, their 
                                                 
47 Examples of this is a photograph of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the miniature park often 
considered in academic works as the perfect materialization of Suharto’s imagined Indonesia. 
Although a popular among family with young children, it is less attractive for youth. 
Similarly, I refrained from using a photograph of Sukarno for the same reason. 
48 Example of these are a map of Indonesia and the Garuda 
49 I was interested to have my informants discuss inter-ethnic romantic relations, but did not 
manage to find a suitable photograph. The issue of inter-ethnic relation (although not 
necessarily in a romantic context) was elicited through other photographs, like the one on 
interracial youth group or the Balinese dancer.  
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perceptions of the Komodo implicate a particular conceptualization of 
Indonesia. 
During the fieldwork, it was not possible for me to have a lengthy pilot 
study to test the effectiveness of the photographs. However, if during the first 
few interviews some photographs proved to be unproductive in terms of 
eliciting information, they would not be used in the subsequent interviews. 
Photos were dropped or added from the set, depending on how elaborate the 
informants respond to them, 50 assuming that the length and depth of 
elaboration is in direct correlation with the connection one has with the image. 
Thus, the set of photographs is not fixed throughout the fieldwork.  
The following is a list of the photographs used in the three research 
sites. These photographs were shown to the informants in size 5R (5" x 7"; 
12.7cm x 17.78cm) in no particular order, except that B, C and D series were 
always shown at the beginning of the interview and A11 and A12 would be 
shown in succession. The decision to start the interview with the B, C and D 
series was made because these are the photographs that are based on local 
lives. This was a useful strategy to build rapport and establish the informants’ 
position as the party who is more knowledgeable than me. 
                                                 
50 Importantly, a photograph is considered productive when people respond to it elaborately, 
regardless of whether the response is related to nationhood or not. Thus for instance, the 
website banner “Malingsia” was dropped in Kupang because many informants do not spend 




Table 1. Photographs used in Jakarta, Banda Aceh and Kupang 





"Varanus komodoensis1". Licensed 






The komodo dragon is a prehistoric 
species inhabiting Komodo Island, 
NTT. It was shortlisted for the “New 7 
World Wonders” in 2009. The 
competition ran for a number of years 
during which the public could vote 
online.  
In a separate case, the government 
planned to move a number of komodo 
to Bali, a proposition that was rejected 
by NTT’s local government for the 
fear of losing out on Regionally 
Generated Revenue (Pendapatan Asli 
Daerah) 51  from tourism, revealing 
inter-regional competition. 
A2  
Advertisement for Tri mobile provider, 
portraying members of Manchester 
United as endorsers, wearing batik 
shirt. 
 
An advertisement for mobile provider, 
“Tri”, owned by the multinational 
company Hutchison Whampoa. In 
2009, “Tri” sponsored a friendly 
match between Manchester United and 
Indonesia’s “All Star Team”. One day 
prior to the arrival of Manchester 
United, a bomb exploded in Ritz-
Carlton, Jakarta where they were 
supposed to stay. The sold-out match 
was cancelled, and “replaced” by an 
additional match against the Malaysia 
team. The batik worn by the players 
shows “Tri”’s knowledge of local 
popular culture. The photograph was 
chosen because it could lead to a wide 
variety of topics ranging from 
terrorism to nationalism. 
                                                 











This is the front cover for Timor 
Leste’s official stamps. It depicts the 
flag of the country and a man in Timor 
Leste’s traditional costume. This 
photograph was chosen to elicit 
discussions about belongingness to the 
country, separatism, and the relation 




Source: author’s documentation 
 
A photo of Jakarta’s skyline. The 
photo was chosen as an aid to talk 
about Jakarta, its position in the 







Flag raising ceremony held weekly 
during the New Order. During the 
reform era, it is still compulsory on 
important occasions. This photo aims 
to generate perceptions about practices 
and expressions of nationalism and/or 
how state indoctrination is perceived 
and received by its subjects. 
A6 
Official photograph of Suharto that 
was hung in each class room. 
A photograph of Suharto that used to 
be hung in front of every class room. 
The photograph was chosen because it 
could elicit the informants’ perception 
or collective memory about the New 













Source: Kompas newspaper 
 
A photo from the front cover of 
Kompas newspaper on the 20th of May 
1998 after students took over the 
parliament building in a string of 
events that would eventually saw 
Suharto resigning.  
This photo was used with the aim to 
bring up perceptions of the New 
Order, the reform era, the sense of 
political agency, participation and/or 




Copyright: Hanantiwi Adityasari 
Joewono 
 
A man holding the electoral ballot in 
2009. For many informants, it was 
their first experience of voting. 
This photo aims to elicit talks about 
political participation, their position as 
a political actor and their personal 
stories about voting. 
A9 
 




A photograph of graffiti on a wall in 
Meulaboh (taken in 2005) that depicts 
the distribution of aid after tsunami. 
The photograph was expected to 
initiate discussions about foreign and 
national aid, or whether disasters are 
seen as a nationally shared experience. 
In Aceh, this photo also aimed to elicit 
personal stories about the tsunami, 








A photo of a group of young people 
from various nationalities. The photo 
was chosen to reveal perceptions about 
other countries and/or Indonesia’s 
relation with other countries. 
Alternatively, this photo could elicit 





Photograph of the crowning of Puteri 




Puteri Indonesia, 2009, Qory 
Sandioriva (r). A Jakarta-born 
representative of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, she became a controversy 
in Aceh because she did not wear a 
veil.  
This photo aims to elicit perception 
about the idea of an Indonesian 
identity, how a representative should 
be, and issues of interregional 
relations. The photo is always shown 
in succession with nr A12. 
A12 
Photograph of the crowning of Miss 





Miss Indonesia 2009, Sunny Halim is 
Indo-American and could not speak 
Indonesian fluently at the time of her 
crowning.  
Similar to A11, the photo aims to elicit 
notions about elements necessary to be 
considered as an Indonesian. At the 
end of photo A11 and A12, I ask 
which girl is more apt to represent 
Indonesia. 
A13 
Photograph of “Visit Malingsia”, a 
mocking wordplay on “Visit Malaysia” 
slogan and logo. It was widely 
distributed through social media at the 
time.  
 
The photograph of an internet banner 
that mocks Malaysia’s tourism 
campaign slogan, “Visit Malaysia: 
Malaysia Truly Asia”. “Maling” is 
Indonesian for “thief” and refers to the 
act of stealing and falsely admitting 
ownership of a handful of Indonesia’s 
cultural wealth presumably done by 
Malaysia. The photo could be used to 






Table 2. Photographs used only in Jakarta 
 Photograph Reason for selection 
B1 
National Monument and the 
surrounding roads under water. 
 
Photograph of a flooded Monument 
Nasional. Heavy flooding hit Jakarta in 
an almost five-yearly cycle and the 
preventable disaster has become 
normalized for many inhabitants in 
Jakarta.  
The photo was chosen to probe 




Source: Kompas newspaper 
Photograph of children living in slums 
with high rise buildings visible in the 
background. This photo was to probe 
attitudes and perceptions of fellow 
Indonesians from a different socio-
economic class.  
B3 
A postcard distributed by Solidamor 
during a campaign to free East Timor 
from Indonesia, shows an elderly 
lady with her right fist held up high. 
The text says, “Free Indonesia from 
East Timor” (in Indonesian) 
 
A reproduction of a postcard for a free-
East Timor campaign. The photo was 
expected to generate ideas about 
separatism, interregional relations, and 
criteria of membership/belongingness 
to Indonesia. In Kupang and Banda 
Aceh, this photo was subsequently 




Copyright: Emil Heradi 
A group of young people in a mall in 
Jakarta. This photograph aims to 
generate stories about the informants’ 




Table 3 Photographs used only in Kupang 
 Photograph Reason for selection  
C.1 
 
Source: author’s documentation 
 
Bemo,a type of minivan, is Kupang’s public 
transport and the pride of the city’s youth. It 
features “cool” visual decorations and 
relatively hi-tech sound system out of which 
popular Indonesian or Western songs blast at 
an extremely high volume. The photograph 
was used to build rapport in Kupang, and 
generate comments about their region. 
C.2 
A banner saying “Sail Indonesia” 
that hung on the site of the meeting 
point in Kupang 
 
Sail Indonesia is an annual yacht competition 
that starts in Darwin, Australia with many 
stopovers at seaside ports in Indonesia, 
including Kupang. Sail Indonesia has been 
held every year since 2003 (except in 2009). 
The photo aims to elicit Kupang’s youth’s 
perception about the international world and 
Kupang or Indonesia’s position in it. 
 
 
Table 4 Photographs used only in Banda Aceh 
 Photograph Reason for selection 
D1 
 
Source: author’s documentation 
 
This is the photo of a coffee-puller in 
“Dhapukupi” one of the most popular, 24hr 
coffeehouses in Banda Aceh. The photograph 
aims to bring up discussions about the life of 
young people in Banda Aceh, including the 





Table 5 Photographs used in Kupang and Banda Aceh 





Copyright: Mark Hobart 
The photograph of a Balinese dancer was used 
as an alternative or back up to “Malingsia” in 
Kupang and Banda Aceh because not 
everyone is familiar with the wordplay shown 
in A13. Explicit probing about Malaysia is 
done if the informant’s comment stops short 
of associating the picture with the country. 
The “equivalence” of this photo with A13 was 
proven when this picture was used in the last 
interview in Jakarta when the photo was 





Source: author’s documentation 
 
This is the Baiturrahman grand mosque, one 
of the most famous landmarks. The photo was 
used to generate the perception of youth in 
Banda Aceh. In Kupang, the photograph was 
used to elicit ideas about interreligious 
relations in the country. 
 
Generally, the instruction in the interviews asks the informants to 
freely comment on the pictures. I assured them to not worry about the length, 
the quality, or the direct relation of the comments with the pictures in 
question. At some points in the interviews, I would probe further or clarify.  
2.2.2 Informants 
This section addresses the second significant factor in the collection of 
data, i.e. the informants. As stated earlier, I have also opted to engage with 
non-elite youth. The overwhelming majority of studies on youth in Indonesia 
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in the context of nationhood have justifiably revolves around pemuda; young 
people as the moral force behind social or political change. Pemuda is studied 
either as a discourse (cf Foulcher 2000, Aspinall 2012), as a particular political 
segment in society (cf Anderson 1972) as well as in its recent transmutations 
as political activists (cf. Lee 2007, Tumenggung and Nugroho 2005). 
However, the majority of youth of Indonesia is apolitical and pragmatic 
(Tumenggung and Nugroho 2005), a condition attributable to political 
stagnation that prevents them from participation and the influence of 
“globalization” in the forms of culture and lifestyle (Tumenggung and 
Nugroho 2005), as well as a continued impact of the apolitical youth formed 
by Suharto’s “Normalization of campus life” (Manurung 2005). 
The majority of my informants are relatively educated and affluent, 
coming from a middle class background. 52  They and/or their parents are 
professionals, hold government jobs, own medium-scale businesses or a piece 
of agricultural land (for those in Kupang and Banda Aceh). Many informants 
in Kupang and Banda Aceh come from outside the provincial centres to study 
or to work, while for the informants in Jakarta, it is mostly their parents or 
grandparents who have moved to the capital. It is possible to see some of the 
informants residing in Kupang and Banda Aceh as the future holders of 
important economic or political positions in their respective cities. While more 
intense competition might make it hard to predict the same for the informants 
in Jakarta, through their overwhelming presence in the social media, this is the 
                                                 
52 Quoting Oxford Business Group in 2010, Simone and Fauzan (2013) point out middle class 
Indonesian households are those that spend between Rp 1 million- 2 millions on basic 
necessities. This covers a significant 48% of the population although 38.5% of this is lower-
middle class.  
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group that forms a significant force in the shaping of youth culture and 
popular discourses on nationalism.53 In total, I have interviewed 70 young 
people, of which 37 are male and 33 female, their age ranging from 15 to 27 
although most are between 22 and 24. 
2.2.2.1 Jakarta Youth 
 
The interviews in Jakarta took place between November 2009 and 
February 2010. I reached out to my informants mainly through snowball 
sampling. The following is an overview of the demographic background of my 
informants in Jakarta. 
 
Table 6: Interviewees in Jakarta 







1 Thomas M Christian 26 Batak/Batak Student Entrepreneur/ 
deceased 




Batak Student Office worker/ 
homemaker 
3 Intan F Muslim 22 Bugis/Bugis Student n.a.** 
4 Maya F Muslim 23 Bugis/Bugis Student n.a. 




6 Tina F Muslim 19 Padang/Jawa Student lecturer 
7 Iwan M Muslim 21 Padang/Jawa Office worker lecturer 
8 Dyah F Christian 23 Java/Java Office worker technician 
9 Tio M Muslim 19 Java/Java Student technician 
                                                 
53 For instance, the first “National Batik Day” in 2009 did not start the popularization of batik, 
on the contrary, the decision to have a national day came after batik was re-appropriated as a 
trendy fashion item among the youth. 
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10 Desi F Christian 21 Batak Student Office worker 




Padang/Padang office worker n.a. 
12 Ester F Christian 22 Batak/Batak Student office worker 
13 Sian F Christian 23 Chinese Student entrepreneur 
14 Dimas M Christian 24 Java/Java Freelancer freelancer 
15 Lisa F Christian 19 Ambon/ Bugis Student retiree 
16 Indah F Muslim 19 Java/Java Student 
Vegetable 
vendor 
Note: *Here and in the subsequent tables, these are the answers to the question 
“where are your parents from?” (Orangtua asalnya darimana?), and could thus refer to 
ethnicity or regional identity. 
** Here and in the subsequent tables, ‘na’ refers to not available. 
 
As the table indicates, their parents or grandparents migrated from 
various regions in Indonesia, making my informants categorically belong to 
their grand/parents’ ethnic groups. Born and raised in Jakarta, their first 
language is Indonesian and very few informants are able to converse in the 
ethnic/regional languages of their grand/parents. They belong to the group of 
15% of Indonesians whose mother tongue is the Indonesian language 
(Boellstorff 2004). In the context of Indonesia, this group is an elite linguistic 
minority, natives of the national language that relegates other languages into 
the “regional” “traditional”, and often also “feudal”, category (Keane 2003). 
In this regard, geographic location has a profound effect on the linguistic 
capital. 
 Religion-wise, half of the informants are Muslims, while the other half 
is Christians. While I did not focus on the issue of religion, at the same time, I 
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do not perceive significant differences in the responses between the Christians 
and the Muslims, for instance, in the case of Aceh’s protests towards Qory. 54 
As the list of parents’ occupations in the table suggests, most 
informants come from a middle class background. Their parents have white 
collar jobs, or have personal businesses. All of them have passed or are still 
doing their tertiary education. 55 Although the number of interviews in Jakarta 
was the smallest compared to Kupang and Banda Aceh, the average length of 
the interviews were longer than in the two other cities. Many of these 
interviews were done in small groups of close friends. This was mainly due to 
practical reasons; the considerable time on the road made us optimize the 
meeting by doing the interviews in groups. They were conducted in public 
places; restaurants, cafe’s and, with one group who are siblings, their family 
home. 
                                                 
54 They generally think that the protests directed at Qory are unnecessary. Qory is a 
representative for Indonesia, not Aceh. Youth in Jakarta are more interested in discussing the 
Indo-American pageant, Suny Halim. 
55 That being said, it is important to note that originally I conducted another three group 
interviews with ten other people in Tangerang. Prior to fieldwork, the design for the study was 
to cover Jabodetabek area (Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi) and so I went to a village 
in Tangerang because I presumed that the site (right next to the airport) might provide 
interesting insights on nationhood and internationalism. Despite living next to the 
international airport of the capital, they are fundamentally marginalized by the society: dirt 
roads lead to their earthen-floored houses and the fastest way to get to their village is by 
crossing a river on a sampan. The fear of being evicted whenever the airport needs to expand 
is ever-present; many of them are children of people who were evicted from their original 
villages in the 1980s. After initial analysis, I had to omit the interviews given by these ten 
people with the hope of saving it for another project in the future. Although geographically 
they live within Jabodetabek and are ethnically “Betawi”, but their responses to the 
photographs reveal a different mode of experiencing the capital than the rest of my informants 
from Jakarta. They do not ‘go’ to Jakarta, and would only pass the city on the rare occasion of 
visiting their relatives on the outskirts on the other sides of Jakarta (e.g. Bekasi).  Their 
responses to the other photographs are significantly different. For instance, because many of 
them did not finish elementary education, the photograph of schoolchildren generated 




Aside from interviews, it was possible for me to attend a number of 
events that are framed as playing out at a “national” level, like a Facebook-
initiated rally to support the accused chiefs of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), a Nokia product launch that used the theme “Voice Your 
Action for Indonesia”, and the ASEAN Football Cup finals between Indonesia 
and Malaysia.  
2.2.2.2 Kupang Youth 
 
I was in Kupang from mid-March, 2010 to the end of April of the same 
year. The contacts I have built prior to my arrival in Kupang were not as 
productive in terms of snowball sampling as I had hoped they would be. 
Having considerably less social network in Kupang than in Jakarta, I resorted 
to introducing myself to the regulars at a newly opened internet café and 
restaurant and to the people of a popular youth radio station, and these 
contacts led me to most of my informants. The following is a list of the people 
I have interviewed there. 
 
 
Table 7. Interviewees in Kupang 
















3 Boy M Christian 24 Sumba/Sumba Civil servant Civil servant 
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5 Joyce F Catholic 22 Belu/Chinese n.a. n.a. 








Civil servant Civil servant 
8 Willi M Protestant 23 Sumba/ 
Chinese 
Entrepreneur Business people 
9 Kristin F Protestant 15 Kupang/Kefa Highschool Lecturer/preacher 

















13 Melly F Christian 21 Rote/Atambua student Civil servant 
14 Eva F Christian 23 Bejawa/ 
Maumere 
student Civil servant 





16 Miranda F Christian 24 Rote/Rote office worker butcher 
17 Lita F Christian 25 Sabu/Sabu office worker 
Civil servant/ civil 
servant 
18 John M Christian 23 Sumba/Sumba student farmer 










21 Shelly F Christian 21 Sabu/Sabu student Farmer 
22 Sinta F Christian 23 Kupang/ 
Kupang 
student Farmer 
23 Lido M n.a. n.a Sumba/Sumba student Farmer 
24 Meisye F Catholic na Flores/Flores student Farmer 
25 Fara M Christian 26 Rote/Rote office worker 
Civil servant/ 
homemaker 
























More than in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, the informants in Kupang come 
from families in civil service. Although NTT’s economic activity is dominated 
by agriculture followed by service, the government service accounts for 95% 
of the latter (Barlow & Gondowarsito 2009). For those with a university 
degree, the common job market is provided by governmental offices or non-
governmental organizations (Elcid Li 2009), an aspiration that is popular 
among the youth of Kupang.  This contributes to a particular way of looking at 
the country that is not detectable in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, as later parts and 
chapters will argue.  
Like in Jakarta, most –although not all- of my informants have passed 
or are still attending their tertiary education. A number of them who come 
from well-to-do families attended colleges in Jakarta, Yogyakarta or Mataram.  
Whereas in Jakarta the informants are descendants from migrants from 
regions outside of the province, in Kupang they come from different parts 
within the province. This pattern of movement has been traditionally the case 
in this region. Other than the Chinese and Arabs, inhabitants of Kupang come 
from the surrounding islands (cf Tidey 2012). 
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The majority of my informants are Christians, and this is unsurprising. 
NTT is home to one of the largest concentrations of Christians in Indonesia, 
with Catholicism dominating in Flores and Protestantism in Timor.  
The majority of the interviews done in Kupang were conducted 
individually although often other people joined the conversations and were 
able to provide comments. The set of pictures used to elicit informants' stories 
is slightly different from the one used in Jakarta. Changes were made in order 
to have a set of pictures with scenes that are familiar to interviewees. Unlike in 
Jakarta, I showed a picture of Kupang's distinctive public transport, bemo at 
the start of the interviews, in the hope of establishing informants' confidence 
through a scene they are more familiar with. The average time of interview 
here is a little bit under one hour.  
During fieldwork, I also interviewed three additional sources; a 
manager of a youth oriented radio station, a first time writer who recently 
published "Timor Leste Top Profile Pictures", a semi-non-fiction work where 
"true" stories of Timor Leste's refugees, Facebook and Idol-like competition 
intertwine, and an officer from the provincial government’s NTT Museum. 
These were not photo-elicited interviews, and the questions were tailored to 
their particular positions of authority regarding the Kupang youthscape. 
2.2.2.3 Banda Aceh Youth 
My fieldwork in Banda Aceh took place from mid-June 2010 to mid-
August 2010. To blend in with the crowd, I covered my hair and wore long 
sleeves during my stay in Banda Aceh. The next table depicts the informants I 
have interviewed in Banda Aceh. 
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Table 8. Interviewees in Banda Aceh 
Nr Name Sex Religion Age Place of origin Occupation Parents’ 
Occupation 
(father/mother) 
1 Yasin M Muslim 24 Meulaboh Student Civil servant/ 
Entrepreneur 






3 Amelia F Muslim 22 Pidie Student Civil servant/ 
civil servant 
4 Jufri M Muslim 22 Lhokseumawe Student Retiree/ 
homemaker 
5 Novi F Muslim 23 Sigli Student farmer/ 
entrepreneur 
6 Yusuf M Muslim 21 Meulaboh Student Civil servant/ 
homemaker 
7 Azman M Muslim 24 Pidie journalist farmer/ 
teacher 
8 Ilham M Muslim 24 n.a. Student Farmer/ 
teacher 
9 Reza M Muslim 22 Bireun office worker Farmer/ 
homemaker 





11 Yunus M Muslim 21 Lhokseumawe freelance Farmer/ 
homemaker 




13 Muchtar M Muslim 25 West Aceh Freelance 
farmer 
14 Kamal M Muslim 20 Sigli Student office worker/ 
teacher 
15 Abdul M Muslim 20 Sabang Student Teacher/ 
office worker 
16 Iqbal M Muslim 19 Meulaboh/Solo Student Small scale 
entrepreneurs 
17 Indra M Muslim 23 Meulaboh/Sigli Student Lecturer/ 
civil servant 
18 Faizal M Muslim 21 n.a. Student (Deceased)/ 
civil servant 
19 Aidil M Muslim 23 Aceh besar Student Civil servant/ 
civil servant 
20 Fitri F Muslim 23 Meulaboh Student (deceased) / 
civil servant 
21 Maira F Muslim 22 Meulaboh Civil servant Civil servant/ 
civil servant 









24 Fachri M Muslim 20 Banda Aceh Student Small-scale 
entrepreneur 
25 Nana F Muslim 20 Banda Aceh Student Small-scale 
entrepreneur 
 
As in the two other cities, the majority of my informants in Banda 
Aceh are students or have completed tertiary education. However, unlike in 
Jakarta and Kupang, many of them have had work experience through part- 
time jobs for NGOs after the tsunami. In addition, all of them have had direct 
and lengthy interaction with foreigners. This substantially gave them an air of 
“cosmopolitanism” that came across in their responses of the photographs and 
that set them apart from youth in Jakarta and Kupang. 
Many of them come from other parts of the province to study or work. 
Just like Kupang, Banda Aceh is a melting pot of people from various parts of 
the province. The experiences of this group of informants regarding two 
significant events in Aceh’s recent trajectory, i.e. the conflict and tsunami, 
vary considerably. Some of them have firsthand experience and lost siblings to 
the tsunami. Others, especially those living in the highlands, were less affected 
by the disaster. The same is valid regarding the conflict between Indonesian 
army and GAM. Some have firsthand experience of being trapped in a shoot 
out, while others have less intense experience of conflict during that period. 
One needs to note that what people remember from the conflict is also 
retrospectively constructed by their perception of the current relation between 
Indonesia and Aceh. Thus it would be reckless to assume that people’s 
positive appraisal of Indonesia-Aceh relation is caused by a lack of negative 
experiences during the conflict years.  
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During my fieldwork in Banda Aceh, I have developed close 
friendship with a group of four young women. One has already graduated and 
worked as an internee in a state institution while the other three were still in 
their last years of university. They all aspire to become writers, whether of 
novels or news articles, and wish to continue higher studies abroad. 56 It was 
with them that I spent most of my non-interviewing time with, and the close 
interaction with this group is balanced by the number of male interviewees in 
Banda Aceh with whom a similar closeness is not possible. 
Overall, the average time of interview in Banda Aceh is a bit over one 
hour, thus slightly longer than in Kupang, but shorter than in Jakarta. Other 
than the main informants, I also interviewed a radio manager and a social 
activist cum intellectual. Both were able to shed light on the youthscape of 
Banda Aceh. 
2.3 Analysis 
The analysis of interviews follows closely what Glynos and Howarth 
(2005) call “critical explanation”, a method of interpretation and explanation 
in the poststructuralist tradition, in particular according to Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of hegemony. It delineates three logics to analyse a particular 
social relation; the social, the political and the fantasmatic (Glynos and 
Howarth 2005). I particularly draw on the first two logics57 in my analysis. 
                                                 
56 At the time of writing in 2013, one of them has won second prize in a national story writing 
competition, one has gone to China for a short term language course, and the third woman is 
preparing to go to Korea for a similar course.  
57 Fantasmatic logic identifies the particular fantasy that makes subjects believe that they will 
achieve or regain fullness/completeness once the truth systems are translated into actual 
practices and projects. An example of fantasmatic logic generally serving as the main force of 
independence movements is the conviction that once the colonizers have been defeated, the 
67 
 
Identifying social logic involves looking at the “overall pattern or coherence” 
(p. 139). Political logic goes a layer deeper and looks at the formation, 
constitution as well as contestation. It revolves around the logic of equivalence 
(who are “us” and “them”) as well as the logic of difference (the alternative, 
potentially divisive discourses of ethnicity, for instance). 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the main concerns regarding the abstract 
nature of concepts of nationhood that have shaped the methodology of the 
research. To find the balance between posing direct questions that might have 
led to mere repetitions of the official discourse, and observation of the elusive 
patterns of nationhood in youth’s daily lives that would require too much time, 
I have decided to use photo elicitation method. The photographs are pre-
selected by me, and my informants were asked to comment freely on them. 
One major advantage is that photographs provide a concrete object to ground a 
highly abstract discussion in, while the polysemic nature of images facilitates 
the reflection and projection of informants’ pre-existing beliefs, attitudes and 
opinions. 
The second part of this chapter outlines the images selected for the 
interviews, and the demographic background of the informants in the three 
places. In total, I have interviewed 70 informants, mostly coming from middle 
                                                                                                                                
free country would finally fulfil its destiny to be great. I refrain from engaging fully in 
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3 A JUXTAPOSITION OF IMAGINATIONS 
Having discussed the theoretical and methodological approach that 
structure the dissertation, this chapter centres on its empirical side, outlining 
an overview of the constructions of Indonesia in the three cities as derived 
from analysis of the interviews and observations. The details from each site 
will be more elaborately presented in the three subsequent chapters. This 
chapter will first provide general view of how Indonesia is imagined in each 
city. It will then move on to various juxtapositions of these imaginings: 
between the centre and the two peripheral areas, between the two peripheries, 
and between the imaginings of people that are favourable towards Indonesia 
and of those who perceive Indonesia as antagonism. In the case of the latter, 
by contrasting the two groups, it becomes possible to see a “regularity of 
dispersion” (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001) of the idea of Indonesia.  
It needs to be noted beforehand that a point by point comparison of the 
three sites is not the goal of this dissertation. Young people in each site 
imagine Indonesia in their own terms and categories that are not necessarily 
directly comparable with the imaginings in the other sites. Forcing the 
imaginings to adhere to the same dimensions or parameters would be to betray 
the ethical premise of standpoint theory. That being said, the privileged factor 
for this thesis remains the centre-region relation in Indonesia. 
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3.1 Plural Imaginings of Indonesia 
3.1.1 Imagining Indonesia from Jakarta 
From the point of view of young people who live in the centre, 
Indonesia is imagined as a self-evident entity. There are two strategies that 
make the construction of this chain of equivalence possible. The first one is 
the folklorization of culture and the second one is the erasure of inter-regional 
hierarchy and disparity.  
An important marker of Indonesia in Jakarta is cultural diversity. 
Importantly, “culture” refers to the products of various ethnic groups that have 
been officially recognized by the state as exemplary of the nation’s greatness 
and diversity, and not to the banal customs and habits of a group of people. 
This view of youth in Jakarta aligns with one of the most forceful strategies in 
dealing with diversity as discussed in the first chapter, that is, the 
“domestication” of culture (Schefold 1998).   
Alongside the celebratory attitude towards “cultural diversity”, inter-
regional differences are undermined or naturalized. Seen from Jakarta, the 
lagging behind of some regions in development is attributed to the local 
people’s “backwardness”, and not to the state’s uneven distribution of 
resources. The idea that “there is nothing” (nggak ada apa-apa) 58  in the 
regions is prevalent, and most informants have little interest in other regions. It 
is this overlooking of interregional discrepancies, alongside an overemphasis 
of cultural diversity that makes Indonesia appears solid and self-evident for 
youth in Jakarta. 
                                                 
58 More on this in chapter 4. 
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The chain of equivalence takes shape in a wider context that forms its 
constitutive outside. Interestingly, a number of different exteriorities can be 
identified: not all “others” are antagonistic. A significant constitutive outside 
in the imagining of Indonesia by the youth in Jakarta, is the economically 
developed and politically influential countries (i.e. “the West” like Europe, 
North-America, but also East-Asia and Australia). The presupposition that all 
states will eventually become as developed as the Western states is common 
among postcolonial nations (Gupta 2004), and youth in Jakarta are not 
unexposed to this overarching paradigm. Young people constantly compare 
Indonesia to these other nation-states. As a result of this comparison, 
Indonesia is then imagined as nation that is lacking in so many aspects. There 
is an overshadowing anxiety of being belittled by these other nations. 59 
Because this cluster of other nation-states is perceived as authoritative and 
imagined to be omniscient, I categorize this as the Lacanian Other, a 
constitutive other that is responsible for the formation of the identity of the 
self.  
The importance of the international world for youth in Jakarta 
generates internal divisions. The logic of difference becomes perceivable. 
Youth in Jakarta distance themselves from the other Indonesians who they see 
to be less worldly, less knowledgeable about order, discipline, civility and 
other requirements to make Indonesia as modern as other countries. These 
                                                 
59 This can be described best by referring to Sartre’s idea that shame is instilled by the 
(imaginary) presence of Others. In “Being and Nothingness”, Sartre ([1943] 1984) expounds 
the working of “shame” as a recognition of oneself that is necessitated on the presence of the 
Other, “…the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of 
myself as I appear to the Other” (italics in original) (Sartre [1943] 1984; 302). In the context 




other Indonesians include government officials and fellow-Indonesians alike.  
In a way, this reflects Fanon’s idea that the white and Western man serves as 
corroborator to a negro’s sense of superiority to another negro (1967). 60 The 
discontent with the current condition in Indonesia makes youth in Jakarta form 
the opinion that the New Order period was more successful than the current 
one in regards to keeping order and controlling the population. 
As earlier stated in the first chapter, the chain of equivalence is defined 
by an antagonism. For youth in Jakarta, this latter position is held by Malaysia. 
For the past half decade, Malaysia has become the ultimate antagonist for 
youth in Jakarta. The country is accused of having “stolen” a number of 
Indonesian cultural artefacts by internationally claiming them to be Malaysian. 
This resulted in a collective hatred towards Malaysia and at the same time, a 
strengthening of the idea of Indonesia in Jakarta. The antagonistic sentiment is 
responsible for the popularization of batik and komodo that have become signs 
that synecdochically stand for Indonesia. The identity of Indonesia as 
culturally diverse is reinforced as Malaysia becomes the constitutive outside. 
In short, the idea of Indonesia as a coherent and self-evident entity is 
strongest in Jakarta. The chain of equivalence is constructed based on the 
emphasizing of folklorized cultural diversity and de-emphasizing of other 
types of inter-regional divergences. Referring to Geertz (1963) the tie that 
binds “Indonesia” for youth in Jakarta are “ethnic” features. Malaysia is the 
ultimate antagonistic other. An overarching discourse is the idea that all 
                                                 
60  Using Adlerian psychoanalysis, Fanon argues that feelings of inferiority towards the White 
Man urges the Negro to compensate it by posing oneself as superior to another Negro. The 
“closer” the Negro is to the White Man, the more superior he is to his fellow Negros (1967). A 
similar tendency is shown by youth in Jakarta who often expresses disapproval of other 
Indonesians who are less disciplined, less orderly and less knowledgeable than them.  
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nations should eventually become as “modern” as a number of Western 
countries. This generates anxiety among youth in Jakarta, and an inclination to 
differentiate themselves from other Indonesians who are less worldly than 
them. This latter is a manifestation of the logic of difference. 
3.1.2 Imagining Indonesia from Kupang 
From the capital of one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse 
provinces (Barlow and Gondowarsito 2009), there is at once compliance and 
dissent to the official discourses of nationhood. On the one hand, informants 
are aware of the hierarchical division between Java and the Outer Islands. The 
former is perceived to be more civilized and developed than the latter. An 
educational degree obtained in Java is a valuable social and cultural capital for 
the youth. At the same time, Papua is the ultimate symbol of backwardness. 
Kupang is positioned between these two extremes.  
Despite the consent to the dominant imagined geography of Indonesia, 
the folklorization or domestication of culture that is ingrained in Jakarta’s 
youth is less identifiable among youth in Kupang. For them, culture is located 
at the sub-national level. It is not folklorized, but refers to the daily habits, 
customs, worldviews conceived through long-term interactions in a particular 
community. The “community” here is fluid; it can be sub-provincial districts 
or ethnicities (e.g. informants in Kupang frequently referred to how particular 
things are done by people from Sabu or Rote, or the difference between people 
in Kupang and Flores), or between provinces (e.g. the difference between 
Jakarta, Kupang and Aceh). In a way, the logic of difference plays a greater 
role than in Jakarta. Unlike for youth in Jakarta, the international world is less 
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important for youth in Kupang. In accordance, the feud with Malaysia is also 
not an issue that captures their interest. 
The overall data suggest that for youth in Kupang, the bond that unites 
Indonesians is not that of cultures and history or tradition, but of rational and 
instrumental interactions. 61 Belongingness to Indonesia is assessed based on 
the perceived financial benefit or loss it will entail. Thus, when informants 
discuss Timor Leste’s decision to separate, their opinions are based on 
considerations regarding material consequences of this secession, for Timor 
Leste as well as for Kupang (e.g. mentioning how the budget that used to be 
spent on Timor Leste was re-allocated for NTT). Moreover, it is only in 
Kupang that legal citizenship is also mentioned as the main marker of an 
Indonesian identity, one that overrules linguistic ability.  
In the construction of Indonesia as an organization, the central 
government is seen as a major source of monetary gains. Becoming a civil 
servant (PNS, Pegawai Negeri Sipil) is the ideal job because of it guarantees 
financial security and social status. Being a PNS is a social capital, not only 
for the individual PNS officer but also for his or her larger kin group (e.g. a 
higher chance for members of the kin to be accepted in the civil service). 
                                                 
61 The narrative of Indonesia in Kupang counters the dichotomy between state and nation, 
often made by scholars. Connor (1994) argues that the state refers to “major political 
subdivision of the globe…readily defined…easily conceptualized in quantitative terms” (p. 
36). A nation on the other hand is “…intangible…a psychological bond” (p.36). However, this 
distinction is not echoed in people’s conceptualization countries, as the data from Kupang 
have suggested. Similarly, in research on Austrian national identity, Wodak et al (2009) find 
that their informants conceptualize Austria as both a nation and a state. The relation between 
experiencing the nation-state as a rational organization and as a psychological bond is 
captured in Geertz’s exploration of the two ties (ethnic/primordial and civic), according to 
him, “...the peoples of the new states are simultaneously animated by two powerful, 





Overall, interaction with the state is often based on monetary considerations. 
The idea that political voice is a commodity is prevalent among youth; people 
join public rallies because they are paid by the interested parties or people vote 
for the candidate in return for material tokens. These are practices of neo-
patrimonialism and examples of what some scholars have termed “shadow 
states”, informal rules of economic-political exchange “…that only partially 
coincides with the formal state apparatus” (Mulholland and Dick 2011). There 
is at once dependency and negotiation with the state. 
Along with the dependency, people remember Suharto as the perfect 
father figure. The term “bapak pembangunan” (father of development) was 
frequently mentioned in Kupang as a response to Suharto’s photograph, unlike 
in the two other sites. Like a father, the ideal government should be 
dependable for resources, and able to enforce order on its people. 
3.1.3 Imagining Indonesia from Banda Aceh 
Due to the rapid changes that have taken place in Aceh, its youth are 
busy exploring and rediscovering the Aceh identity. Aceh is a stronger 
framework that structures their responses to the photographs than Indonesia 
(e.g. the photograph of komodo elicits many comments about how komodo 
does not live in Aceh). The youth are mostly interested in Acehnese culture, 
tradition, history and its international position. Aceh is seen as one unity, and 
internal differences between various ethnic groups (Gayo and Alas people are 
minorities in Aceh) and regions (the coastal versus the inland area) are de-
emphasized in Banda Aceh. As in Kupang, culture is not folklorized, but 
refers more to the daily practices of a particular people.  
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Firsthand experience of direct interactions with foreign aid workers 
provides familiarity with other countries that is different from the mass-
mediated cosmopolitanism of Jakarta’s youth. The international world is not 
referred to with a generalized “outside” (luar) like in Jakarta, but is imagined 
as concrete countries: e.g. India, Korea, France or Singapore. Young people 
appear to be confident of Aceh’s international standing, while Indonesia’s 
international status is less important or relevant. In the Malaysia-Indonesian 
feud over cultural artefacts, youth in Banda Aceh tend not to take Indonesia’s 
side; they either take a neutral stance or take Malaysia’s side by arguing for 
historical and cultural proximity with the country across the strait. Put 
differently, the strongest and most salient chain of equivalence is of Aceh as 
an entity, not Indonesia. 
Aceh’s belongingness to Indonesia is not self-evident, although 
everyone agrees that peace is preferable. Two distinct imaginings of Indonesia 
can be identified among youth in Banda Aceh. The first sees Indonesia as the 
antagonism of Aceh, while the second sees the country as a compromise. 
Henceforward, throughout the thesis, I will use the label “Indonesia as 
antagonism” to refer to the first imagining and “Indonesia as a compromise” to 
refer to the second imagining. 
As an antagonistic force, Indonesia is a negation of the fulfilment of 
Aceh’s destiny. Indonesia and the Dutch are both perceived as colonizers. 
There is a continuation between the violence perpetrated by the Dutch, with 
the betrayals of the Javanese and the injustices of the government in Jakarta. 
This perception crystallizes Aceh’s position as the morally superior, yet 
violated victim. The antagonistic line is not only based on past violations, but 
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stretches out to the present and possibly into the future. This narrative is 
supported by a strong collective memory of Aceh’s glorious sultanate era, 
perceived as a factual proof that the Acehnese are not only capable, but is also 
destined to be sovereign. These notions are common in the genesis of ethno-
nationalism. Portrayal of the nation in the framework of ethno-culture 
generally involves “...myths of the past, which see the seeds of national unity 
and pride as deriving from histories of an ancestral homeland...” (Brown 2002: 
566). 
The narrative of “Indonesia as a compromise” portrays Aceh’s 
inclusion and present peaceful condition as the best option for the moment 
being. Here, Indonesia is perceived to be another entity, but one that is not 
necessarily antagonistic. The emphasis on pre-colonial history or the 
Indonesian-Aceh conflict is significantly weaker in the responses to the 
photographs (e.g. the photograph of the Baiturrahman mosque elicited 
comments about how it is a symbol of Aceh and people did not emphasize its 
historical significance). People focus more on progress and development. 
Consent with Aceh’s position in Indonesia emerges together with a cluster of 
ideas and attitudes that are similar (although not identical) with those held by 
youth in Jakarta and/or Kupang. Thus, to illustrate, informants who agree with 
Aceh’s inclusion show a more positive appraisal of Suharto, a more 
instrumental approach of the state and less aversion towards Jakarta’s or 
Java’s domination.  
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3.2 Contrastive Imaginings of Indonesia 
In this section, I will highlight a number of contrastive imaginings by 
comparing patterns of inclusion and exclusion within and between Jakarta, 
Kupang and Banda Aceh. To bring out the geo-political situatedness as a 
factor, I will contrast the imagining of Indonesia in Jakarta with the 
imaginings in Kupang and Aceh, highlight the differences modes in which 
youth in Kupang and in Banda Aceh negotiate with the dominant power, and 
conclude with an overview of “regularity in dispersion” of the idea of 
Indonesia. 
3.2.1 The Centre versus the Periphery 
In this section I discuss the inferences drawn from the comparison 
between the responses obtained from Jakarta’s youth with those from Kupang 
and Aceh. This is based on the division in the dominant imagined geography 
of Java versus the Outer Islands. Overall, the fundamental dissimilarity lies in 
the degree of homogeneity of the community imagined.  
As mentioned earlier, viewed from Jakarta, Indonesia is a 
homogeneous entity. Jakarta’s youth have a myopic vision regarding the Outer 
Islands, and perceive Indonesia as if only consisting of Jakarta. Cultural 
artefacts are detached from the worldview and daily lives of particular groups 
of people wherein they are produced and are expected to remain static, as they 
symbolize Indonesia as a whole. Interregional discrepancies are downplayed 
and often attributed to the inherently “primitive” condition of the people in the 
peripheries. The idea of Indonesia is relatively intact and coherent. On the 
79 
 
contrary, youth in Kupang and Banda Aceh consider Indonesia to contain a 
more heterogeneous community.  
In Kupang and Banda Aceh, perceptions of Indonesia are shaped by a 
double-layered awareness of the dominant discourse of Indonesia as a united 
nation, and the discrepancy of this view with their experiences of inequality 
and disparity. Thus, far from imagining Indonesia as a community based on 
equal brotherhood, youth in the two cities are poignantly aware of their 
peripheral positions. Furthermore, despite knowing the official discourse 
regarding culture, for youth in Banda Aceh and Kupang culture is also 
experienced as an ingrained practical knowledge, grounded in the practices of 
a particular group of people who inhabit the same locality. 
As the first chapter has outlined, a continuing source of tension in 
Indonesia has been the government’s homogenizing tendencies and the 
regional/ethnic allegiances. The discrepancy between the point of views of 
Jakarta and Kupang and Banda Aceh indicates that the pattern persists among 
the young generation.  
3.2.2 Plural Peripheral Imaginings 
In this section, I focus on the imagining of Indonesia in Kupang and 
the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” in Banda Aceh. These two groups 
have employed different strategies to deal with their marginalization. 
“Indonesia as antagonism” holds a strong oppositional stance against the 
central government. NTT on the other hand, has not expressed hostility despite 
occupying the same (if not even more) peripheral position. I propose that the 
differences in the strategies are conceptually predicated on two interrelated 
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factors; 1) the presence and strength of a chain of equivalence of sub-national 
identities (e.g. based on ethnicity, region, etc) and 2) and attitude towards 
interregional discrepancy. I will present how these factors play out in Kupang 
and Banda Aceh. Regarding the latter, throughout this section, I draw from the 
imagining of “Indonesia as an antagonism”. 
For young people in Kupang, the idea of NTT as a unity is weak; the 
province is perceived as consisting of a wide array of people with different 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious backgrounds. An overarching pan-NTT 
identity is weak, or absent. The saliency of NTT’s heterogeneity challenges 
the formation of the idea of NTT as a unitary entity among other 
(regional/ethnic/religious) entities across Indonesia.  
As discussed earlier, for youth in Kupang, smaller networks are 
important because they serve as channels through which state resources are 
redistributed. Instead of turning away from, or turning against the power 
holders, the main survival strategy is by capitalizing on smaller network 
relations to move closer to the center of power. Smaller political factions 
ensure that there is no overarching ethno-nationalist identity in Kupang. Thus, 
antagonistic sentiment against the central government is weak. In his study on 
minority strategies, Brown notes that “patrimonial features of politics…. serve 
to promote the factional rivalries dividing and weakening ethnic nationalist 
movement” (Brown 2004: 567). In Kupang, the economic marginalization that 
the region has undergone for years has not led to separatist activism or violent 
revolution because of the absence of an alternative chain of equivalence.  
On the other hand, in the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”, the 
trajectory of Aceh is strongly shaped by the sense of continuous exclusion by 
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the central government. For these informants, the trajectory defines the 
relation between Indonesia and Aceh. Sentiments of having been betrayed by 
Indonesia still reverberate. 
At the same time, there is a strong sense of ethnic identity among the 
youth in Banda Aceh which was made easier (in comparison with Kupang) by 
the region’s non-archipelagic terrain and relative homogeneous configuration 
in terms of religion or language. The narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” 
resists Indonesia due to the strong chain of equivalence of Aceh as an entity 
and the perception that interregional discrepancy is caused by injustices done 
by the central government. 
In a study on hegemony and contention, Roseberry (1994: 357) argues 
that “the dominated ... initiate all sorts of subtle ways of living with, talking 
about, resisting, undermining, and confronting the unequal and power laden 
worlds in which they live.” This section has shown that Kupang and Banda 
Aceh as the dominated employ different strategies to confront this power 
disparity. Following Eriksen (1993) there are three options of responses to 
domination; assimilation, acquiescence and separation. Youth in Kupang 
prefer to assimilate or consent to their subordination, while some of the youth 
in Banda Aceh prefer secession from Indonesia. In other words, the stance 
against the power holder is not solely based on material deprivation alone, but 
involves a more complex interplay of alternative sub-national identities and 
interpretations of discrepancies.  
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3.2.3. Regularity in Dispersion: Shared Ideas of “Indonesia” 
Although people imagine Indonesia differently, it is possible to 
identify similarities among youth for whom Indonesia is not antagonistic. This 
cluster of similarities shows a consistent contrast with the responses of the 
narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” in Banda Aceh. I take this pattern to 
signify that there are a number of shared ideas among those who do not hold 
strong aversion towards Indonesia or being Indonesian. Here, the analysis 
draws heavily on the idea of “regularity in dispersion”. This notion is adapted 
by Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2001) from Foucault’s exploration of discursive 
formation in Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). 62  To quote Laclau and 
Mouffe’s definition at length, regularity in dispersion is, “...an ensemble of 
differential positions. This ensemble is not the expression of any underlying 
principle external to itself....but it constitutes a configuration, which in certain 
context of exteriority can be signified (italics in original) as a totality” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, [1985] 2001; 106). Compared to Benedict Anderson’s 
conceptualization of how the nation is imagined, using “regularity in 
dispersion” as an analytical tool makes it possible to have a more refined 
understanding of the actual and heterogeneous contents of the imaginations63 
while acknowledging their changing nature. 
                                                 
62 Laclau and Mouffe’s criticize Foucault for emphasizing the dispersion of “regularity in 
dispersion” for this would imply a particular point of reference in correspondence to which 
elements are dispersed. Laclau and Mouffe focus on the limit of this dispersion instead and 
emphasize the regularity of “regularity in dispersion” (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001; 106). 
By emphasizing the regularity, Laclau and Mouffe take into account the irregularity (or in 
their terms, the “undecidability”) out of which the regularity is constructed through 
articulatory practices. 
63 For example, what Anderson has conceptualized as imagined “brotherhood”, my analysis 
understands it to be a consenting attitude towards power disparity. Although similar, both 
stances are not the same. 
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As indicated by the definition, the “context of exteriority” holds the 
key role. In this research, the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” is the 
differentiating exterior. It is in contrast to this that a particular pattern can be 
outlined from the ideas of Indonesia in Jakarta, Kupang and in the narrative of 
“Indonesia as compromise” in Banda Aceh. In contrast with “Indonesia as 
antagonism”, the three other narratives are more contiguous to each other and 
contain shared markers of Indonesia.  
There are three identifiable shared ideas in the discursive ensemble that 
will be explored below: 1) a salient and varied use of “Indonesia” as a point of 
reference in interpreting the world 2) a naturalization/acceptance or ignorance 
of hierarchy between the center and the periphery, and 3) the prioritizing of 
the control and dependability functions of power holders. These themes are 
not homogeneous; there are variations in content and strength in the responses. 
However, they do appear as clustered themes in contrast with the antagonistic 
imagining of Indonesia in Banda Aceh. 
The first shared theme is the use of Indonesia as framework to interpret 
their surroundings. Unlike in the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” that 
reduces the image of Indonesia to an antagonistic position, in the other three 
groups (Jakarta, Kupang and the narrative of compromise in Banda Aceh), the 
imagining of Indonesia varies. At times, Indonesia is portrayed as a positive 
entity (e.g. unique in terms of cultural diversity), while at other times, it is 
imagined to be lagging behind in development. 
The second shared theme is consent towards power disparity between 
the centre (Jakarta) and the regions. Indonesia is imagined as a country with an 
asymmetrical power distribution. This is not elicited explicitly, but implied in 
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the responses to some photographs.  For instance, in the responses of youth in 
Kupang and in the narrative of “Indonesia as compromise” in Banda Aceh, the 
photo of Jakarta’s skyline generated stories of the differences between their 
region and the more developed Jakarta. Importantly, in these comments 
disparity is noted but little negative feelings towards the center are expressed. 
The photograph of Timor Leste generated comments reflecting awareness and 
knowledge of the disproportionate material distribution, but the sense that that 
this is a form of injustice that needs to be rectified is absent. Here, the contrast 
with the responses in the imagining of “Indonesia as antagonism” is clear. For 
these particular youth in Banda Aceh, disparity is undoubtedly the outcome of 
a discrimination that is strongly biased towards the center. Injustice has to be 
ended, and Aceh’s sovereignty is the main solution. 
The third theme is the implied preference for a strong, controlling and 
yet dependable government, over one that protects individual rights and 
freedom. Photographs of Suharto, the electoral ballot, the 1998 student 
demonstration and Timor Leste’s flag were specifically productive in eliciting 
comments that imply this political attitude. For youth in Kupang, Jakarta and 
in the narrative of compromise in Banda Aceh, Indonesia during the New 
Order, was in better hands than it is today. 64 The government was able to 
                                                 
64 In 2010, the reigning party during the new Order, Golkar proposed to officially recognize 
Suharto as a national hero. The proposal was eventually turned down by the government after 
protests from human rights activist groups. Outside of activist circles however, Suharto is an 
admired figure. Research conducted by Indobarometer in 2011, an independent research 
institution, showed that Suharto is the most popular president for the 1,200 respondents in the 
33 provinces. Suharto occupies the first place in the popularity poll with 36,5%, followed by 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (20,9%), Sukarno (9.8%), Megawati Sukarnoputri (9.2%), B.J. 
Habibie (4.4%) and Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid (4.3%). (in “Soeharto beats SBY in 





maintain the people’s welfare (the idea that the prices of goods were lower 
during the New Order is very widespread).  Suharto had enough power to 
enforce his will on the people, and so minimize differences in opinions and 
foreclosed avenues to conflict. Implied in this ideal image of Indonesia is the 
relegation of idealistic notions such as “freedom” and “tolerance” as 
secondary, less important values. “Democracy” is associated with the 
cacophonic chaos of opinions, castigations and accusations, often done in the 
name of “people”. The 2009 election and the large number of candidates 
people have to select from are often considered confusing. Some informants 
would rather have these candidates chosen by an authorized institution. The 
photograph of the students’ demonstration in 1998 generates comments of the 
ineffectiveness and selfishness of street demonstrations because protesters 
destroy public infrastructure (a common idea among informants in Kupang) 
and hold up the already heavy traffic (a common idea in Jakarta). Notions of 
freedom are poignantly absent in Jakarta and Kupang. 
This is in stark contrast with the narrative of “Indonesia as 
antagonism”. In their responses, there is no mentioning of homogenous order 
or material dependency on the central government. For these informants, 
freedom from oppression is highly valued. People do not perceive the reform 
era to be chaotic and disorderly. Instead, the current condition guarantees 
more freedom for the people.  




3.3 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter provides an overview of the imaginings of Indonesia and 
in doing so, argues that there is the necessity to expand upon Anderson’s 
“imagined community” by taking into account the plurality and situatedness of 
these “imaginations”. Using Laclau and Mouffe’s theorization of hegemony as 
a framework, it is possible to argue that the chain of equivalence that construct 
“Indonesia” is not equally strong, or successful in subsuming differences, in 
the three research sites. There is heterogeneity in regards to the imagination as 
well as to the community imagined.  
This adds to the discussion of culture that have engaged anthropologist 
in the past few decades. The notion of culture has received criticism for being 
too static, essentializing and ahistorical. However as Thompson et al (2007) 
highlight in their study on the perception of Southeast Asia among students in 
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore, culture as learned and shared knowledge is 
very much present in the form of “descriptive repertoires, normative cultural 
schemata and the meanings that they convey”. These are ways of thinking 
about the world at a particular period of time for a particular group of people.  
Students in Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore imagine the configuration of 
Southeast Asia differently, yet at the same time they all share an overarching 
knowledge and belief of “Southeast Asia” as a viable, regional entity 
(Thompson et al 2007).  
In the context of my research, despite the differences in the imaginings 
of Indonesia, there are some shared similarities across the three places. This is 
exemplified by the regularity in dispersion from the data obtained during 
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fieldwork. Due to the variety shown in the data, it is possible to differentiate 
responses of those who consent to being Indonesian, with those who do not 
(the “Indonesia as antagonism” discourse among youth in Banda Aceh). 
Moreover, based on the responses of informants, it becomes evident that to 
different degrees, Indonesia is imagined as a “nation” as well as a “state”. In 
other words, belongingness to a nation is not only ideological, but is also 
based on very rational, instrumental considerations.  
The following chapter will discuss in more detail the imagining of 
Indonesia from the centre. The idea of Indonesia among youth in Jakarta is the 
substantially closest to the hegemonic discourse of Indonesia in comparison 

















4 UP, CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE IMAGINING 
OF INDONESIA IN JAKARTA 
 
The nation, for young people in Jakarta, is anything but banal (cf. 
Billig 1995). At the time of the research, Jakarta was the epicentre of a wave 
of popular nationalism. The reproduction of nationalism took place in 
cyberspace, fashion, sports and music. The dispute with Malaysia over a set of 
cultural artefacts (e.g. batik, a folk song and a folk dance) was at its height, 
and one way of countering Malaysia’s (supposed) claim over these artefacts 
was by “showing” them who the rightful owners are. 65 Nationalism was no 
longer the domain of state education and the media, but became a movement 
that was trendy and fashionable in Jakarta. 
This chapter addresses the way Indonesia is imagined by youth in 
Jakarta in 2009-2010. The chain of equivalence that constructs “Indonesia” is 
stronger than in the two other sites. Despite the appropriation of nationalism 
into the popular culture, this chapter will show that this current wave of 
nationalism is still embedded into the state’s discourses of Indonesia.  
The construction of Indonesia is based on the idea of ownership of 
cultural diversity, and the overlooking of interregional political and 
economical disparity. The understanding of culture reflects closely the long-
held official discourse regarding culture and nationalism (see chapter 1). This 
                                                 
65 The 1st October 2009, a few days after I arrived in Jakarta, was the first “National Batik 
Day”. To celebrate batik’s inclusion into UNESCO’s list of intangible world heritage, the 
president had asked people to wear batik on that day. Based on my observation, this was 
received enthusiastically by the general public. Many people, mostly either university students 
or office workers, wore batik on that day. 
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understanding is also infused with capitalistic ideology that uses the “trope of 
possession” to frame nationhood (Foster 1995). Cultural elements are not 
reflective of particular worldviews but are perceived as commodities 
exchangeable for international recognition and actual economic growth.  
The second force in the constructing of the chain of equivalence is 
ignorance of other regions. Outside of the cultural artefacts, there is “nothing” 
in the peripheries. People residing in the peripheries are perceived as more 
primitive, passive and dependent. Inter-regional economic and political 
disparities are de-emphasized. The existing hierarchy is conceived as 
“natural”; like in a familial relationship where one is superior to the other, 
Jakarta holds the responsibility to guide and take care of the less capable 
peripheries. Through this logic of equivalence, internal differences and 
disparities are erased and made non-threatening.  
This chain of equivalence is constructed in contrastive comparison 
with a number of constitutive exteriorities, the strongest of which is the 
international world. The imagining of Indonesia for youth in Jakarta is partly 
shaped by a constant comparison with an imaginary cluster of developed 
countries. This imaginary other can be identified as the Lacanian Other in the 
formation of the idea of Indonesia. The importance of international 
recognition forms the backdrop of the dispute with Malaysia, perceived as the 
main competitor and so becoming another constitutive outside, one that is 
purely antagonistic.  
Although the logic of equivalence predominates, the middle class 
youth distinguish themselves from other Indonesians who they perceive to be 
less worldly. Here, one can detect the workings of the logic of difference. 
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Continuing with the standpoint theory perspective, I will start with a 
brief outline of the socio-historical trajectory of Jakarta. In particular, I am 
highlighting Jakarta as a city that for many decades has been the main 
showcase of Indonesia’s progress, a status that made it exceptionally different 
from other regions in Indonesia. 
4.1 The Socio-Historical Context of Jakarta 
This section highlights the paradoxical position of Jakarta in the power 
constellation of Indonesia. Anderson marks Jakarta as the birthplace of the 
nation (1983b). It has been dubbed as the most –even the only- Indonesian 
city” (Castles 1967), that is simultaneously also extremely different from all 
other Indonesian regions (Drake 1989). These two contrastive descriptions of 
Jakarta will be fleshed out. I will highlight three interrelated forces; the 
“melting pot”66 nature of the society, the privileged economic and political 
position, and Jakarta’s function as the key site of discursive nationalist 
practices. These factors are interrelated and generate a condition whereby 
Jakarta becomes the showcase of Indonesianness that, paradoxically, makes it 
different from any other Indonesian region. 
One of the persistent characteristics of Jakarta is its “melting pot” 
nature. Since the Dutch colonial forces67 turned the coastal city into their seat 
                                                 
66  The term is put in brackets because I hesitate to follow through with the idealistic 
connotations attached to the term.  
67 A “typical” account of Jakarta would stretch back to the 12th century when the region went 
by the name “Sunda Kelapa” and functioned as the main port for traders, the arrival of 
Portuguese in the 16th century, their subsequent defeat by the Bantenese sultanate that changed 
the name to “Jayakarta” in 1527, a year that continues to be celebrated as the “birth” year of 
Jakarta. In the 1600s the Dutch trading company, VOC, followed by the Dutch government 
took over the region and turned it into the center seat of administration for their economic and 
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of administration, it has hosted a steady stream of migrants from other regions 
in the archipelago. In the 19th century, this migration was driven by financial 
or educational interests. Batavia became the site of encounter between elite 
young students from various regions of the Dutch Indies, pilgrims in the 
education system for whom the imagining of Indonesia as a sovereign country 
became possible (Anderson [1983] 2006). 
Nationalist organizations with strong regional attachments 68  were 
conceived by students in Batavia who were exposed to western ideas of 
progress, autonomy and rationality, while at the same time maintaining 
traditional worldviews of their respective ethnic groups (van Miert 1996). 
Several of these groups, eventually declared the ‘Sumpah Pemuda’ (‘Oath of 
the Youth’) in 1928, an allegiance to ‘one homeland, one nation and one 
language.’ 69 It was within these groups of students, that the idea of Indonesia 
as a sovereign nation-state emerged.  
                                                                                                                                
political endeavours (cf. Cybriwski and Ford 2001; Winarso 2010). Taking a historical 
perspective, the city has been the destination for migrants since the 17th century, long before 
Indonesia shaped up.It was the seat of Dutch administration and people moved to Batavia, 
either as “free settlers” as well as slaves (Castles 1967). 
68  The imagined community formed during this period does not necessarily refer to 
“Indonesia”. Thus for instance, as van Miert (1996) argues, among the members of Jong 
Sumatranen Bond (JSB), the community imagined was that of Sumatra. This imagination of 
ethnic-based communities could only be produced in Batavia where internal differences 
between the ethnicities on Sumatra Island are subsumed under a common bond, i.e. of people 
who originate from Sumatra Island. Members of JSB aimed to strengthen ties among peoples 
from Sumatra, and promote “interest in the land and people of Sumatra”. Interestingly, as Van 
Miert further shows, these were partly competitive reactions to the strengthening of the 
Javanese group (Van Miert 1996). 
69 It retrospectively became a marker of the birth of Indonesian nationalism and continues to 
be commemorated annually. For a detailed discussion on the construction of Sumpah Pemuda 
as a symbol of proto-nationalism, please consult Foulcher (2000). The photograph depicting 
school children saluting the flag was taken during the commemorating ceremony of Sumpah 
Pemuda in 2009. 
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After independence, Sukarno as well as Suharto built the capital in 
accordance to their ideal images of the nation, an instance of what Kusno calls 
“nationalist urbanism”, referring to their aim to create a “unifying image of 
Jakarta as the centre that represents the nation for citizens living in the city (as 
well as elsewhere in the country)” (Kusno 2004).  
For Sukarno, Jakarta was the showcase not only of a new, independent 
nation but also of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an international anti-
colonial movement. Sukarno insisted to “...build Jakarta into the greatest city 
possible...” and envisioned it to become “...the beacon of the struggle of the 
whole humankind...of the new emerging forces.” (Abeyasekere 1985: 12). 
Physical traces of Dutch colonialism were obliterated or left to decline, and 
made place for revolutionary monuments and skyscrapers. 70  
Suharto continued to use Jakarta as nationalistic display, but adjusted it 
to his ideology. The anti-Western stance of Sukarno’s was replaced with 
Western oriented economics employing the discourse of development (Kusno 
2004). This time, the physical makeover of Jakarta was not only as 
expressions of national pride but also implicit invitations addressed at foreign 
investors (Abeyasekere 1985). In terms of internal affairs, the New Order was 
a highly centralized government and Jakarta was by far its most developed 
region. Eighty per cent of public total expenditure of the provinces was 
distributed through the national budget, controlled by government institutions 
in Jakarta (Drake 1989). The discrepancy between Jakarta and other regions 
was very significant. Drake noted that, in the early 80’s, unlike other regions 
                                                 
70 The absence of buildings from the colonial period in the Jakarta scenery is significant, 




where the average of urbanization was only 22.4%, Jakarta was thoroughly 
urbanized, the economic growth rate was high and there was a greater 
heterogeneity of population compared to all other regions (Drake 1989).  
The city continues to expand throughout the 80s. Metropolitan Jakarta 
became the core of an agglomeration that expanded to its suburbs, captured by 
the acronyms “Jabotabek” (acronym for Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi), 
and later, “Jabodetabek” (when the agglomeration incorporated Depok, West 
Java). The migration trend continues. A survey conducted in 1995 shows that 
59.6% of migrants moved to Jakarta for employment, 35.5% for familial 
reasons revolving around employment too, 2.8% for education and 1.6% for 
housing (BPS 1996 in McCarthy 2003). 
In 1998, Jakarta became the centre stage for the string of events that 
would lead to Suharto’s downfall. Its inhabitants were not only witnesses and 
actors in one of the first anti-government street protests after years of 
authoritarian rule, but also in the riots and violence71 that took more than 1000 
lives. 72  
In May 1998 the authoritarian and centralized rule broke down and the 
society was radically unsettled. This is an instance of what Laclau calls 
“dislocation”; a rupture in the discursive order (Laclau 1990). In the aftermath 
                                                 
71 Riots erupted in Jakarta on May 13-15th, 1998. Mobs looted and burnt down shopping malls 
and businesses. Female Chinese-Indonesians became the targets of gang rapes. 
72 According to the report by The Joint Fact Finding Commission (Tim Gabungan Pencari 
Fakta) , the number of deaths following the riots in Jakarta varies between institutions. “The 
Volunteer Team for Humanity” (Tim Relawan Kemanusiaan)  noted that there were 1 207 
casualties, the overwhelming majority died of fires in department stores. Data obtained by 
state bodies like the regional police department (polda), the military regional department 
(Kodam)  and Jakarta’s regional office (pemda), however, show that the casualties were 
significantly lower, 451, 463and 288 respectively. The number of rapes was never confirmed. 
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of 1998, “nationalist urbanism” as the chief discourse to build Jakarta withered 
despite strong efforts by the then governor Sutiyoso (Kusno 2004). There is 
explicit discontent and distrust with the government, making it difficult for the 
government to enforce their nationalist ideals on Jakarta (Kusno 2004). The 
state is no longer the sole authority. Furthermore, for the middle class in 
Jakarta, distrust is directed not only towards embodiments of the government, 
but also towards the lower class, as they take shelter from the latter in the ever 
increasing number of malls and the so-called New Towns73 (Kusno 2004, cf. 
Siegel 1998 on the attitude of middle class Jakartans during the May 1998 
riots towards the military and “the masses”).  In other words, the cracks in 
society that were presumably repressed under an authoritarian rule74 became 
visible. 
                                                 
73 Kusno (2004) frames malls and New Town as “two most significant middle class enclaves 
inherited from Suharto’s regime” (p. 2389). These are places where people can avoid the 
dangers of the street, filled with vendors and criminals. 
74 This repression of differences is of course not only in Jakarta. Suharto’s regime prohibited 
the people to discuss issues related to SARA (“Suku, Ras, Agama dan Antar-golongan”, or 
Ethnicity, Race, Religion and Inter-group. The latter is a vague term that is flexible enough to 




Figure 2: Map of Jakarta75  
My informants from Jakarta are situated in this particular juncture and 
their imaginings of Indonesia are embedded in this socio-historical condition. 
In the following part, I elaborate on their imaginings of Indonesia. In 
accordance to with Laclau and Mouffe’s theorization, I will start by addressing 
construction of the chain of equivalence, concentrating on the strategies and 
notions that are used to frame sameness and to subsume differences. The 
second section will continue by elaborating the constitutive exteriors of this 
chain of equivalence. 
 
                                                 
75 From http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkas:Peta_Jakarta.gif retrieved 13/08/2013 
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4.2 The Hegemonic Construction of a Community 
Being in the centre, young people in Jakarta have internalized the 
hegemonic discourse of Indonesia, more than in the two other research sites. 
There are generally two ideas drawn from the dominant discourse that are 
reflected in the youth’s narratives of Indonesia. The first one is the idea of 
culture as a “national” possession, and the second one is the downplaying of 
interregional disparity. Both ideas are strategies that have been employed by 
various regimes in Indonesia to structure the idea of a singular “Indonesia”. 
4.2.1“Culture” as the Foundation in the Construction of a Chain of 
Equivalence 
One of the most important markers of Indonesia for youth in Jakarta is 
its cultural diversity. In line with the state’s discourse, as for instance 
embodied in Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the nation is imagined as an entity 
that contains a uniquely high variety of traditional cultures. Knowing the 
Indonesian cultures is one of the main signs of being Indonesian. This idea of 
Indonesia is clearly detectable in the responses of the informants and in the 
general expressions of nationalism in Jakarta at the time of the research, as the 
following elaboration will show. 
  
4.2.1.1 Nationalizing and domesticating culture  
 
Desi was a third year student when I met her in 2009. Her parents 
migrated from North Sumatra to Jakarta to pursue higher education, and her 
father had subsequently worked at the Indonesian Taxation Authority. When I 
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showed her the photographs of Qory Sandioriva and Sunny Halim, like for 
most informants, it was not difficult for her to decide which pageant would be 
more suitable to represent Indonesia internationally. Desi pointed at Qory’s 
photograph, 
She knows more about Indonesia, the typical things of Indonesia. I think that people 
out there, or the judges, would like (Qory) more. (What are the things that she needs 
to know?) The cultures of each region, probably. Like the culture of Javanese, the 
culture of Batak, and so on. (Desi, 21 year old, student) 
 
Desi’s stance is a strong echo of the dominant state’s discourse. As 
discussed briefly in the first chapter, “culture” is understood as the set of 
tangible or perceivable products that are assumed to be unique to particular 
ethnic groups, and yet harmoniously in correspondence with each other. In the 
example given by Desi, the Batak and the Javanese cultures are imagined to be 
equivalent because they are considered to contain similar items like dances, 
costumes, or traditional house.76 This folklorizing is necessary to dismantle the 
various regional cultures from all its dynamics and complexities that might 
threaten the nation’s unity. Yampolsky (1995) notes that the New Order 
particularly controlled regional cultures to ensure that they do not pose 
political dissent, do not transgress moral boundaries (e.g. are not offensive to 
any of the five religions), and are of a “good” quality. At the end, what is 
valued is “...art that is neat and orderly, disciplined, inoffensive, attractive or 
impressive to look at, pleasant to listen to” (Yampolsky 1995: 712). Thus, 
culture is not seen as a collective system of beliefs, knowledge, values or 
                                                 
76 This was how cultural diversity was introduced to the young generation. The common 
teaching activity demands the students to memorize and match the ethnic groups to their 




norms that individuals consider to be commonsensical and logical due to 
socialization processes. Cultural aspects of a group that are incompatible with 
the government’s idea of the Indonesian culture are conveniently erased, a 
strategy that reinforces the chain of equivalence.  
 
4.2.1.2 Commodifying culture  
Although state discourses of culture play an important role in the 
construction of Indonesia, it is imperative to see its intertwinement with the 
logic of the market.  As Comaroff and Comaroff note in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), 
ethnicity is increasingly commodified. Expressions of worldviews and ways of 
living (that is, culture) are marketed as signs of “the tradition of a people”, 
exchangeable with material gains. This takes place especially through the 
tourism industry. Increasingly, culture is perceived as property, framed in 
terms of ownership. This is a transformative force in the self-imagining of a 
nation. In a volume on nation-making in Melanesian countries, LiPuma (1995) 
argues that “the emergence of the citizen, national identity, and forms for 
objectifying ‘the nation’ are inseparable from a progressive materialization of 
history, whereby people increasingly identify history with object property… 
rather than with knowledge or social relation” (p. 40). 
The imagining of Indonesia in Jakarta is reflective of this global 
trend.77 I met Ester and her friend, Sian, in one of the restaurants in a shopping 
                                                 
77 The commodification of culture in Indonesia is by no means the only time that the idea of 
culture is informed by external forces. Pemberton’s study (1994) clearly shows how the 
Javanese culture was fashioned out of Dutch repression. As the Dutch power over Java grew 
stronger, people turned “inward” and focused on culture. However, whereas for Pemberton’s 
subject, Javanese culture became a means to deal with the encroaching foreign force, for the 
current day youth in Jakarta, Indonesian culture is first and foremost a means of recognition 
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centre next to their university in downtown Jakarta. It was lunch time and they 
had just finished a class. Ester’s parents’ migrated from North Sumatra, 
making her categorically a Batak although she does not speak any of their 
languages, while Sian’s grandparents migrated to Indonesia from China. Sian 
and her sister had stayed in China with her father’s family for a year after the 
ethnic riot in 1998 for fear of further violence.78 Like Desi, they agreed that 
knowledge of culture is the most important trait, especially for a representative 
of Indonesia. The link between culture and tourism is more explicit in their 
responses.  
I would prefer her (Qory) to represent the country if her knowledge about Indonesia, 
culture, tourism is solid….but if she does not know culture and tourism, I would rather 
have the other girl (Sunny) do it….Because, you know, if (knowledge about culture)  is 
not there, whose culture are you going to promote? (Ester, 22 year old, student) 
 
For youth in Jakarta, cultural artefacts are commodities in the global 
market that is increasingly defined and framed by the tourism industry. Ester’s 
emphasis on the importance of knowing “culture, tourism” implies an overlap 
of both areas.  
The commodification of culture is not only outwardly oriented towards 
prospective international tourists, but is also directed inward. Nationalism is 
expressed by consuming culture. For instance, the clothing line “Damn! I love 
Indonesia!”, 79 owned by a former MTV VJ, brands itself as combining “…the 
                                                                                                                                
by foreign forces. This is indicated by the fact that my informants do not have expansive and 
detailed knowledge of these “culture”. 
78 Her father’s clothing factory in the Western part of Jakarta was burned in the riots but they 
have since established a restaurant offering Chinese cuisine (they were preparing to open the 
second branch of the restaurant when I met her in 2009). Sian’s experiences in 1998 made her 
one of the two informants in Jakarta who dislike Suharto. The other informant is Dimas, the 
son of a former political prisoner accused of as being a member of the communist party. 
79Note that this expression is untranslatable into Indonesian, indicating the global aspect of 
Indonesia’s nationalism in Jakarta. 
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richness of Indonesian traditional culture with today's youth pop culture.” 80 A 
number of established national and global brands capitalize on the growing 
nationalism by making nationalist-themed television commercials. In these 
commercials, “nationalism” is conveyed through the showcasing of many 
“exotic” cultures of Indonesia, 81 e.g. the traditional dances and costumes of 
people in Papua, Maluku, North Sumatra, Bali, etc. The main characters with 
which the audience should identify themselves are invariably depicted as 
people from big cities who visit these faraway places as either tourists or 
adventurers. The overall message that these brands want to convey is clear: 
consumption of the products and nationalism go hand in hand. 
This intertwinement between nationalism (a sphere that had been 
dominated by the state in the New Order) and consumerism/global capitalism 
could perhaps be better understood in what Heryanto (2010) observes as the 
growing tendency to frame political participation (the 2009 election) through 
the discourse of entertainment. The domain of popular culture (fashion, music, 
entertainment in general) has become an acceptable site for political 
participation, including expressions of nationalism.  
The perception that culture is an object or a commodity facilitates the 
strengthening of the chain of equivalence. Similar to the New Order’s 
domestication and regulation of culture, internal differences between 
worldviews and customs of various ethnic groups are fashionably smoothed 
over in the reform era. At the same time, the capitalistic discourse also informs 
                                                 
80  English in original in http://www.damniloveindonesia.com/about.php 
81 The range of products varies widely, from food and beverage to cigarettes, from national 
brands to international ones (e.g. Coca-Cola, Nokia and Mercedes Benz have all used 
nationalist-themes in their promotional activities).   
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the construction of antagonism. The animosity against Malaysia is based on 
the idea that Malaysia is the archrival that offers the same commodities to the 
international market. This will be discussed in the penultimate section of the 
chapter.  
The following part will engage with the perception of other regions 
from Jakarta. Because “cultural diversity” as propagated by the state has 
become the only acceptable –and hence also the only perceivable- way to 
appraise difference, youth in Jakarta have little interest in other regions aside 
from their “cultural” contribution to the nation’s pantheon. 
4.2.2 The Negative Space of Indonesia: of Forgetting and Emptiness 
Some photographs often elicit responses that reveal the informants’ 
perceptions of other regions and the positionality of one’s own region in the 
larger constellation of Indonesia (e.g. the photograph of Jakarta’s skyline). 
With the youth of Jakarta, a myopic vision of the Outer Islands is clearly 
identifiable -including among those whose parents migrated from outside Java. 
A visual metaphor used in Jakarta to describe the regions is that there is 
“nothing” there.  
I argue that this “nothingness” of the other regions serves as the 
negative space in the imagining of Indonesia. The negative space is a concept 
in visual studies that refers to the empty space surrounding an object. The 
presence of this negative space (in other words, the absence of another 
presence) contributes to the form of the object. Thus, it is precisely the 
“nothingness” of the regions that makes Indonesia from Jakarta appears as a 
solid and coherent entity, devoid of the complexity of internal disparities. 
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The idea that there is nothing outside of Jakarta is identifiable in the 
conversation with Intan. At that time, she was about to finish her study in 
journalism in a private college in 2009. Since she was five years old, she used 
to divide her time between Pontianak where her parents live, and Jakarta 
where she stayed with her extended family who are Buginese. However, she 
understands very little of Bugis language and has not visited the region for a 
very long time. Intan finished her senior high school (Sekolah Menengah 
Umum) in Pontianak, where she met the boyfriend she was with at the time of 
the research (her boyfriend, Rudi was also interviewed in the same session as 
was Intan’s cousin, Maya). Rudi, moved to Yogyakarta before settling down 
in Jakarta to establish his own business. When we talked about Pontianak, she 
stated unambiguously, 
There’s really nothing in Pontianak. It’s just because my parents are there....oh, and 
my younger sibling is there too. There, I would only hang around in my parents’ 
bedroom. Other than that, if my parents are not there, I would rather not go to 
Pontianak. (Intan, 22 year old, student) 
A similar attitude about Pontianak was shown by Maya who has lived 
in Jakarta throughout her life. During our talk, Maya repeatedly teased Rudi, 
who was born and who grew up in Pontianak, for his hometown’s poor 
infrastructure: the roads are cracked, there are many patches of land with wild 
vegetation (kebon), the school wall is made from bamboo and parking lots are 
overgrown by grass. He subtly defended himself by blaming the 
underdevelopment on the swampy soil of the region that makes it unsuitable 
for high-rise buildings, and somewhat inconsistently, pointed out that they do 
have a shopping centre and a “21” (the national Cineplex chain) since the 90’s. 
Intan and Maya’s attitudes regarding Pontianak are common among the 
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middle class youth in Jakarta: the regions are imagined as lacking, and 
basically, as “nothing”. 
There are other expressions wherein the “nothingness” is implied. 
These will be further discussed in the entailing section. 
4.2.2.1 Dependent and weak peripheries 
Other than the explicit mention of how there is “nothing” in the 
regions, the image of “nothingness” of the peripheries is implied in the notion 
that people in the regions are helpless and dependent on the center; 
conceptually depriving them of agency and will, and thus, negating the 
possibility of various discordant opinions and interests. This is a depiction that 
reoccurs frequently in discussions about the Outer Islands, as the following 
excerpts will show. 
Tina and Iwan are two siblings from a Padang family. They are the 
third generation of migrants. Their grandfather moved to Jakarta from Padang. 
His wife, their grandmother, came from Solo. This fact only dawned upon 
Tina a few months after this interview during a conversation we had with her 
cousin, who pointed this out. Iwan was born in the United States where their 
father obtained his Master’s Degree. Tina was born a few years later in 
Palembang, when their father lectured in Universitas Sriwijaya, the state 
university. Both came across as particularly opinionated about many issues. 
As we were discussing the photograph of Timor Leste, I asked them what they 
think of the separatist movements in Papua and Aceh. Iwan, the older sibling, 
said the following. 
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Oh Papua. Honestly, in the case of Papua, it is Indonesia’s fault…Everything 
in Papua was taken by Indonesia, but Indonesia did not guide (membina) them 
(Iwan, 21 year old, office worker) 
As the discussion shifted to Aceh’s demands for separation, his sister 
argued, 
Tina: I don’t think Aceh will (separate). Well, it’s up to them, but they will go 
bankrupt eventually. 
Iwan: But they seem to really demand separation. 
Tina: Still, they’re dependent on Jakarta. I’m very sure. I think, at least for 
people in Sumatra, they are dependent on Jakarta.” (a conversation 
between Tina, 19 year old student and Iwan, 21 year old office worker)  
 
The term “membina” (from “bina”) suggests a patronizing position 
where a party is “enlightened” by a superior other. By assuming that 
Indonesia82 is in charge of guiding Papua or Aceh, Indonesia is positioned as 
being more advanced and hence morally responsible for the well-being of the 
regions. In the context of regional discontent, youth in Jakarta always use the 
term “Indonesia” to refer to the dominant party, instead of “Jakarta”, the 
central government, or “Java” (these terms are often used interchangeably in 
the two other cities). This is another strategy to erase interregional injustices 
by locating the problem to lie between Indonesia as an authoritative 
collectivity versus one particular, trouble-making region (instead of a 
problematic pattern where the centre oppresses all other regions). 
At some point, as Tina was talking about her road trip to Padang and 
the bare plots of land she saw along the way, she stopped abruptly and 
introspectively examined her myopic vision of Indonesia.  
I think, when I say I’m a nationalist, the sentiment is only in the context of 
Jakarta, not the whole of Indonesia...I know it’s wrong, all I can see is Jakarta. 
                                                 
82 Also, by using the term “Indonesia”, it indicates the confidence that whatever will happen to 
these smaller regions, Indonesia will continue to exist. 
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Whenever someone talks about Indonesia, I would only think of Jakarta. 
However, there are actually many regions that we can develop. We can move 
to another region and develop it. (Tina, 19 year old, student) 
Even when realizing that her horizon of Indonesia is limited to Jakarta, 
Tina remained confident that people in other regions would benefit from 
development initiated by the centre. This implies the idea that the people in the 
peripheries are not self-reliant, and their advancement is conditioned on the 
graciousness of the people from the center.  
Important to note is how discussions about regional development are 
framed in the context of compassion from the side of the more developed 
centre. By framing it as aid, instead of as right, Jakarta’s domination and 
possible exploitation of the regions are naturalized and de-problematized. 
Material disparity is not attributed to wrongful acts of injustices by identifiable 
agents, but is merely taken for granted as an accepted fact.  
4.2.2.2 Forgetting Timor Leste 
Although informants tend to overlook interregional disparity, the 
photograph of Timor Leste made the informants face what is fundamentally a 
negation of Indonesia and a disruption in the chain of equivalence. 
Interestingly, most informants (with the exception of Tomas and Dimas, two 
politically well-informed informants,) have forgotten about Timor Leste. 83 
Although they are aware of its earlier attachment to Indonesia, they do not 
remember or know the reason for its secession.  
                                                 
83 To put matters in a temporal perspective, Timor Leste’s referendum took place in 1999, 
thus one year after the 1998 riots that Jakarta’s youth do remember. Most of my informants 
were in their early teenage years, and understandably too young to remember these events 
based on their own personal experiences of watching or reading the news. Knowledge of these 
period must be obtained through other parties, e,g, family members, teachers, the media, etc. 
The fact that Suharto and the 1998 riots are better preserved in their “memory” than Timor 
Leste’s secession mirrors the wider public’s lack of interest in Timor Leste.  
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Liza and Indah are two best friends since high school. Indah’s parents 
rent a stall in a wet market in South Jakarta where they sell fresh vegetables, 
and every day she would help them out. Liza’s father was a football coach, but 
became unemployed after suffering a stroke. He had wanted her to continue 
university education in Ambon, his hometown, but after spending a few 
months there, Liza decided that she could not adapt to the city because, as she 
recalled, “the people are rude” and she does not understand the language.  
The following lengthy quote is necessary to give a sense of the 
vagueness of the memory as they try to recall and figure out what happened to 
Timor Leste. 
Liza: They have broken away, right? 
Indah: Broken away? Oh, (you mean) Timor Leste 
Liza: This is that thing with KD (short for “Krisdayanti”, an Indonesian singer who at 
that time just married a business mogul from Timor Leste) 
Indah: Huh? How did you get to KD? Well, it’s not wrong (laughs) 
Liza: Yeah, that celebrity 
Indah: You and your gossips! 
Liza: Oh, this happened in 2002…well…I don’t really know.  (The secession) should 
have been prevented before it was too late ….Why did they separate? Was it 
because they were not provided for? 
Indah: What’s this symbol? (pointing to the flag) 
Liza: I don’t know… Was it because Indonesia bombed them and things like that? Or 
was it because the people were neglected? I don’t know. 
Indah: So that’s why they separated… 
Liza: It’s too bad for them, if they stay with Indonesia, they would receive aid in case 
something like tsunami happens. In their case…it will not be like that. 
Indah: They were neglected. 
Liza: Yes, too bad. Maybe they separated because they had thought, ‘I’m being 
neglected, it’s better for me to separate….’ Timor Leste…ehh, a small town that 
is denser than Jakarta, eh, I mean, Indonesia. But I don’t think Timor Leste is 
well-known. It’s not. It’s only famous in gossip shows.  
(A conversation between Liza, 19, student and Indah, 19, student) 
 
While the disregard of the conflict between Timor Leste and 
Indonesia’s central government could be interpreted as political and historical 
ignorance on the part of the youth, I propose to see this as another strategy that 
reinforces the imagining of Indonesia as a homogeneous nation. The 
conversation between the two girls reflects a denial of Timor Leste’s 
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secession. This attitude is grounded in the larger society. Thus for instance, 
analyzing how Timor Leste is covered in History textbooks for junior high 
school (SMP) and senior high school (SMU) in the 2000 curriculum in 
Malang, Java, Gratton (2004) reveals that the stances are in contradiction with 
each other. While the SMP textbook frames Timor Leste as a burden (“duri 
dalam daging”; a thorn in the flesh) for Indonesia, the SMU textbook 
discusses the Santa Cruz Incident, thereby suggesting that there might be a 
justifiable reason for their independence movement. Gratton (2004) concludes 
that this difference might be due to the whims of their editors than anything 
else. Interestingly, the 2006 History curriculum does not include the secession 
of Timor Leste altogether. 84   The fact that it took three years before the 
absence was publicly discussed indicates reluctance or ignorance to deal with 
the history of Timor Leste and Indonesia. 
The glossing over or even forgetting of Timor Leste’s breakaway is 
another expression of the “nothingness” attributed to the peripheries. 
Forgetting implies that “nothing” has happened there. This is a necessary 
strategy to avoid a rupture in the chain of equivalence. Admitting that a part of 
Indonesia preferred to be no longer a part of the nation would mean that the 
unity can be questioned.  
The logic of equivalence is necessarily selective; it homogenizes by 
erasing elements that could rupture the chain of equivalence. In the case of 
Jakarta’s youth, it selectively omits the event that disrupts and questions 
Indonesia, that is, Timor Leste’s separation. One could evoke the famous 





words of Ernest Renan in his classic lecture, “Forgetting…is a crucial factor in 
the creation of a nation” ([1882] in Bhabha 1990: 11). 
The forgetting of Timor Leste indicates a collective denial of regional 
discontent. As the conversation between the two girls suggests, young people 
in Jakarta are not imperceptive: they rightly speculated that Timor Leste was 
“not provided for” and “neglected” by the central government. Despite the 
concern, implied in this attitude is, as mentioned earlier, the taken for granted 
idea that “Indonesia” (or the center, or Jakarta) is in charge and responsible for 
the wellbeing of other regions. The hierarchy and power disparity is tacitly 
accepted.  
4.3 The Constitutive Others 
 
So far, in this chapter I have addressed how the imagining of Indonesia 
among youth in Jakarta involves strategies that emphasize interregional 
similarities while downplaying differences. The data presented have not 
diverted from the existing analysis about the homogenizing state’s discourses 
regarding diversity/difference (see Chapter 1). This section presents an aspect 
of the construction of nationhood in Indonesia that has not received as much 
attention, that is, the constitutive outside. These are exterior elements against 
which the chain can be contrasted, or what is theoretically termed as the 
“Other”. 
The data obtained indicate that there are two interrelated Others at play 
in the imagining of Indonesia: the international world and Malaysia. The 
international world is an umbrella term I use here to refer to a number of 
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countries that young people in Jakarta perceive as models of how nation-states 
should be. Because young people construct Indonesia based on comparisons 
and recognitions of these other states, there is a pessimistic and negative self-
stereotyping of “Indonesia” among the young in Jakarta. I employ the notion 
of Lacanian Other to interpret the way that the imagined international world 
informs the imagination of Indonesia. 
The second identifiable constitutive exterior is Malaysia. The 
neighbouring country with which people in Jakarta share linguistic and 
cultural commonalities is the epitome of what Laclau and Mouffe identify as 
the antagonistic other. Antagonism involves the belief that once the 
antagonistic force has been annihilated, “we” will become who “we” are 
supposed to be (Laclau and Mouffe [1985]2001).  Malaysia is the archrival 
that denies Indonesia of its destiny to be internationally recognized for its 
cultural diversity. In other words, the conflict with Malaysia is related to the 
international world as the Lacanian Other, and the wider tendency to apply the 
logic of the market to nationhood (see section 4.2.1.2 on “Commodifying 
Culture”). 
4.3.1 “Luar” as the Lacanian Other 
The construction of Indonesia among youth in Jakarta is outlined 
against the international world, simply referred to by “luar” (outside) in daily 
conversations. The countries mentioned in the responses are those that are 
considered more developed, thus “The West” (North-America, West-Europe 
and Australia) and Asian countries like China, Japan, Korea and Singapore.  
This imaginary congregation of stable, modern and civilized countries 
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represent the ideal and normative nationhood. They serve as the Lacanian 
Other, a notion referring to the knowledgeable, authoritative and valuable 
exteriority (Dashtipour 2009). The Other represents “the rules that govern the 
game” (Hook 2008) in which the subject is always already embedded. While it 
might seem unwarranted to extrapolate tenets drawn from studies on 
individuals’ psyche to explain collectivities, Lacan’s Other is not exclusively 
located at the level of the individual (although it is internalized), but is a 
“social substance” (Hook 2008). In other words, it is possible to use the term 
to understand the shared imaginings that a collectivity has regarding an 
authoritative, superior, rule-giving exterior. 
In the context of this research, I argue that other countries are 
positioned as the Lacanian Other because they embody taken for granted ideas 
of how nations should be. Among Jakarta’s youth, there is a constant looking 
at, and up, to other countries. This generates the sense that “we” are also being 
watched by “them”, an omniscient –and judgmental- Other.85  Put in other 
words, youth in Jakarta define Indonesia through comparisons with other 
countries, or by imagining how Indonesia is perceived by them. 86  
                                                 
85 The anxiety is prevalent. In the interview with Nia, as she was commenting to the photo of 
the flag raising ceremony and wondered whether pupils in other countries do the same, she 
suddenly asked whether there is a “gap” (she used the English term) between Singaporeans 
and Indonesians. Not really understanding where she was coming from, I asked her to clarify. 
Nia replied, 
“I mean socially. Like in the US, what I know is that Indonesians there are looked down on; 
the people do not want to mix with them (“dipisahin”, lit “separated”). What about 
Singapore?” (Nia,22 year old, student). 
86 The positioning of other countries as significant exteriorities is of course not exceptional. 
The imagination about one nation presupposes the imagination about the existence of other 
nations, forming an inter-national system. Concisely stated by Ree (1998: 83), “nations only 
exist in the plural”, a phenomenon referred to as “internationality” (p.80). Anderson discusses 
the presence of other nations in the construction of imagined community in his notion of 
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The developed countries serve as models, points of reference, of how a 
nation-state should be in terms of society’s welfare as well as the political 
system. Thus Desi’s explanation of why “luar” is better is because it is not 
overpopulated and polluted like Jakarta. Nia, a student in Business 
Administration, pointed out the lack of public parks in Jakarta.  
...like the Central Park in New York...so that people do not have to be in the malls 
during the day”. (Nia, 22 year old, student) 
 
 
The constant comparison with other countries is not only in regards to 
the comfort and quality of life. Intan, who did her final bachelor thesis on the 
communication strategies of parties in the 2009 campaign, compared 
Indonesia’s electoral system with that of the United States and Britain, 
If we make a comparison (English in original) with independent states like the US, 
you see that there they only have the Republican and the Democratic Parties. It is the 
same in UK, there are only two parties; the Labour and Conservative. Here, it’s really 
a mess, a total mess. (Intan, 22 year old, student) 
 
 
The use of the term “independent” indicates the assumption that an 
orderly system of election with a small number of participating parties is part 
of how a sovereign state should be. Indonesia, despite its independence, has 
not met this criterion. The comparison of Indonesia’s “messy” multi-party 
electoral system with those of other countries (mainly the United States) was 
frequently pointed out in the interviews.  
The informants are of the opinion that the reform era has brought chaos 
and confusion. The disappointment with reformasi is palpable. They use the 
terms “gloomy” (“suram”), “scattered” (“berantakan”), “in pieces” (“ancur”) 
                                                                                                                                
“unbound seriality” (Anderson 1998:34). What is noteworthy in the case of Jakarta’s youth is 




to describe the current condition (often as a response to the electoral ballot, to 
the 1998 rally or as nostalgia elicited by the photograph of Suharto,). With the 
exception of two informants (Sian whose family business was ruined in the 
1998 riot, and Dimas, whose father was political prisoner), the New Order is 
favourable because Suharto was able to maintain stability and control the 
people. Even an individual like Tomas, who is a political activist in one of the 
most politically active universities in the toppling over of Suharto expressed 
sympathy to him, 
I miss this man. (Why?) It’s obvious, now everything is in pieces, nothing is certain 
anymore in Indonesia. (Thomas, 26 year old, student) 
 
Generally, comparison with other countries generates feelings of 
inferiority. Dyah is a 23 year old administration staff in a multinational 
company at the time of the research. I met her and her brother, Tio, in their 
family’s modest rented house in one of the narrow alleys around Menteng 
Pulo cemetery in South Jakarta. When we discussed the photograph of an 
international group of friends, she told me why it is difficult for Indonesians to 
relate to foreigners. 
Indonesians are stupid, they’re very weak in language well, language and…religion, I 
guess. I think Indonesians are overly fanatic. Ridiculous. Mmmm…and the 
intelligence level is low (laughs). Even those with higher education in Indonesia can 
be very narrow-minded, so they would not have anything to talk about to a foreigner. 
They might feel awkward and not really know, ‘what should I talk about with a bule 
(Caucasian)? (Dyah, 23 year old office worker) 
In many ways, Indonesians are imagined to be inferior to foreigners. 
The attitude is widely shared across the interviews: Indonesians are 
undisciplined, unintelligent, and impolite. There is a tendency to use the third 
person pronoun (“orang Indonesia”) and not the first person plural pronoun 
(“kita”) when expressing these traits, suggesting that informants distance 
themselves from the Indonesians to whom the negative descriptions are 
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applied to. 87 Implied is the division between us” (who are knowledgeable, 
disciplined, cosmopolitan, and thus more similar to people from developed 
countries) and “them” (the inadequate government, the undisciplined and 
uncivilized Indonesians, etc). 88 I propose to see this as manifestations of the 
logic of difference (i.e. alternative discourses that disrupt the chain of 
equivalence) in Jakarta’s youth’s idea of an unproblematically united 
Indonesia. The alternative discourse here is globalization, and the importance 
                                                 
87 Examples of the use of “orang Indonesia” emerging in the interviews are as follows. 
On the cancellation of the friendly against Manchester United:  
“it was because these Indonesian people rioted, that’s why (it was cancelled) (Liza, 19 year 
old student) 
Response to photo of Jakarta’s skyline:  
“As usual, it’s difficult to regulate Indonesians. Motorcycles would often cut you off. People 
don’t apologize if they hit you, they do not have respect for other people.” (Desi 21 year old 
student) 
Response to photo of a group of youth:  
“They say Indonesians are friendly. Yeah right, they seem friendly but are actually the kings 
of terrorism (raja teroris).” (Dimas, 24 years old, freelancer) 
Examples of the use of “kita” 
On the importance of flag-raising ceremony:  
“So that we remember history” (Liza, 19 year old student) 
Also on the same topic:  
“The ceremony to me is an expression of respect to the forefathers, to make us aware that we 
are Indonesians…” (Dimas, 24 year old, freelancer) 
I became aware of this distinction when during the interview with Nia (22 year old student) 
when she corrected herself, changing from “us” to “them”:   
“When (the tsunami) happened, it was the Americans who helped (us). How come we are not 
ashamed, Indonesians I mean, are not ashamed of that. (The Americans) have been scolded 
(by Indonesians), but they are the ones who eventually helped out.” 
88 This tendency was perceivable even in 1998 although it did not become a public issue. In a 
piece about the 1998 demonstrations and riots, Siegel (1998) noted that the middle class in 
Jakarta are distrustful of the lower class as well as the authorities. I personally experienced 
how very early on in 1998, students joining long marches were required to wear their 
respective “alma mater jackets” (jaket alma mater, each university has their own jacket) to 




of international approval. This divides Indonesians in two groups, those who 
know how to achieve international approval (the position wherein my 
informants situate themselves) and those who do not. 
Although the sense of instability brought about by the reform era might 
have increased the criticism against fellow Indonesians, this is by no means a 
new discourse. In 2012, the second edition of Mochtar Lubis’89 1977 speech 
titled “Manusia Indonesia” was re-printed. In the prologue, Jakob Oetama, 
founder of the daily Kompas, explained that Lubis’ speech has become all the 
more relevant and substantial during the mercurial period of reformasi 
(Oetama in Lubis [2001] 2012). In his speech, Lubis listed what he saw to be 
the weaknesses (feudal, hypocritical, irresponsible, superstitious, lacking 
integrity) and the strengths (artistic, due to people’s closeness to nature) of a 
prototypical manusia Indonesia. 90  One could trace the similarity between 
Lubis’ imagining of “the Indonesian” with how youth in Jakarta imagine 
Indonesia to be culturally diverse (or, in Lubis’ words, artistic) and yet inept to 
fulfil the requirements of a modern society, as exemplified by the established 
modern nations. Nairn’s thesis of the nationhood as Janus-faced, 
simultaneously oriented towards the future and the past at the same time, is 
reflected in the split attitude of my informants as well as in Lubis’s speech. 
In a twisted way, one finds shadows of Anderson’s “spectre of 
comparison”, as the image of an ideal Indonesia is framed through unbound 
seriality that assumes an attitude of “open-to-the-world” and a frame of 
                                                 
89 An acknowledged writer, journalist and winner of the Ramon Magsaysay award in 1958 
90 The imagining of Indonesia of Jakarta’s youth as a nation superior in terms of culture but 
inferior in terms of “modern”, organizational abilities are based on the same line of thought 
one that, I would argue, contains traces of internalized Orientalism. 
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universality that constructs the world as seamless 91  (Anderson 1998). 
However, unlike the speech made by Haji Misbach in 1920 that drew perfect 
parallels between the anti-colonial struggle in Java with the one in Austria92 
(Anderson 1998:30-32), Indonesia in the imagination of current day youth in 
Jakarta (and, based on Lubis’ work, this is probably a post-independence 
phenomenon) is a painful failure to live up to the standards of other nation-
states, introduced by the same logic of unbound seriality.   
The international world as the Lacanian Other is one of the strongest 
and most pervasive constitutive exterior. Throughout its history, Indonesia has 
positioned itself either in opposition or in alliance with the Western 
countries 93 , an ambivalence that paradoxically indicates the persistent 
presence of this particular Other. One could recall Gupta’s rejection of 
“homogeneous, empty time”. In post-colonial states like Indonesia, “the nation 
is shaped by a sense of lag and historical consciousness of lack” (Gupta 2004). 
                                                 
91 Unbound seriality is exemplified by a sense that “…from Bangkok and Birmingham two 
parallel series were stretching out across, and seamlessly mapping, a singular world” 
(Anderson 1998: 34). 
92 Haji Misbach, a haji and communist living a small village in Central Java in the 1920’s held 
a public speech wherein he drew parallels between social changes happening in Java with 
those taking place in Austria, depicting how the world is being turned upside down in both 
places.  
93 More than fifty years apart from each other two works on Indonesia’s relation with “the 
West” were published, producing a strikingly similar analysis. In “Indonesia and The West”, 
Palmier (1955) analyzes the paradoxical relation, “along with aversion goes a desire to win the 
esteem...of foreign countries.” A similar analysis is provided by Elson (2006) although he did 
not refer to Palmier’s work. In a similarly titled article, he argues that there is “repugnance 
and allure”, in Indonesia’s attitude to the West. Perceiving the West as ‘being modern’, the 
ambivalence comes from a desire to be modern like the West, but at the same time a fear that 
it would cause a loss of the essential Indonesian ‘self’. As the earlier section shows, these 
stances have been imprinted in the development of Jakarta by Sukarno and Suharto, with 
Sukarno’s regime closer to opposition against the West and Suharto’s inclined towards 
alliance. In this continuity, it is possible to argue that the attitude of young people in Jakarta is 
closer to Suharto’s stance than to Sukarno’s. 
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This section has described how nationhood among youth in Jakarta is defined 
by this lack. 
4.3.2 “Malaysia” as the Antagonistic Other 
 
An excess of the importance of the international world as the Lacanian 
Other is the positioning of Malaysia as Indonesia’s antagonism, as the main 
rival in the competition over international approval. 94 Although Malaysia is 
legally and geographically another country –and thus literally part of the 
international world-, young people in Jakarta do not categorize the country as 
such. Comparing Malaysia to Australia and China, Desi noted that the two 
latter countries are “luar beneran” (really outside), implying that Malaysia is 
not. Implied here is that Malaysia is not “worthy” to be called “luar”.  
Malaysia and Indonesia are equal in terms of their international reputation.  
Malaysia’s claim over a number of cultural products spurred the 
dispute. In 2007, Malaysia’s “Truly Asia” campaign95 used the song “Rasa 
Sayange”, a folk song widely thought as originating in the Moluccas, 96 
                                                 
94 The bilateral relation between Indonesia and Malaysia has been marked by intermittent 
spats although none escalated into outright war. One could argue that Malaysia is the “default” 
archenemy of Indonesians during times of internal crisis. In 1963 Malaysia unilaterally 
declared ownership of Sabah and Serawak and Sukarno launched an anti-Malaysia campaign 
with the forceful slogan, “Ganyang Malaysia”. While this leg of crisis ended in 1966 when 
Suharto took over the leadership, three years later another dispute took place over the islands 
Ligitan and Sipadan, also at offshore North Borneo. It was only in 2002 that the International 
Court decided that they belonged to Malaysia. The current spat started in 2005 or 2006 with 
the renewed dispute over the Ambalat block in the Celebes Sea.  
95A video of the ad with comments from Youtube users from presumably Malaysia and 
Indonesia’s side of the feud, expressing their mutual dislike : 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eu-nfKFDSB8   
96  “Gubernur Maluku Bersikeras Lagu "Rasa Sayange" Milik Indonesia” Antara News 
website, 3 October, 2007 in http://www.antaranews.com/view/?i=1191423395&c=SBH&s= 
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eliciting attacks from Indonesia’s hacker communities. Similar problems 
ensued when Indonesians realized that Malaysia folk art Barongan is similar 
to “Reog Ponorogo” a lion dance from East Java, and that the country also 
produces batik, the epitome of Indonesia’s “high” culture. 97 Again in 2009, an 
ad for a television show titled “Enigmatic Malaysia” incorporated shots of 
Tari Pendet, a Balinese dance, and fuelled protests from the Indonesian side. 98 
The term “Indon”, that is used by Malaysia’s press to refer to Indonesians was 
subsequently perceived as derogatory in Jakarta. 
The bitterness ran deep among my informants. When I showed to Liza 
the photograph of the Balinese dancer, her first response was, “Malaysia”. For 
her, the meaning of the photograph is less determined by the elements that 
show its “intrinsic” nature (e.g. the costume that refers to Balinese culture, the 
pose that refers to the act of dancing, etc) and could hypothetically be seen as 
referring to “Indonesia’s”, but instead it reminds her first and foremost by 
what it is not. She continued,  
Liza: ...there are so many cases like this, like batik. (They are being) claimed (as 
Malaysia’s) 
Indah: This is a Balinese dance, is this kecak? 99 Eh, no it’s not. 
                                                 
97  Processes of centuries-long cultural migration and assimilation between the people in 
Southeast Asia were never part of the public discourse in Indonesia. Although one could 
attribute this to an ignorant population, the absence of pre-nation discourses indicates the 
strength of nation-states as a framework to make sense of the world. 
98 Discovery Channel Singapore, the maker of the ad and broadcaster of the show eventually 
apologized to Indonesia and retracted the shot. The apology did not have the intended effect 
and contempt towards Malaysia continued (cf.  Indonesian Minister Rejects Malaysian Pendet 
Apology. Jakarta Globe, August 28, 2009 in 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/national/indonesian-minister-rejects-malaysian-pendet-
apology/326562 
99 The Balinese monkey dance, performed by large groups of men, thus visually very different 
from the photograph of a female dancer. 
118 
 
Liza: No idea. It doesn’t matter what the name of this dance is. It comes down to 
the same thing. It’s really bad. We’re not even talking about the Indonesian 
domestic workers there. 
Indah: Yes, they’re being colonized there (“dijajah”). 
(A conversation between Liza, 19, student and Indah, 19, student) 
 
In the face of this archrival, Indonesia is seen as one homogeneous 
entity, especially in terms of cultural diversity. This is perfectly exemplified in 
Indah’s seemingly trivial guess of the name of the dance and Liza’s 
subsequent assertion that the precise name and type of the dance does not 
matter because, “it all comes down to the same thing”, that is, they are all 
threatened by Malaysia. A chain of equivalence is constructed between “our” 
possessions that are claimed by Malaysia: regardless of whether it is produced 
in Bali, in Ponorogo or in the Moluccas, regardless of whether they are artistic 
products or human beings (e.g. migrant workers). Differences between them 
are erased by a shared difference with something external to them (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001).  
An important aspect of antagonism is that it serves to solidify the chain 
of equivalence. The public reaction against Malaysia involved a rejuvenation 
of nationalism. There has been a renewed interest and popular appropriation of 
batik. 100 Similarly, the national football team’s popularity reached its highest 
peak during the finals of ASEAN Football Federation (AFF) Cup against 
Malaysia in 2009.101 Young people are especially involved in this rejuvenation 
                                                 
 
101. The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/04/aff-suzuki-cup-caught-
192-million-viewers-2010.html)  (04/03/2011) reported that in total, broadcasts of two legs of 
the 2010 ASEAN Football Federation (AFF) Suzuki Cup final between Indonesia and 
Malaysia attracted an average of 15 million viewers in Indonesia, twice the number of the 




of nationalism, partly because there is a sense that the government cannot be 
counted on, as the earlier section suggest. Liza’s story of her hacker boyfriend 
is one example. 
In the dispute with Malaysia, the President only said, ‘we should be patient 
(sabar)…he did not do anything. Indonesia seemed to cower. I have a boyfriend who 
is a hacker. He blocked Malaysia’s website to show ‘Look, I’m Indonesian’… The 
police rounded him up but they were also proud of him. (Liza, 19 year old, student) 
 
Imagined as the archrival, Malaysia strengthens the chain of 
equivalence of Indonesia, at least for youth in Jakarta. Nationalism is no 
longer limited to government-sanctioned expressions. For youth in Jakarta, the 
government is no longer in charge in defining how nationalism should be 
expressed, despite this, the discourses and symbols used by the youth were the 
ones propagated by the New Order. 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Among young people in Jakarta, the imagining of Indonesia is very 
similar to the presentation of “Indonesia” in the official state discourse. Like 
in the official discourse, among the youth in Jakarta, there is a folklorized 
understanding of cultural diversity. Cultural artefacts are perceived as national 
possessions with perfect correspondence and commensurability between one 
culture and another. The long-held state’s discourse embodied in the national 
slogan “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” and the capitalistic discourse intertwine and 
inform the imagining of Indonesia as consisting of many equivalent cultures. 
Another strategy that reinforces the chain of equivalence is the 
naturalization of interregional disparity. Jakarta’s domination is not seen as 
caused by injustices done by the central government that needs to be amended, 
but is treated as an accepted fact. An event that could potentially expose the 
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frailty of Indonesia, i.e. Timor Leste’s secession, has been selectively 
forgotten and is incomprehensible for youth in Jakarta. 
There are a number of constitutive exteriors that can be identified 
based on the interviews and impressions during fieldwork. The international 
world is the Lacanian Other as it provides a constant gaze and point of 
reference against which Indonesia’s performance is assessed. Indonesia is 
imagined to be invariably inferior in comparison to these Others. At the same 
time, desire for international recognition is strong.  
The second Other is Malaysia. The neighbouring country is seen as 
“claiming” a number of Indonesia’s properties, that is, cultural artefacts. This 
launched a strong current of popular nationalism as young people actively 
engage in maintaining the cultural borders of the nation. 
Like their city of residence, Jakarta’s youth seem to be the epitome of 
“Indonesianness”: their first language is Indonesian and they no longer 
harbour deep attachments to their “traditional” ethnic groups and instead look 
forward to progress. Their “exceptional” situatedness informs the construction 
of Indonesia that is not completely shared with youth in other cities.  As the 
next two chapters will point out, people in other parts of the country have 









5 INDONESIA FROM THE PERIPHERY: 
IMAGINING INDONESIA IN KUPANG  
  
“Do you know what NTT stands for?” Mikael, a 27 year old civil 
servant in the department of transportation asked me a few minutes after we 
were introduced to each other. He had spent some years studying and working 
in Jakarta but returned when decentralization regulations ensured that “putra 
daerah” (literally, sons of the region, i.e. local people) would have priority for 
government jobs. Not bothering to wait for an answer, he grinned and 
continued, “Nasib Tidak Tentu, bahkan Nyaris Tak Terdengar, kita hanya 
berharap Nanti Tuhan Tolong” (an uncertain fate, largely invisible, we only 
hope that God will help us).  
The wittiness of the wordplay aptly encapsulates the economical and 
socio-political condition of Kupang and NTT in general. The region is 
subjected to many exclusionary and marginalizing forces. As a result, from the 
periphery, the idea of Indonesia is more complex and layered than in Jakarta.  
Although the idea of homogeneity – the unity and uniqueness of the 
nation – is introduced through formal means such as education, the 
informants’ own experiences of interregional disparities, e.g. inequality 
between various regions, ethnicities and religions, betray the heterogeneity of 
Indonesia. National and local narratives of Indonesia converge and diverge 
among youth in Kupang. Wee (2002) describes such discourse in the 
peripheries as having a “dual character”; it adopts the national discourse that is 
formal, textual, well-articulated and “objective” and yet at the same time, there 
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is an internal, local discourse that is drawn from daily experiences. These 
disagreements with the dominant discourse of Indonesia are forms of the 
“performative narrative” that according to Bhabha (1994) refers to “counter-
narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing 
boundaries…disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which ‘imagined 
communities’ are given essentialist identities” (p.149). 
This chapter will present the contestations and compromises towards 
the official construction of Indonesia in Kupang. Counter-narratives are posed 
against the dominant imagined geography of Indonesia (Jakarta/Java versus 
the Outer Islands), and against the domestication of culture. Their experiences 
disagree with the “nothingness” that, for youth in Jakarta, defines the 
peripheries, and with the idea that culture is located at the national level. As 
the interviews in Kupang show, the domestication of culture that poses as 
homogenizing force has not been able to completely erase cultural 
heterogeneity in Indonesia.  
However, the existence of these narratives that  “disturb ideological 
manoeuvres” of the state does not translate to sentiments of antagonism 
among youth in Kupang, let alone political acts of dissent, in sharp contrast to 
attitudes in Banda Aceh, to be discussed in detail in the next chapter. People 
compromise with the peripheral position. Yet, unlike Mikael’s sarcastic 
wordplay, they do not passively wait for supra-human intervention: the 
compromise takes the form of an instrumental approach towards nationhood 
and neo-patrimonial survival strategies.  
In a way, young people in Kupang challenge the hegemonic 
construction of Indonesia as a cultural entity in a non-oppositional way. Their 
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framework of the nation (e.g. as a political entity) is based on the discourse of 
neo-patrimonialism, a dominant mode of governing especially in the New 
Order (Brown 2004). Put in other words, whereas the imagining of Indonesia 
in Jakarta is structured by ideologies used in nation-building, in Kupang it is 
more structured by the tacit practices of the state. 
Importantly, Kupang could be seen to represent a part of Indonesia that 
is understudied, where anti-colonial nationalism and nation-building did not 
unfold with the same strength as in Java (cf van Klinken 2013) and so result in 
different ideas of the nation. 
Before turning to the details of interviews and fieldwork data, the next 
part will provide an outline of the economic and socio-historical condition of 
Kupang that to different degrees have informed the situated imaginations of 
my informants. Two interrelated aspects of greatest significance are the 
economically marginalized position of NTT and the socio-political system of 
the NTT archipelago. 
 
5.1 The Socio-Historical Context of Kupang 
The majority of scholarly accounts of Timor’s history draw attention to 
the sandalwood trade that has been the main lure of Timor and its surrounding 
islands (cf. Gunn 1999; Ricklefs 2008; McWilliam 2005). As early as the 15th 
century, Chinese traders took advantage of the abundance of sandalwood in 
Timor. Later Portugal, and subsequently the Dutch came for the same 
commodity. At that time, the chief local political power with which the foreign 
traders had to deal was a kingdom in the south-eastern part of West Timor, 
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named Waiwiku-Wehale under which minor, tribal kingdoms thrived102 (Gunn 
1999). Portuguese and Dutch forces worked together with the local power 
system and so disturbed the pre-existing alliances, as new ones were formed 
and others were dissolved. Power was in direct correlation with the ability to 
deliver the commodity (Gunn 1999). The important role of local chiefs for 
foreign trade remains in practice in the recent history. 103 As Gunn succinctly 
puts it, “…the importance of dealing with local lords, rajas or rei104s to win 
favours, allegiances, and allies has been recognized by all outsiders in their 
dealings with Timorese, whether Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, Australian, or 
Indonesian” (Gunn 1999: 35). 
Colonial experiences in Kupang, and other similar small towns, differ 
from how colonialism unfolded in Java. Whereas in the latter, the Dutch forces 
transformed Java, Kupang was of little economic value and the maintenance of 
the city served only to keep competing colonial forces away (van Klinken 
2013). Nationalism was weak. People were more interested in factional local 
politics, vying over the strategic position of brokers linking resources from the 
                                                 
102 Unlike most parts of Indonesia, the region was never under the influence of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, or the subsequent Islamic tradition (Farram 2003).  In a nation where Buddhist and 
Hindu empires (Srivijaya and Majapahit respectively) are constructed as the proto-community 
(Wood 2005), a region like NTT is an outlier in terms of its position in the state discourse. In 
this construction, Timor is considered to be a vassal state of Majapahit in the past although 
most probably Majapahit did not exert real authority over the area (Farram 2003). The 
imaginary positioning of Timor as Majapahit’s vassal state however closely reflects the minor 
position of NTT in current day Indonesia.  
103 A phone conversation, that I incidentally overheard, attests to this. The caller (the person 
renting the room next to mine, who also came from Jakarta) tried to convince his interlocutor 
in Jakarta to conduct business in manganese mining in NTT. He persuaded mainly by telling 
the interlocutor that he has made contact with a person who is knowledgeable of the local 
power system and has good relations with many “raja kecil” (chiefs) of NTT (Fieldnote, 
19/4/2010). Thus suggesting the crucial role these chiefs would play in the extraction 
business. 
104 The terms respectively used by the Dutch and Portuguese forces to refer to small lords. 
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central government and the local communities (van Klinken 2013). A similar 
pattern could be identified in contemporary youth’s pragmatic take on 
nationhood, as the later parts of this chapter will show. 
In 1945, the shift of power from the Dutch to the new state, Indonesia, 
made West-Timor part of the latter, 105 while the eastern part of the island 
continued to be ruled by the Portuguese. After independence, in coordination 
with the Dutch forces, the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago 
advocated the formation of a federal state, as a way to balance a centralistic 
structure created by the colonial government that had neglected the Outer 
Islands, and had left the latter underdeveloped (Agung 1996). The federation 
was called “Republik Indonesia Serikat” (United States of Indonesia) 
comprising of Java, Sumatra, The Great East and Kalimantan (Agung 1996). 
The first state established was Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT, East Indonesia 
State) encompassing Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor and its 
surrounding islands, Celebes and Maluku. NIT was divided into 13 smaller 
autonomous regions. In this configuration, Kupang was a district within the 
region “Timor and its surrounding archipelago” that included Sabu, Alor and 
other smaller islands. Flores was established as a separate region within NIT 
(Agung 1996). The idea of Indonesia as a federation met with opposition, 
especially from Java. Eventually NIT disbanded in 1950. In other words, for a 
short period after independence, West Timor became part of a discourse that 
eventually gave way to the unitary and highly centralized state that eventually 
                                                 
105 This is not to say that NTT passively underwent the shift of ruler. Groups like Timorsch 
Verbond propagating independence from the Dutch and the advancement of Timorese 
interests existed (Farram 2002). 
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prevailed. In the official history of Indonesia, NIT was framed as a puppet 
state of the Dutch. 106  
In 1958, Kupang became the capital of the province of NTT within an 
Indonesian Republic; one of the most ethnically diverse provinces. NTT 
covers 566 islands of which 42 are inhabited. The largest four islands are 
Timor, Flores, Sumba and Alor.  Sixty one percent of the inhabitants of 
Kupang are Protestants, 22.9% are Catholics and 14.09% are Muslims107 (BPS 
2011). 
 
Figure 3. Map of East Nusa Tenggara108 
Compared to other regions, the province has constantly been one of the 
least developed. Analyzing the 1980 census, Drake notes that together with 
West Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Barat, NTB), NTT is “by far the least 
                                                 
106 The cynical wordplay of NIT standing for Negara Ikut Tuan (the nation that submits to the 
wants of the master, the latter being the Dutch) is still part of the public discourse. 
107 For NTT, the composition is as follows: 34,29% are Protestants, 55,85% Catholics and 
9,64% Muslims (http://ntt.bps.go.id/index.php/sosial-dan-kependudukan/agama/24-
data/agama/90-persentase-pemeluk-agama-menurut-kabupaten-kota-dan-agama-yang-dianut-
2011). In other words, Kupang as a predominantly Protestant city is a minority in terms of 
religion, even in the province. 
108 "Nusa Tenggara Timur". Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons - 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nusa_Tenggara_Timur.png#/media/File:Nusa_Teng
gara_Timur.png retrieved 27/05/2015 
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integrated and developed” region in the country (Drake,1989; 221). A decade 
later, in 1990, the per capita GDP of NTT was 67% lower than the per capita 
GDP for the whole of Indonesia (Jones et al 1998). This trend continues in the 
reform era. The GDP of NTT in 2003 was one of the lowest in Indonesia. 
Thirty five percent came from agriculture, followed by service (26%), (Barlow 
and Gondowarsito 2009). Service is mostly provided by government 
institutions, with private enterprises only accounting for 5-6% (Barlow and 
Gondowarsito 2009). Domestic private investment is low and foreign 
investments are sporadic (Barlow and Gondowarsito 2009). A survey on the 
perception of business operators on the attractiveness of regional investment 
ranks Kupang as one of the five least attractive municipalities in 2003 (Sahin 
et al 2012). A similar survey in 2004 listed bureaucratic issues, illegal fees and 
weak implementation of law and regulation as the main problems (Sahin et al 
2012).   Mismanagement, misguided policies, and corruption decreased 
revenue from sandalwood (McWilliams 2005). Transparency International’s 
(2008) survey reported that in 2008 NTT ranked lowest on corruption 
perception index.  In 2011, NTT’s Human Development Index ranked as 31st 
out of 33 provinces, only faring better than West Nusa Tenggara and Papua 
(BPS 2011). Another important factor in the socio-economical condition of 
Kupang is its proximity to Timor Leste. The referendum in 1999 that freed the 
Eastern part of the island from Indonesia’s rule had an adverse impact on its 
Western counterpart, resulting in economic disadvantages and social 
instability (Nixon 2004; Sahin et al 2012) 
NTT is highly reliant on the central government. In 2002, over 70% of 
the provincial government’s income came from the central government. The 
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maintenance of governmental institutions absorbs a large part of the routine 
provincial expenditure. In 2002, this amounted to 78% (Barlow and 
Gondowarsito 2009). In 2007, there were 355 government institutions that 
employed a total of 6,152 civil servants (Tidey 2012). With a large presence of 
government institutions, for young people, the government offers the most 
ideal and visible employment opportunities. Forty five percent of the 
informants interviewed by Jones et al. (1998) aspired to work as civil servants, 
or PNS (Pegawai Negeri Sipil). In 1996, 30 000 applicants met the basic 
criteria for only 301 PNS positions from NTT (Jones et al 1998). The 
perception that the ideal job is in the civil service remains common among my 
informants, as the later part of this chapter will address.  
Although NTT is economically dependent on the central government, a 
closer look reveals interdependency between the local bureaucrats and the 
“state”. In this regard, Kupang is a prime example of what van Klinken 
identifies as “middle Indonesia” (2009). These are small cities, mostly 
provincial centers where state institutions are strongly present and where, 
subsequently, the state is appropriated and localized. As the later part will 
show, the neo-patrimonial logic and practices of the youth in Kupang are 
grass-root instances of what van Klinken (2009) calls the “seizing of the 
state”. 
This section has addressed the various socio political and economical 
backgrounds of Kupang and NTT that inform the youth’s imagination of 
Indonesia. In the following sections, I will discuss the conception of Indonesia 
as constructed in Kupang. From a province that is archipelagic and highly 
diverse, Indonesia is more heterogeneous than viewed from Jakarta or Banda 
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Aceh. Youth in Kupang perceive Indonesia as an entity that consists of various 
groups that are not necessarily equivalent with each other: there are internal 
incongruities and incompatibilities between the “People” (that in the 
dominant, Jakarta-centred, discourse are portrayed as singular subjects of the 
nation-state). The construction of Indonesia in Kupang is suspended between 
an awareness of the dominant narrative of the nation as a homogeneous 
totality, and a realization dictated by daily experiences that the nation is highly 
heterogeneous. 
5.2 Counter-narratives to the Dominant Discourses of Indonesia 
This part will highlight a number of narratives about Indonesia that 
diverge, or run counter to the dominant discourse. There are three points of 
disjunctures: disagreement with the dominant imagined geography that 
relegates all non-Java Islands under a simplifying “Outer Island”, dissent with 
the idea of “culture” as a national possession, and a disregard for the 
promotion of Indonesia’s international standing. 
5.2.1 Inhabiting the Negative Space: “Do You Know Where Kupang is?” 
This was the question posed by Vita to her fellow students in 
Yogyakarta, where she obtained her college degree. She migrated with her 
parents from Riau when she was nine years old. Her mother had wanted her to 
move back to Riau and work there, so that they will continue to have close 
familial connection with the region. Vita refused to move, because all her 
friends are in Kupang109. At the time of research, Vita was working as a sales 
                                                 
109 Note the difference with Liza’s refusal to move to Ambon from Jakarta. Liza refused 
because of, what she perceived to be the backwardness of Ambon (the rude people), while 
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promotion girl for a brand of toothpaste. She recalled, as she was poring over 
the photograph of Jakarta’s skyline, how little the people from other regions 
know about Kupang. 
I asked (my college friends), ‘do you know where Kupang is?’ ‘Is Kupang in 
Celebes?’ one of them asked me. (My friend) must have flunked the geography class! 
(laughed) ‘Do you know NTT?’ I asked them. No, they don’t know it too. Most 
people in Yogyakarta think that Kupang is part of Flores or Timor Leste. They would 
say, ‘oh, is (Kupang) in Flores?’, I had to explain, ‘No, Flores is a district city, 
Kupang is the provincial city’. (Vita, 27 year old, sales promotion girl) 
 
There are many variations to the same storyline that I have heard 
during my fieldwork. Riska was a radio announcer at the time of the research. 
She had finished her college degree in Administration in Mataram (NTB), her 
parents’ place of origin, a few years earlier. It was there that she had to explain 
to her college friends that the people of Kupang are not like the Papuans who 
have “dark-skin and frizzy-hair”. This is not only a sentiment among the 
young. A friend, whom I have known years earlier in Yogyakarta when she 
studied for her Master’s degree, kept repeating an anecdote in which she had 
to convince a freshly graduated medical doctor from Java, who was about to 
start her mandatory service in rural areas, 110 that the economy of Kupang is 
sufficiently developed that she will not have difficulties in finding eateries in 
the city (warung makan). People in Kupang are aware of the many 
misconceptions and denigrating stereotypes about their city. The provincial 
capital is eclipsed by more well-known places in East Indonesia.  
                                                                                                                                
Vita’s reasons do not put Riau in such a negative light. This difference highlights the 
inclination of people in Jakarta to look down on other regions. 
110 Under a government scheme, it is compulsory for new doctors to spend the first few years 
of their professional career serving in an area more remote than their place of origin. 
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Their reactions to the misunderstandings are subtle contestations to the 
fact that only a handful of regions are known by other Indonesians. Regions 
like Jakarta and Bali are prominent in the public’s imagined geography of the 
country, whereas Kupang and places like Flores, Timor Leste, Ambon or 
Papua are indistinguishable from each other. The highly Java-centric discourse 
simplifies the rich variety of the regions that lie outside the center by reducing 
them into one signifier referring to what is not Java, i.e. the Outer Islands. By 
contrast, perceived from Kupang, Indonesia’s internal variation is more 
heterogeneous than implied in the binary division of Java and not-Java. As my 
informants had to explain to the people they have met in other regions, Flores, 
Timor Leste, Papua or Celebes are not the same as Kupang. 
Another subtle contestation to the hierarchy is by rejecting the 
essentializing assumption that people in the peripheries are underdeveloped 
because they are inherently primitive and backwards (see Chapter 4 on how 
youth in Jakarta consider other regions to be dependent and helpless). Youth 
in Kupang offer an alternative reason for the developmental lag of their 
region; it is attributed to a set of values that prioritizes comfort and social 
cohesion more than efficiency and productivity. The self-portrayal emerges in 
discussions elicited by the photograph of the bemo, the mini vans serving as 
the main public transport. According to my informants, the loud and extremely 
decorated bemo is a sign of how young people in Kupang value comfort and 
entertainment more than efficiency; 111 it is more important for them to have a 
                                                 
111 The attachment of young people to bemos is impressive. Some bemos have proper names, 
like“Arjuna”, “Cinta” and “Elisabet”. Cliques of high school students have “their” favourite 
bemo and would only ride on them to go to or come from school. These bemos are well 
decorated with stickers, stuffed animals and neon lights, often substantially covering all 
windows including the windshields. These stickers often reveal what is considered “cool” at 
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leisurely ride on a slow yet “cool” bemo than reaching their destination on 
time on a bemo that has no decoration or music.  
This image is mainly generated in comparison with Java or Jakarta (in 
part because I as a Jakartan was their main interlocutor) that is generally 
imagined to be unfriendly, and where people prioritize work and efficiency 
over personal relations. The image of youth in Kupang about their own city 
falls in line with a general imaginary dichotomy about the city versus the 
village where the former tends to be imagined as modern, individualistic and 
fast-paced while the latter is perceived to be backward, collectivist and slower. 
In the responses of my informants however, these latter features – a slower 
pace of life, social cohesion – are portrayed as being positive, to counter (or at 
least, explain) the economically marginalized status of the province. 
The contestations are not radical. There is compliance to the dominant 
discourse, as youth in Kupang, to a certain extent, share the dominant 
imagined geography of Indonesia: Jakarta and Papua are imagined to be 
located at the two extremes in a spectrum of developed-underdeveloped. 
Jakarta is perceived as a desirable place. For youth in Kupang, having spent 
time in Jakarta or Java adds to their social capital. As a lecturer from one of 
the universities confided, depending on the available budget, parents prefer to 
send their offspring to the West for education. The very well-off families send 
their children to Jakarta, while those with smaller budgets send them to other 
cities in Java, such as Yogyakarta and Surabaya. Various elements of youth 
                                                                                                                                
some point in time, and the range is very eclectic (e.g. “Starbucks”, “Oakley”, “Fox News”, 
“Google”, “Facebook”, but also “Jesus”, “Jehova” and various phrases  like “Oh My God”, 
“Do Not Touch”, etc.). The main attraction is the sound system that guarantees loud music in 
ful bas (full bass). Passengers can request songs to the driver, Indonesian and Western songs 
are particularly popular. 
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culture in Kupang draw its inspiration from the capital. Thus, a manager of a 
popular youth radio station reveals that to stand out and attract listeners, they 
adopt the music repertoire, the format of shows and presentation styles of 
radio stations in Jakarta. 
On the other extreme of the spectrum, as in Jakarta, Papua is the 
symbol of underdevelopment and primitiveness. Stereotypes and derogatory 
attitude about Papuans are common; some informants talk of how Papuans 
“eat humans” and “walk around naked”.  Although this imagined geography of 
Papua vis a vis other regions in Indonesia is also shared with the youth in 
Jakarta (see previous chapter), in Kupang, one could not detect a patronizing 
attitude. Despite a feeling of superiority in comparison to Papua, the sense of 
being responsible for the latter’s development is absent in Kupang.  
In this section, I have discussed how being on the periphery is 
experienced, and how ambivalence regarding domination entails. Their 
experiences of youth in Kupang dispute the dominant imagined geography of 
Indonesia where every region outside of Java is reduced to the “Outer 
Islands”. However, although youth in Kupang dislike the fact that other 
Indonesians do not know Kupang or think that Kupang is underdeveloped, at 
the same time, they comply with and have internalized some parts of the 
dominant imagined geography. 
The following part will provide an example of a stronger contestation 
against the official discourse of Indonesia’s cultural identity, before 
proceeding with addressing the alternative framework used in Kupang to 
construct Indonesian nationhood. 
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5.2.2 Challenging the Domestication of “culture”  
In the previous chapter, I have argued that culture is the main signifier 
that holds the idea of “Indonesia” together for youth in Jakarta. By subsuming 
interregional differences under the notion of “cultural diversity”, culture is 
fixed, museumized, and more importantly, deprived of the potential to become 
a threat to the nation’s unity. This notion is challenged in Kupang. Young 
people hold the opinion that each sub-national community has its own 
collective ways of being (customs, habits, beliefs, etc) that might be 
incompatible with those of other groups.  
Two of the most productive photographs that elicit notions of what 
being Indonesian means are those of the Acehnese and Indo-American beauty 
pageants. In Kupang, responses to the pictures are ambivalent. On the one 
hand, people invariably start with remarks on the importance of knowing the 
Indonesian culture, and “looking” Indonesian. Yet, on the other hand, 
variations to this dominant discourse of culture would often follow.  The idea 
of culture as being “national” is not self-evident in Kupang. Mikael, possibly 
more articulated than many other informants, summed the general attitude. 
Responding to the photograph of Sunny, the pageant winner, he said the 
following, 
...how well does she (Sunny) know the Indonesian culture? …(She has to know) at 
least five cultures...If they’re in Java, they could learn the cultures of Banten, DKI 
Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Jogjakarta, East Java. They could go to Taman 
Mini, study the cultures for two months, and hang around the place. There is a 
miniature of Indonesia in the park, we learn about the cultures there, right? Indonesia 
does not have an authentic culture, 112 there are so many. (If we don’t acknowledge 
this), we end up imitating the Javanese, talking ‘nggak, nggak’ and ‘ngek, ngek’ 
(these are sounds he perceived to be common in the Javanese language). It does not 
need to be this way. (Mikael, 27 year old, civil servant) 
                                                 




Mikael captured the ambivalence between the national and the local 
narrative. The initial part of the quote is in line with the dominant discourse of 
culture and nationhood. Culture is considered to be static products that belong 
to particular ethnic groups. Mastering various cultures can be done through 
consciously “studying” them in Taman Mini, a miniature park displaying 
“cultures” from every province. This stance is identical to the one expressed 
by Desi in Jakarta, and echoes the cultural strategy employed by the state to 
erase differences by emphasizing similarities. 
However, the subsequent sentences effectively subvert this dominant 
discourse. Instead of arguing that the cultures of Banten or DKI Jakarta etc are 
all subsumed under the signifier “Indonesian culture”, Mikael explicitly 
negated this by saying that none of them could be considered as authentically 
Indonesian. They all belong to their respective ethnic groups, and the country 
itself does not have its own, authentic culture. The statement rejects two 
things. The first is the taken for granted notion that every culture of every 
ethnic group within Indonesia would self-evidently become “national” 
possession, and the second one is the Java-centrism that is the result of the 
“nationalization” of Java culture and its domination over other cultures, a 
result of not acknowledging the equality various cultures of the different 
ethnic groups. Mikael’s comment is an instance where diverging 
understanding of Indonesia is generated as a reaction to homogenizing forces.  
Mikael’s shift from the understanding of culture as fixed artefacts (i.e. 
observable in Taman Mini) to how it is played out in the daily life (i.e. Java-
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centric) shows that to youth in Kupang, culture also belongs to everyday life. 
Although, as mentioned earlier, Mikael is particularly more articulated than 
other informants in expressing his thoughts, the idea that culture is also 
located at the level of the local is prevalent in Kupang, as the subsequent 
section will argue.   
Culture as local collective predispositions 
Youth in Kupang challenge the concept of “culture” as a national 
possession by arguing that an individual’s sense of morality, customs, habits 
and other collective dispositions (that in the social sciences is commonly 
referred to with the umbrella term “culture”) is embedded in localities and 
societies at the sub-national level (e.g. in the realm of kin group, ethnic group, 
regions, etc). Different groups of people have different cultures that can be 
incompatible with each other, even though they belong to the same nation-
state.  
The following quote is taken from an interview with Miranda, a 24 
year old graduate from the law school in Universitas Cendana. She reflected 
on Qory Sandioriva’s relation with Aceh and the Aceh people, and their 
disagreement over the appropriateness of a woman to present oneself without 
the hijab.  
… I think, it’s because she does not live in Aceh that she has the courage to break the 
conventions. It would have been different had she been born and had she lived in 
Aceh. In that case, she would have known the rules. How could she not? If we have 
lived with a particular set of conventions, it’s impossible to transgress them. We all 
hold particular beliefs, it’s impossible to deviate from them…. (And what about the 
protests of the Aceh people?) You cannot blame them also, it’s their rules...I would 
not know how to solve this (controversy). This is an issue of customs, of beliefs. 
These are very difficult to change. So people in Aceh will continue to be against her, 
but she will not be bothered, because she was not born there. Had she been born 
there, she would have understood why the Acehnese are against her. (Miranda, 24 




In Miranda’s explanation, an individual’s sense of morality and of 
what is appropriate or not, is grounded in the society, and attached to a locality 
where the person grows up. This understanding of culture closely resembles 
Bourdieu’s (1990) notion of habitus; a set of predispositions that is embedded 
in collective practices113 and hence, societies and localities. Depending on the 
society wherein one lives, an individual would internalize particular sets of 
beliefs and conventions to which they abide and with which they navigate 
through life. These conventions and beliefs are absolute and impossible to 
transgress, not because they are inherently “true”, but because the person who 
adheres to them cannot perceive an alternative.  
According to Miranda’s point of view, the primary social group that 
serves as the site of the structuring predisposition; it is not “Indonesia”114 but 
various sub-national regions. 115 This is a prevalent conception in Kupang. In 
casual conversations on various topics, people would make references to 
ethnicity, e.g. Rote people are like this, and Sabu people are like that. In her 
study on favouritism and access to civil service jobs, Tidey (2010) notes that 
the local discourse frames ethnicity as an important category in Kupang. 
                                                 
113 Bourdieu (1990) defines habitus as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (p.53)…. “It ensures 
the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in the organism in the forms of 
schemes of perception, thought and action tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices, and 
their constancy over time…” (p.54) 
114 See the previous chapter to compare this with the easiness by which youth in Jakarta 
attribute many positive and negative features to “Indonesia”. See also the following chapter 
where “Indonesia” becomes a signifier for all evil for some youth in Banda Aceh. In both 
cases, “Indonesia” is more salient than to youth in Kupang. 
115 The exact communal identities that are considered important might be many and 
overlapping, e.g. ethnicity, kin group, religion, social class, etc. In the context of this research, 
it is sufficient to note that it is not the nation that is used as the main frame and category. 
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Although she goes on to challenge this popular discourse by arguing for the 
mediating role of class (Tidey 2012), the fact that ethnicity is commonly 
thought of as the main category is significant for this research. This shows that 
the most salient sense of belongingness is not to the nation but to sub-national 
entities. The earlier comments expressing the perception about the difference 
between people in big cities (who value efficiency) with Kupang people (who 
value comfort) are based on the same understanding of different regional 
cultures. 
As implied in Miranda’s comment, every group adheres to their own 
rules and beliefs that can run counter to those of another group. The same 
logic is implied in some of the informants’ attitude regarding Aceh. In terms 
of religion, Aceh is perceived as radically different and incompatible with 
Kupang and NTT. This is indicated by Mikael’s comment that warns the 
Acehnese to “never dare to bring those (Islamic) rules to NTT” 116 or Boy’s (a 
24 year old civil servant who is otherwise talkative) uninterested shrug to the 
photograph of the Baiturrahman mosque that went along with a curt shrug, 
I don’t know anything about it, I’ve never known anything about it and will not find 
out either117 (Boy, 24 year old civil servant) 
 
These are expressions that connote the incompatibility between NTT, 
populated by a Christian majority, and Aceh, populated by a Muslim majority. 
The internal differences that is perceivable from the point of view of 
Kupang youth, as explored in this part, further disrupt the homogenizing 
discourse of national culture; not only does Indonesia not have a national 
                                                 
116 “Kau jangan bawa-bawa aturan datang ke sini, eih, rusak kalau kau bawa aturan ke NTT.” 
117 “Nggak tau, nggak pernah tau dan nggak mau cari tau.” 
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culture, but the sub-national, local cultures are incommensurable with each 
other. 
5.2.3 Absence of the International World as the Other 
Unlike in Jakarta, the international world does not play a salient role in 
the construction of Indonesia for youth in Kupang. Young people are less 
interested in the international world than youth in Jakarta. Some are not aware 
of “Sail Indonesia”, the international event that has been held almost annually 
since 2003. The event is not immediately interpreted as a chance to promote 
Kupang, let alone Indonesia, to the outside world. Similarly, the komodo is not 
framed as a national treasure, unlike in Jakarta.  Deni, a 26 year old with no 
clear occupation, but whose parents seem to own the house rented by an 
internet cafe, commented on the photograph of the komodo, “it’s somewhere 
between important and unimportant, most people in Kupang don’t find it 
interesting”. The photograph of the Balinese dancer and conversations about 
Malaysia, have not elicited engaged discussions about Indonesia’s sour 
relation with its neighbour. Although most are aware of the feud, there is very 
little emotional involvement detectable in their responses. 118  
                                                 
118 The general public in Kupang does not seem to be really engaged with the conflict with 
Malaysia. In a corner of the Flobamora mall is “mini photo-studio” that promotes itself as “the 
best mini photo studio in Indon”. “Indon” is a term used to refer to Indonesians by the 
Malaysians, and, following the feud, is considered derogatory by youth in Jakarta, it would be 
unimaginable to have it used to attract customers. The fact that it is used in Kupang suggests 
that the feud with Malaysia is not experienced in the same intensity across the nation. 
This does not mean that youth are completely ignorant of other countries. Like in Jakarta, 
people consider many other countries to be superior to Indonesia and that is important to be 





Figure 4. The Flobamora shopping mall hosts the services of “The best mini 
photo studio in ‘Indon’.” Unlike in Jakarta, the term ‘Indon’ is acceptable in 
Kupang. 
 
In general, people are less interested to discuss Indonesia’s global 
performance. The country’s international relations do not have an immediate 
impact on the daily life in Kupang. Riska told me, 
I guess it’s normal that the capital is more visible to foreigners...If they come, they 
would not visit other regions, although Indonesia has so many provinces. They would 
only go to Jakarta. They only know Jakarta and Bali. (Riska, 25 year old, radio 
announcer) 
 
The detached attitude confirms the belongingness to Indonesia and an 
acceptance to the fact that NTT is a peripheral region within the nation and 
does not play an important role in its international relations. At the same time, 
the lack of interest itself implies a rejection of the nationalistic framework.  
In Kupang, the conceptualization of Indonesia is not based on other 
countries as the constitutive outside. This is partly because Indonesia itself is 
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imagined to be a heterogeneous entity. The ethno-cultural bond between 
Indonesians is weak, and boundaries with other nations become less salient 
and important. Despite the divergences, youth in Kupang are not averse 
towards Indonesia. Instead of an emphasis a historical or cultural bond, the 
fundamental reasons for belongingness to the country are more pragmatic in 
nature. 
5.3 The Instrumental Bond in the Construction of Indonesia 
In the previous sections, I have explored the various ways in which the 
perceptions of youth in Kupang challenge the homogenizing forces of the 
dominant discourses on nation and culture. Young people in Kupang form 
their own idea about Indonesia, one that is less ingrained in the official version 
of Indonesia. The nation, seen from Kupang, is closer to a political entity ruled 
by instrumental logic, than a cultural entity bounded by a sense of shared 
bloodline, tradition of past.  Overall, there is a practical approach towards 
nationhood. 
The practical approach towards the nation-state is exemplified in the 
following excerpt from a response on the photographs of the two beauty 
pageants by Christo, a young man whose parents had migrated from Rote, the 
southernmost inhabited island of Indonesia. Whereas the majority of 
interviewees mention phenotypical features, language and culture as signs of 
Indonesian-ness, it was only in Kupang that the idea of citizenship as a marker 
of belongingness to a nation-state was mentioned. The fact that it has not 




It is stated nowhere that being an Indonesian citizen equals to being able to speak 
Indonesian…There are people in the kampongs and villages who cannot speak 
Indonesian. They only know their regional language, like the language of Rote. But 
they are Indonesians, they have an ID card, and they’re listed in the district office 
(lurah). It means they’re Indonesians citizens although they can’t speak Indonesian. 
There are still so many people like that. (Christo, 27 year old, café manager/student) 
 
Christo’s attitude indicates a definition of belongingness to a nation 
that is based on legal citizenship. Anyone, regardless of their phenotypical 
features, cultural background and linguistic ability, is an Indonesian as long as 
they meet the legal criteria for citizenship. In a way, having the necessary 
legal documents is the main bond that defines the community of Indonesians. 
Thus, instead of an affective connection that is based on notions of shared 
primordial “givens” of the “people”, the bond to Indonesia is instrumental and 
practical. The country is experienced more in its function as a “state”, than as 
the more affective term, “nation”.  
In the sections to follow, I address the meaning of belongingness to 
Indonesia, and how youth in Kupang subsequently imagine and engage with 
the nation-state. Practical concerns such as financial security, upward 
mobility, improvement of the quality of life etc. are the main points of 
consideration. 119 Indonesia is imagined as an entity with a powerful centre 
with which other regions have to negotiate for resources. 
5.3.1 Pragmatic Belongingness to the Nation 
The photograph of the “Timor Leste man” was very effective in 
eliciting attitudes regarding belongingness to Indonesia.  The issue that has 
                                                 
119 This is not to say that youth in Kupang do not have affective sentiments as the bases of 
their sense of belongingness. The earlier section indicates that young people in Kupang do 
have “affective bonds” but these are sub-national in nature; to their region, ethnic group etc. 
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been conveniently forgotten in Jakarta is very real in Kupang: the refugees still 
pose a social problem in Kupang120 while at the same time, Timor Leste is 
perceived by some enterprising people from NTT as a promising market for 
businesses. Generally, the stereotypes of Timor Leste people among my 
informants depict them as rude, primitive and less intelligent. 
Timor Leste’s secession from Indonesia is considered by youth in 
Kupang as an irrational decision. Sovereignty does not guarantee welfare and 
progress. In comparison with the chaos that ensued from separation, staying 
with Indonesia would have been the better decision. This is the stance 
expressed by Willi. He comes from a Chinese-Sumba business family, trading 
in security related goods. At the time of the interview, his family had just 
signed a business deal with a security agency owned by a US citizen, 
operating in Timor Leste. This forms his opinion that the ones benefiting from 
Timor Leste’s independence are people from outside. For the people of Timor 
Leste themselves, independence is disadvantageous. He puts this in a strong 
metaphor. 
                                                 
120 West Timor had to bear an exodus of at least 250,000 refugees (ICG, 2011). It created 
economic and social instability in West Timor. In the aftermath of the killing of UN officials 
by mobs in Atambua in 2000, UN withdrew its forces and West Timor suffered from the 
security scare among foreign investors and visitors (Nixon, 2004). In 2002, UN removed the 
“refugee status” of the people who formerly lived in Timor Leste, leaving them in the hands of 
the Indonesian government, a move considered premature by some (ICG, 2011). In 2005, the 
central government dissolved the refugee camps, effectively forcing the already impoverished 
provincial government to deal with the ex-Timor Leste population (ICG. 2011). Social 
frictions between the locals and the refugees worsened, in 2009 erupting into a deadly riot (cf 
http://us.nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/24404-
tawuran_antar_warga_di_ntt__tiga_tewas). In 2010, conflicts regarding land use between the 
ex-refugees and the locals still posed problems to the NTT government and people (cf 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91329/INDONESIA-Land-tensions-flare-for-former-
refugees). As Nixon (2004) argues, Timor Leste’s separation has taken a large toll on West 
Timor, second only to the price paid by Timor Leste itself. However, unlike the eastern side of 




They want to be independent, but their human resources are not ready ….Right after 
secession, things became chaotic. If they were really ready for separation, they would 
have known which direction to take. Let’s put it this way, it’s like someone who 
walks out of prison. It’s easy to walk out of prison, but after that, what? (Willi, 23 
year old, entrepreneur) 
 
Willi’s approach is utilitarian: it is better to be imprisoned and secure, 
than to be free but without a clear aim. Freedom itself is not considered as a 
valuable goal. Instead of on the causes (e.g. the will to break free from 
oppression), youth in Kupang focus on the consequences of sovereignty, (e.g. 
whether it has brought improvement or impoverishment to the region). Like 
most informants in Kupang, he also perceives secession to have brought a 
plethora of negative consequences for the people of Timor Leste; chaos, 
impoverishment, displacement, separation and killings of family members.  
For youth in Kupang, practical consequences, like the assessment of 
the cost and benefit, form the bases of belongingness to Indonesia, 121  as 
opposed to ideological ones, indicating a rational and instrumental approach. 
Being part of Indonesia is not based on shared primordial features, but on 
strategic avoidance of even worse adversity. The central government is not 
viewed as an antagonistic force and people are willing to conciliate with it. 
This pragmatic rationale behind belongingness to Indonesia is 
manifested in interactions with the state as the subsequent section will argue. 
                                                 
121 Note the difference with Jakarta. Whereas in Jakarta a logic of patron-client is also 
detectable in the youth’s opinion about the central government’s responsibility to places like 
Papua, it is always framed in affective terms like “care”, “guidance” etc. (see 4.2.2.1). In 
Kupang, descriptions of the interaction with the government is framed as rational exchange. 
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5.3.2 Practical Engagement with the State 
In this section, I will address how youth in Kupang negotiate and 
compromise with the state. The data mainly (but not solely) come from 
responses elicited by the photograph of the electoral ballot and the 
conversations I have had regarding aspirations to enter the civil service. 
Throughout this section, it will become apparent that the main mode of 
political engagement of youth in Kupang is grounded in neo-patrimonial logic.  
Neo-patrimonialism is a concept derived from Weber’s 
patrimonialism, referring to a system of rule that is an extension of the 
patriarchal structure where authority is bounded by traditions (Guliyev 2011). 
In neo-patrimonialism, the role of tradition has eroded but public rule is still 
perceived and treated as a personal domain, a perception that becomes 
institutionalized (Guliyev 2011). It is thus a mixture of “traditional” authority 
in communities with modern governance techniques and apparatuses (Guliyev 
2011). According to some studies, neo-patrimonialism is the dominant and 
most pervasive mode of governance in Indonesia (Brown 2004). This system 
was partly the state’s strategy of maintaining unity by rewarding local 
government with financial resources in return for loyalty and it is thus an 
indirect way to keep the country united (Brown 2004; van Klinken 2009). 
Following the reform era, power and capital are dispersed and diversified, 
resulting in a proliferation of corruption and nepotism (cf. Korte 2011; Erb 
2011). Korte’s study suggests that even at the level of the national 
government, coalitions are based not on shared values and ideologies, but on 
the strategic necessity to maintain power by ensuring that other political elites 
receive their due share of power and capital (2011). Although this has been the 
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dominant mode of governing, in Jakarta and Banda Aceh neo-patrimonial 
logics has not emerged to the foreground, unlike in Kupang.  
Without arguing that people in Kupang are “essentially” more 
patriarchal, I would point out that this discourse is more salient there than in 
the two other sites. A good example is the prevalence of the term “bapak 
pembangunan” (father of development) to refer to Suharto in Kupang. This 
term was not mentioned by informants in the Jakarta or Banda Aceh.  
Generally in Kupang, Suharto is remembered as a fatherly authority figure. 
Boy told me,  
Back then, Pak Harto united the minds and the views of all Indonesians, from when 
they were kids. Whenever we were told to draw a landscape, we drew mountains and 
a sun. All over Indonesia, people did that. From early on, we were instilled in us one 
view, one perception... (Boy, 24 year old, civil servant) 
 
The homogenization of minds is positively appraised; Suharto is not 
the main actor behind a highly centralized system that causes economic 
inequality between the regions, but the main drive behind Indonesian unity. 
The overwhelming majority of the informants admitted that in the 2009 
election, they voted for family members, citing the lack of information about 
other candidates or simply explaining that it is the way things are done in 
Kupang, 122 the latter suggesting this practice to be part of local culture. But it 
is more than mere loyalty to one’s kin. Melly is a 21 year old female who 
shares a family name with a high rank officer in the provincial government. 
                                                 
122 Unlike in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, no one mentioned the formulaic “vision and mission” of 
the candidates as the main material to decide who to vote for. Admittedly, I often had the 
impression that this formulaic expression does not represent much but a repetition of 
something that they have heard through the media (this is especially true for the interviews in 
Jakarta), but at the very least it shows these youngsters were informed of the “right” and 
“proper” response in line with the norms of “good governance”. 
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Her father is a civil servant. She told me about the latest local elections when 
her father had asked her to vote for a relative. Melly questioned the 
assumption that their votes will be reciprocated in the future. 
It’s okay if these people still remember us down here once they reach the top, but 
what if they don’t? We vote for them, then they win, but what about us? (Melly, 21 
year old, student) 
  
Voting for family members is a practice to ensure one’s economic 
and/or political survival. Melly, and presumably her father too, expect the 
relative to give something (e.g. jobs, material resources, etc) in return for 
votes.  
A similar story is recounted to me by Velinda. Whereas Melly has 
clear ties to the government sector, Velinda’s widowed father sells pork meat 
in the local market or around neighbourhoods on his motorbike. In the last 
regional election, her father made a deal with a candidate. 
My father asked (a candidate) for a street light in front of our house. There is only 
one lamp on the street and it’s a bit far from our place. So when (a candidate came) 
my father asked, ‘well, there’s no lamp post in front of our house. I will vote for you 
but I suggest (I) will get a lamppost’. So the next day, the PLN (National Electricity 
Company) came and erected one. But on the election day itself, my father did not 
vote for him (laughs). So you just have to be smart (putar otak), the candidate doesn’t 
know what takes place inside the booth. (Velinda, 21 year old, sales promotion girl). 
 
Melly’s and Velinda’s stories show how the know-how of negotiating 
and outsmarting power people is transferred from one generation to the next. 
Political agency means being able to turn the right to vote into personal, 
material benefits.  
This logic is well-understood by all parties. As a master of ceremonies 
and radio announcer, Riska has obtained the status of public figure in Kupang. 
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Subsequently people had told her to sign up as legislative candidate for the 
2009 regional elections. She declined the suggestion, arguing the following. 
I don’t have the money. To be a candidate, first you have to have money to pay 
people. Otherwise, it’s impossible. No one would vote for nothing in return, that 
would be stupid. So of course, the candidates have to give something in return. Based 
on my experience here, sometimes candidates would hand out Rp 20,000123, and that 
is enough to make the recipient agree to vote for candidate. (Riska, 25 year old, radio 
announcer). 
 
From the point of view of youth in Kupang, political agency is 
perceived as commodity that is exchangeable with economic capitals. This 
viewpoint cuts across social class and is the main mode of interaction with the 
state. 
As mentioned earlier, becoming a civil servant is the ideal job for 
youth in Kupang, but this position does not come for free.  Almost everyone I 
met in the course of fieldwork has a story revolving around negotiations to 
enter the civil service. The common perception agrees that there is a price tag 
attached to a position, 124 depending on one’s particular social and cultural 
capitals and the extent to which it meets the requirements set by the decision 
makers. These requirements are not limited to the criteria pertaining one’s 
performance and quality, but is also related to other sets of identities, like 
ethnicity, religion, family etc. 125  
                                                 
123 A little bit over USD 2.00 with the conversion rate at the time of the writing in 2013. The 
rate has not fluctuated very significantly between 2010 and 2013. 
124 Exact numbers are hard to get by or to verify, but Christo told me that he was asked for 80 
million rupiah. 
125 Thus, for instance a Muslim woman told me that she was one of the shortlisted candidates 
to become the anchor for the regional television channel. She eventually declined the offer 
when she was told that she would get the job on the condition that she does not appear on 
screen with her headscarf on, since the audience is predominantly Christian. 
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In line with the pragmatic engagement with the state, the advantage of 
becoming a PNS lies in its financial security, in combination with a relatively 
light workload (in contrast to more ideological reasons, e.g. contributing one’s 
abilities to develop the nation). Miranda, who has been working for 10 months 
for a multi-national credit company still wishes she could obtain a place in the 
civil service. She confided,  
It’s good to work as civil servant, you get retirement fund. Here (in a private 
company), you have to use your brain and perform, otherwise you’ll get fired. 
(Miranda, 24 year old, office worker) 
If one is to apply the norms of “good governance” to these practices, 
they would be seen as transgressing the rules and categorized as nepotism. The 
expected boundary between the personal and the public domain is 
transgressed. However, from the point of view of my informants, these 
practices are commonsensical forms of the rational exchange of capital. In a 
study on corruption and mining concessions in Flores, the other large island of 
NTT, Erb suggests that the local discourse of corruption distinguishes between 
“bad” and “good” corruption. “Good” corruption is when the act is perceived 
as strengthening social bonds by “sharing the wealth”. “Bad” corruption is 
when it reveals personal greed and selfishness (Erb 2011). The practices 
described by my informants belong to “good” corruption, because wealth is 
shared with voters. Thus, when talking about these practices, terms such as 
“corruption”, “collusion” or “nepotism” (shortened in Indonesian to KKN, the 
triumvirate “evil” practices according to reform movements) did not surface.  
Neo-patrimonialism is not exclusive to NTT or Kupang. As previously 
mentioned, decentralization played a part in the diffusion of neo-patrimonial 
practices, leading to more corruption. Monetary exchanges for votes have 
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become the general public’s expectations, especially since the rule for direct 
vote was implemented, ironically, to curb corruption and bribery at the 
parliament level (Erb 2011). In her observation of how the dynamics of local 
elections in Tana Karo, Simandjuntak (2009) concludes that pilkada 
(“pemilihan kepala daerah” or district head election) does not lead to 
democracy. People tolerate money politics, whether it is between constituents 
and candidates as well as between candidates and political parties. In the end, 
the winner was the candidate closest to the central government, and who could 
channel the state’s resources to the local area (Simandjuntak 2009). 
Despite the seemingly fractured nature of this mode of governance, 
according to Brown (2004), patrimonialism to a certain extent keeps the nation 
together. Strong identity-based movements that could threaten the state’s unity 
(e.g. based on religion, ethnicity or territory) are ameliorated by a privileging 
of patron-client networks (Brown 2004). The same effect could be presumed 
to take place in Kupang. Young people are more focused on these networks 
than on building alternative identity-groups. Put in other words, there is no 
antagonism against Indonesia because a competing chain of equivalence (e.g. 
one that is based on ethnicity, religion, region etc) is also absent.  
Although the logic of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism is 
widespread in Indonesia, they are not part of the explicit nation-building 
strategies employed by the state (these put more emphasize on cultural or 
historical identity, as earlier chapters have shown). What makes the imagining 
of Indonesia in Kupang substantially different from the other two sites is that 
it is structured on these implicit practices of governance than on what has been 
explicitly disseminated through education or the media. 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the imagining of Indonesia by youth in Kupang.  
From the periphery, the imagining of Indonesia is multi-layered, at times 
converging and diverging from the dominant discourse of a homogenous 
country.  
Indonesia is not held together by shared “given” features of similar 
language and culture. Differences between the customs and habits of various 
sub-national groups are clearly visible from the point of view of youth in 
Kupang. They can be incompatible with each other. The idea of a “national” 
culture under which all these customs and habits can be subsumed is weak. In 
other words, for youth in Kupang, it is not ethnic ties that bind Indonesia. The 
homogenizing forces that domesticate culture and downplay interregional 
differences are less internalized by the youth in Kupang than in Jakarta. 
Differing opinions about culture are formed exactly as reactions against the 
state’s (over-) emphasis on ethnic ties. 
The absence of strong conviction in shared “given” similarities is 
compensated by an instrumental approach towards nationhood. This is not a 
new or exclusive mode of engagement in Indonesia. Many studies throughout 
the decades have asserted that Indonesia’s governance is marked by a dual 
logic; that of the legal rational and the patrimonial (Korte 2011), and this dual 
logic seems to foreground Kupang’s youth’s imagination of Indonesia. 
Belongingness to a nation is more about the personal benefits that it brings; 
financial security, avoidance of further adversity, or an improvement of one’s 
quality of lives. In other words, the imagining of Indonesia in Kupang is not in 
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accordance with the discourses employed in the nation-building strategies, but 
more in line with the state’s practices of governance. 
Anderson’s description of the nation as an “imagined community” is 
insufficient to explain the nationhood as experienced by youth in Kupang. The 
idea of fraternity among all Indonesians is not salient, as people focus more on 
smaller, strategic networks. Yet, these networks are not strongly identity-based 
and do not threaten the nation’s unity, as Brown (2004) noted.  
The following chapter will look at the imaginings of Indonesia in 
Banda Aceh where, in contrast to Kupang, a strong ethnic identity is present 
and has disrupted the hegemonic construction of Indonesia as a unitary nation-
state that stretches from Sabang to Merauke. The data from Kupang and 
Banda Aceh present two differing ways of how peripheral regions deal with 










6 INDONESIA QUESTIONED: DECONSTRUCTING 
THE NATION IN BANDA ACEH 
For young people in Banda Aceh, being Indonesian is not a self-
evident reality. Most informants grew up in the 1990’s during the 
implementation of Aceh as “Military Operation Zone” (DOM) when rejections 
of Indonesia were part of the public discourse and secession was a viable 
possibility. It was only in 2005 that peace was finally agreed on. After the 
cessation of hostility, youth in Banda Aceh were absorbed in the 
reconstruction and rediscovery of the Aceh identity. This was clearly 
detectable in the prominence of Aceh as the main framework to interpret the 
photographs. In this context, Indonesia is less important than Aceh. 
Taking the risk to tread the thin line between oversimplification and 
clarification, I propose that there are two constructions of Indonesia. Unlike in 
Kupang where divergence and convergence from the dominant discourses 
intertwine in most individuals’ responses, in Banda Aceh one can clearly 
distinguish informants who are against Aceh’s inclusion with Indonesia, from 
those who are not, based on their imagining of Indonesia.  In other words, it is 
possible to assert that the informants in Banda Aceh can be distinguished into 
two groups based on their different narratives of Indonesia. 
One group constructs Indonesia as an antagonistic force that deprives 
Aceh from its right to self-rule, while the other views Indonesia as another 
entity that is not threatening to Aceh’s identity. The first is referred to as 
“Indonesia as antagonism” and the second one as “Indonesia as a 
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compromise”. 126 In comparison to the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”, 
the narrative of “Indonesia as a compromise” shows more similarities and 
contiguities with the idea of Indonesia in Kupang and Jakarta. This cluster of 
ideas in the three latter groups is what I consider to be the regularity in 
dispersion of the idea of Indonesia. 
This chapter is structured differently than the two previous one. The 
idea of Aceh (its history, present condition, culture etc.) strongly foregrounds 
the responses of the informants. It would not be appropriate to not reflect this 
in the chapter. Thus after an overview of the socio-historical context of Banda 
Aceh, I will move on to discuss how youth are exploring the Aceh identity, 
before closing the chapter with addressing the two constructions of Indonesia 
in Banda Aceh.  
The entailing overview of Aceh’s socio-historical context is 
substantially more expansive than the overviews for Jakarta and Kupang. I 
consider this to be necessary because of the important role Aceh’s history 
continues to have for its young people, especially in the narrative of 
“Indonesia as antagonism”. 
                                                 
126 The two stances are not discrete cluster of perceptions, and should instead be 
comprehended as the two ends of a spectrum.  
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6.1 The Socio-Historical Context of Banda Aceh 
 
Figure 5. Map of Aceh127 
 
The earliest written account of Aceh is traceable to the Liang Dynasty 
from 6th century China that tells of a Buddhist polity (Schroter 2010). 
Subsequently, Hindu and Islam entered, followed by the Portuguese and the 
Dutch (Schroter 2010). The interactions of people from many places in Aceh 
leave its legacy in the physical features of the Acehnese who continue to pass 
on the awareness of being of mixed heritage to their offspring (Schroter 2010), 
                                                 
127 From "Kecamatan Aceh Banda Aceh" by Karya sendiri. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via 
Wikipedia - 
http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkas:Kecamatan_Aceh_Banda_Aceh.svg#/media/File:Kecamat
an_Aceh_Banda_Aceh.svg retrieved 27/05/2015. 
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suggesting that the identity as being of mixed heritage remains valuable in 
recent times.  
While evidences of interactions with people from across the oceans are 
plenty, this is not the case in regards to Aceh’s relation with Java.  Although 
the official historiography of Indonesia presents the 13th century kingdom, 
near what is now Lhokseumawe, Samudera Pasai, as the first Islamic kingdom 
in Indonesia that was eventually conquered by Majapahit,  Reid (2006) noted 
that this is recorded in Hikajat Raja-Raja Aceh, an account probably written 
for a Javanese ruler. Most significantly, in the written records up to the 17th 
century, no other mention of Java can be found in Acehnese chronicles, unlike 
in chronicles from other regions like Banjarmasin, Malacca, Bali or Makassar 
where Java occupies a central place (Reid 2006). Scholars generally argue that 
the impact of the occupation by Majapahit or the Javanese was not prominent 
(McKinnon 2006). 
The 17th century was the pinnacle of Aceh’s glory. Its leader, Sultan 
Iskandar Muda ruled over a centralized administration and enforced 
regulations of trade. At this point, Aceh was an important Islamic trading 
centre (Missbach 2010) and enjoyed diplomatic relations with many states. As 
later elaboration will show, the sultanate period is imagined to be the ideal and 
original state to which Aceh must return in the narrative of “Indonesia as 
antagonism” of Banda Aceh’s youth.  
In the 18th and early 19th century, Aceh became more and more 
incorporated in the trading system of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore 
under the British auspices. However, only five years later, the Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty allocated Sumatra to the Dutch. Initially only maintaining a fleeting 
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presence, the Dutch started to exert more power in the later decades of the 19th 
century. In 1873, the Aceh-Dutch war that would last for the following thirty 
year started (Reid 2006). Increasingly, this war became to be framed as a Holy 
War, led by Islamic groups, in opposition not only to the Dutch, but also to 
their supporters, the Aceh’s aristocrats (uleebalang) (Robinson 1998). In 1903, 
Aceh formally fell under the Dutch rule although sporadic resistances 
continued.  
In the mid 20th century, Aceh became part of a wider movement across 
the archipelago against the Dutch and the Japanese. The notion of Holy War 
continued to frame the resistance (Reid 2006) and the Islamic groups in Aceh 
continued to lead the anti-colonial movement (Robinson 1998). Some sort of 
national consciousness began to emerge. The Acehnese-Islam identity started 
to merge into an Indonesian identity (Aspinall 2009b; Reid 2004). In 1945, as 
part of the former Dutch Indies, Aceh became one of the provinces of 
Indonesia. Initially, Aceh was a strong supporter of Indonesia’s independence, 
collecting substantial amount of money to fight the Dutch that until 1949 
continued to regain its rule over the archipelago (Robinson 1998). 
In 1949, the Indonesian independence was finally settled and 
internationally recognized. Fractures between Aceh and Indonesia emerged 
not long after. The Islamic state earlier envisioned by the Acehnese did not 
materialize. To aggravate matters, in 1950, Aceh’s status as a province was 
cancelled and the region became part of North-Sumatra. In 1953, the former 
governor, Tengku Daud Beureu’eh launched a resistance movement and 
proclaimed Aceh as part of a larger Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) (Sulaiman 
2006; Ricklefs 2008) with a number of other regions (Robinson 1998). At this 
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time, the demand was not separation from Indonesia, but a more Islamic 
Indonesia. As a response, in 1959 the central government, under Sukarno, 
gave Aceh the status of special territory, granting control over religion, 
custom, tradition and education as long as it is not in contradiction with 
Indonesian law (Robinson 1998; Sulaiman 2006). The insurgence ended in 
1962 (Robinson 1998). 
In 1976, the relation between Aceh and Indonesia reached another 
critical point. Hasan di Tiro, a former part-time member of the Indonesian 
mission in the United Nations in New York, formed the “Free Aceh 
Movement” (“Gerakan Aceh Merdeka” or GAM). He grew disappointed with 
Suharto’s Javanism, a secular application of Islam and the New Order’s 
centralized and homogenizing governance (Sulaiman 2006). Hasan di Tiro’s 
movement was strongly based on a (re-)construction of Aceh history. In his 
narrative, Indonesia and Java are portrayed as new oppressors (Reid 2004; 
Robinson 1998). The movement was defeated in 1982. Di Tiro had left the 
country a few years earlier to form a government in exile (Robinson 1998). 
In the late 80’s, insurgences started to flare again in a higher intensity 
than before. In the 1990’s, the decade wherein most of my informants grew 
up, the government turned Aceh into a Military Operation Zone (DOM).  
International Crisis Group in 2001 noted that between 1000 to 3000 people 
were murdered and another 900 to 1400 disappeared during the 
implementation of DOM (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). At this point, GAM 
expanded and started to train their recruits in Libyan camps (Aspinall 2009a). 
In August 1998, the DOM ended and the New Order was overthrown. 
Violence between GAM and TNI (Indonesian army) continued and intensified. 
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For the first time, GAM became a truly mass-based insurgency. It recruited 
thousands of people, and controlled, for awhile, the countryside (Aspinall 
2009a). The movement expanded to the general public. In early 1999, students 
from all over Aceh gathered in Banda Aceh and created the Sentra Informasi 
Referendum Aceh (“Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum” or SIRA) a 
strong civilian movement. In November 1999, SIRA organized a massive rally 
in Banda Aceh to demand referendum, inspired by the one given to East 
Timor. In 2002, Aceh was given a special status that facilitates expressions of 
Aceh’s distinctiveness (Bertrand 2004). The region’s name became “Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam” and the Shariah law was implemented within the region in 
2002 (Milallos 2007). A “Cessation for Hostility Agreement” (COHA) was 
signed in December 2002, but not long after, the agreement broke down.  
In 2004, negotiations between Indonesia and GAM leaders resumed, 
mediated by Crisis Management Initiative under the leadership of Finland’s 
president, Martti Ahtaasari. As the dialogue was on its way, the tsunami at the 
end of that year significantly accelerated peace talks (Kingsbury 2006). The 
Helsinki peace agreement was signed by both parties in 2005. It states that 
Aceh continues to be part of Indonesia, in return for substantial autonomy, 
except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, 
monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion. 
From then on, Aceh society experienced rapid changes. The rebuilding 
of Aceh was a colossal endeavour under the auspices of the Agency of 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Aceh and Nias (BRR). 128 In 2006 the 
                                                 
128 It coordinated up to 12,500 projects, over 60 donors and multilateral agencies, and up to 
700 NGOs for both territories (Aceh Recovery Newsletter 2009) 
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first provincial election was held, and an ex-GAM combatant, Irwandi Yusuf, 
was elected as Governor. Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA, Badan 
Reintegrasi Aceh) was established to help former GAM members to 
reintegrate into society (Hillman 2011). By 2007, ten districts were led by 
GAM-related individuals (Aspinall 2009a).  
The province possesses a significant amount of resources, totalling up 
to US$ 7.9 billion for the period between 2006 and 2027 (Hillman 2011) in the 
form of revenue from gas and oil trade (70% of the total), and “special 
autonomy” grants from the central government accounting for 2% of the 
national General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum), significantly more 
than what other provinces receive (World Bank 2009; Hilman 2011). 129 
Despite the high revenue, Aceh’s poverty index increased, (World Bank 2009; 
Hillman 2011).  Economic activity after the tsunami was tied to reconstruction 
projects (e.g. transport, trade, construction), and other sectors were unable to 
revive the economy after the reconstruction phase ended (World Bank 2009). 
Although policy goals were stated in the provincial government’s “Mid-term 
Development Plan”, there were no detailed plans of longer term strategies130 
(Hillman 2011).  
                                                 
129 One of the flagship projects of the new government, that had a significant impact on my 
informants, was to provide up to US$ 100 million in scholarships for postgraduate education. 
In 2009, students were sent to 30 different countries (Hillman 2011). The Human 
Development Index in 2009 ranked 17th out of 33 provinces (BPS 2009). 
130 Thus for instance, the abovementioned scholarship program was not aligned to 
employment policies, indirectly forcing them to find jobs outside the province (Hillman 
2011). Similarly, Aceh Universal Health Insurance (JKA, Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh) 
inadvertently unevenly spread the load for public hospitals and clinics (puskesmas), burdening 




Further obstacles were created by post-conflict politics among former 
GAM131 members who vie for a piece of the revenue cake (Hillman 2011; 
World Bank 2009; Aspinall 2009a; cf. Ansori 2012). Many entered the 
construction field that was in high demand after the tsunami, and one of the 
most corrupt businesses in Indonesia. The former combatants obtained 
contracts not so much because of their expertise in construction, but because 
of their political power and the potential to disrupt peace (Aspinall 2009a), 
thus project tenders are often embedded in the patronage system built during 
the conflict (World Bank 2009). These practices are manifestations of neo-
patrimonialism. Interestingly, unlike in Kupang, in the interviews in Banda 
Aceh, the patron-client discourse did not emerge, suggesting that it has not 
become the prevailing survival strategy. Similarly, a survey among business 
people done by Transparency International in 2008 ranked Aceh as the third 
least corrupt province of Indonesia (Transparency International 2008). 
Another significant change of Aceh is in the realm of religion. The 
Shariah Law was implemented after 1999 as a way for the central government 
to win back the Acehnese (Aspinall 2009b). Shariah enforcement consisted of 
two domains; the administrative apparatus (the Shariah police and Shariah 
court), and the rules that over the years have become more precise and 
punitive (Aspinall 2009b).  
Although Aceh has been imagined mainly as a united entity, internal 
discontent is present. Two regions, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) and Aceh 
                                                 
131 When the MoU was signed, up to 10,000 ex-combatants and civilians had to be 
rehabilitated (World Bank 2009) 
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Barat Selatan (ABAS)132 demanded to be installed as provinces in their own 
rights, even prior to the peace agreement. The two largest ethnic minorities, 
the Gayo and Alas (Schroter 2010) are concentrated in ALA, while other 
ethnic minorities live in the proposed ABAS (Amsori 2012). Unsurprisingly, 
this agitated the provincial government in Banda Aceh. In 2013 at the time of 
writing this issue has not been resolved. 133  The movement is driven by 
grievances over economic disparity (Amsori 2012; Ehrentraut 2010), linguistic 
discrimination (the privileging of Acehnese language) and substantially 
structured by different experiences during the conflict period (Ehrentraut 
2010).  
This subchapter has given an overview of the socio-historical context 
of Aceh. A strong awareness of Aceh’s history, a frail relation with Indonesia 
and the fast-paced changes that is unfolding in the past half a decade, all play a 
part in how Indonesia is imagined by the young generation in Banda Aceh. 
6.2 Inhibiting the Negative Space: Aceh as a Distinct Entity 
In interpreting the photographs, Aceh is the primary reference point for 
its youth. The “negative space” of the peripheries (see Chapter 4 on Jakarta) is 
reversed, and Aceh is more important than the nation-state. This section will 
address two clearly identifiable aspects that indicate the foregrounding of 
Aceh in the engagement with the world. These aspects deal with the 
                                                 
132 ALA would cover Central Aceh, Southeast Aceh, Aceh Singkil, Gayo Luwes and Bener 
Meriah while ABAS would cover Aceh Jaya, Southwest Aceh, Nagan Raya, Simeulue, and 
South Aceh (Ansori 2012). 





exploration of Acehnese culture/identity and Aceh’s place in the international 
world. Although it might seem as a diversion from the research question, this 
section shows how young people in Banda Aceh resist the marginalization of 
their region in the national discourse.  
6.2.1 Reinventing Aceh Culture  
In 2010, the youth of Banda Aceh were exploring various aspects of 
the Aceh identity. Music artists formed bands like Kande, Seramoe Reggae 
and Nyawong that offer repertoires of traditional folk songs as well as new 
ones recounting local stories, whether it is about love, war or the tsunami. 134 
Writing courses, foreign film festivals, public lectures, etc are organized by 
social and cultural movements, such as “The Cultural League of Tikar Pandan 
Community” (Liga Kebudayaan Komunitas Tikar Pandan). 135 Compared to 
the local publishing world in Kupang, the literary universe in Banda Aceh is 
lively. Many writings have been published on the conflict and post-conflict 
life.  
Outside of these cultural productions, exploration and reinvention of 
the Acehnese culture also take place through everyday practices.  For youth, 
the Acehnese tradition and culture is a salient reference point to make sense of 
their everyday activities. At the time of the research, the popular hang-out 
spots for young people are the coffee houses that line the streets of Banda 
Aceh. Although coffee houses have since long been a fixture in Aceh’s adult 
                                                 
134 Songs like “Hikajat Prang Sabi” (Epic of the Sabi War) or “Panglima Prang” (war fighter) 
that were appropriated by Aceh’s independence movement are now easily available at 
roadside CD vendors. 
135 See http://www.tikarpandan.org/ 
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men’s social life, coffee houses equipped with Wi-Fi136 facilities only emerged 
after the tsunami. Offering free internet connection, these coffee shops attract 
a younger demography. 137 However, despite the appeal of the Wi-Fi as a form 
of modern communication technology, the habit is interpreted as a 
continuation of the “Acehnese tradition”. This was how coffee houses were 
explained to me by many Acehnese I have encountered, and expressed clearly 
by Kamal, whom I met in a coffee house named “Napoleon Kupi” near 
Simpang Surabaya. When we met, he had been in Napoleon Kupi for a good 
one and half hour with his three friends, who rarely glanced away from their 
personal laptops. 
This is a tradition of the Acehnese…So in Banda Aceh, a coffee shop is the most comfortable 
place to chat about anything, all sorts of issues, business...politics, religion. Once we sit in a 
coffee shop, all the secrets will be revealed (laughs). You could say the coffee shop has 
become our home.  (Kamal, 20 year old, student) 
 
This is a common response; informants often recalled stories about 
how coffee shops have played an important role in the social life of the 
Acehnese men. Although Kamal’s activities in coffee shops mainly revolve 
around laptops and the internet, two sophisticated and high-tech items in the 
context of Indonesia, he situates this as the continuation of a traditional 
                                                 
136 Out of the six café’s that I frequented, only the famous Solong café in Ulee Kareng did not 
have a Wi-Fi facility.  Based on my conversations with its regular patrons, this seems to be a 
distinguishing factor that attracts a particular type of customers; those who are more interested 
in intellectual discussions with other patrons instead of being in a place where everyone 
concentrate on their communication devices. The fact that the lack of Wi-Fi is distinguishing 
enough to become a brand indicates the widespread use of Wi-Fi in other coffee shops. 
137 Hypothetically, because Wi-Fi is an important appeal of a coffee house, an interpretation of 




practice. I take this to be an indication of the importance and salience of 
tradition and culture for contemporary youth in Banda Aceh. 138 
 
Figure 6. Inside “Napoleon Kupi”: young people and their laptops. 
Aceh culture versus national culture 
Although youth in Banda Aceh are aware of the official discourse 
regarding “national culture”, culture is understood to be collective 
predispositions located at the level of ethnic group and/or region. Culture is 
not first and foremost an abstract set of artefacts that one can master by 
consciously studying them, the way that it is implied in the national 
curriculum, and the way it is understood in Jakarta. On the contrary, 
individuals acquire mastery of culture by living in a particular society. The 
                                                 
138 To grasp the significance of this, it is useful here to compare with how youth in Kupang 
interpret the bemo (see chapter 5). Their preference to the loud bemo is not explained in terms 
of the “traditionally musical” culture of the Timorese, (something that they could also profess, 
given that dancing is a key activity during social gatherings) but as a liking for entertainment 
that sets them apart from the more productive Javanese. The point of reference in Kupang is 
contemporary Indonesia, while for youth in Banda Aceh, it is more embedded in an imaginary 
collective past of the Acehnese. 
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following excerpt is taken from a response of Aidil on the photograph of Qory 
Sandioriva. Aidil is a student majoring in English language, both his parents 
work as civil servants in Banda Aceh, and like most of my informants he 
disagrees with Qory as a representative of Aceh.  
She does not master the culture in a natural way, but by studying it. Look at her 
background, her father is a Sundanese, her mother comes from Takengon, she lives in 
Jakarta and has not returned to Aceh. It is different from us who live in the region. I 
live here, I know the Aceh culture naturally. She needs to study it intentionally. 
(Aidil, 23 year old, student) 
As in Kupang, in Banda Aceh, culture is seen as a collective 
disposition of a particular society, akin to Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus” 
(Bourdieu, 1990). This stance questions the idea of culture as located in the 
national realm, or that the cultures of various sub-national groups are 
transparently compatible with each other. The notion of “national culture” 
fails to be a key signifier that constructs a chain of equivalence; it cannot erase 
the differences between various societies. 
For Banda Aceh’s youth, culture is primarily located at the level of the 
region (thus, Aceh). There is an assumption that all Acehnese share the same 
culture. This leads to ignorance of internal differences, 139 an attitude that have 
generated the discontent of minority ethnic groups and spurred demands of 
separation from NAD. Although this issue was not covered extensively in the 
                                                 
139 An instance of intra-Aceh difference appears in my interview with Novi, who comes from 
the same minority ethnic group as Qory’s mother, i.e. Gayo, told me that people in Takengon 
are appreciative of Qory. 
In Takengon, no one is against her. People are generally supportive. They think, “oh, it’s great 
that someone from Gayo can ‘go international’ (English in original) (Novi, 23 year old, 
student) 
She did not continue to elaborate on what she personally thinks of the discrepancy between 
attitudes of the people in Takengon and Banda Aceh, probably inhibited by the presence of 
her friends who are ethnically Acehnese. No other informant mentioned during the interview. 




interviews, but in the limited conversations that I have had, my interlocutors 
attributed the demand to personal political interests of elite groups in these 
provinces, and not as something culturally or ideologically justifiable. This 
reflects the general accusation of the provincial government towards ALA and 
ABAS movements140 (Ehrentraut 2010). Thus, although Banda Aceh’s youth 
perceive differences between relatively large units of regions (e.g. provinces), 
intra-Aceh diversity is not acknowledged and the Acehnese people are 
portrayed as a singular group. 141  
6.2.2 Aceh and the World 
In accordance with the growing confidence in Aceh, the region is 
perceived to have its own international reputation, unmediated by Jakarta. 
Thus, there is an implied sense of being a separate entity from Indonesia. 
The experience of youth in Banda Aceh regarding interactions with the 
international community is exceptional, in comparison with the experience of 
most Indonesian youth. They have had encounters with foreign aid workers, 
the regional scholarships program provide a higher chance to study abroad, 
and the redeveloped infrastructure give them easy access to the internet. 
Unlike in Jakarta, where the experience of the international world is mediated 
by the mass media, or as holiday destinations, for youth of Banda Aceh, the 
international community consists of real individuals they have had substantial 
interactions with. It is referred to as concrete countries (instead of the 
                                                 
140 See an example of this attitude in  
http://atjehpost.com/saleum_read/2013/05/03/50274/77/3/Pemantik-pemekaran-ALA-dan-
ABAS 
141 In other words, Indonesia and Aceh use the same strategy to downplay internal differences. 
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generalized “luar” like in Jakarta) like India, Korea, France, Turkey or Japan. 
From Banda Aceh, there is no need to acknowledge Jakarta and Bali as the 
connecting hubs of Indonesia to other countries, because Aceh’s youth have a 
more direct access to the world. 
Religion, however, remains a strong boundary. Although most 
informants describe themselves as tolerant to religious differences, this is not 
an unconditional attitude. Informants often express how Aceh people will 
welcome foreigners as long as they do not threaten the religious integrity of 
Aceh. This is for instance expressed in the following excerpt from the 
interview with Nana. 
Some people think that....after the tsunami, Aceh, especially Banda Aceh has gone downhill 
because of foreign influences....They did not only bring aid, but also bad influences....Thus in 
one case, the books distributed to elementary school children had the sign of a cross at the 
back. Also in the food packages, many crosses (are printed), in the colouring books for 
children. (Nana, 20 year old, student). 
 
Overall, people are more welcoming towards people from Muslim 
countries, like Turkey, and are most suspicious of countries with a 
predominantly Christian population.  Once a group of foreigners are perceived 
as a threat to Aceh’s integrity, they will be treated as invaders and the 
Acehnese will raise all arms to defend themselves. The same impression is 
obtained by Kingsbury, who noted the "tradition of accepting outsiders as 
friends but fighting them as invaders" (Kingsbury 2006).   
Whether the attitude towards foreigners is favourable or unfavourable, 
either stance implies that Aceh is imagined to be a self-standing entity in the 
international community. This stance is further illustrated by their opinions 




My informants are well aware of the dispute between Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Despite the awareness about the issue, strong antipathy towards 
Malaysia is absent. On the contrary, there is a sense of affinity with Malaysia 
that is not found in Jakarta and Kupang. As Reid stated, in the pre-colonial 
period, Aceh had more cultural, political and economical connections to the 
Malayan Peninsula than to Java (Reid 2004). This affiliation continues well 
after the establishment of the two nations. In 1980’s, Malaysia was the 
destination of a growing Acehnese diaspora and played an important role in 
the spread of GAM ideologies 142  (Missbach 2013). In the contemporary 
period, the affinity between the two regions continues.  
Many informants have personal interactions with Malaysians, either 
with those who come to study in Aceh universities or with those they have met 
during travels to the country. These personal interactions with Malaysians, and 
the cultural and historical affinities, prevent the formation of negative images. 
Informants generally do not attribute the blame to Malaysia as a whole entity, 
and some blame Indonesia’s side for failing to appreciate and to take care of 
its cultural artefacts, leaving the opportunity to do so to Malaysia. What is 
more revealing of their stance regarding this dispute is the matter through 
which they convey their opinions: it is generally done in a factual manner, 
                                                 
142 Missbach (2013) argues that the Acehnese diaspora had an important role in the 
secessionist movements as provider of moral and ideological support. The diaspora started in 
Malaysia in the 80’s. Deprivation from the host country as well as the country of origin 
solidified antagonistic sentiments against the latter. When Malaysia cracked down on illegal 
Indonesian labourers, the detention center inadvertently became a site of edification on 
separatist ideologies among the Acehnese. A riot broke out in 1998 when the Malaysian 
government tried to deport them back to Indonesia against their will (Missbach 2013). In all 
these, it is obvious that the Acehnese prefer Malaysia to Indonesia. 
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lacking any trace of strong emotions thus indicating detachment (but not 
disinterest, unlike in Kupang143) from the conflicting parties.  
A more elaborated opinion regarding the feud with Malaysia is 
expressed in the following excerpt from an interview with Yusuf, a regular in 
Solong coffee house. His full name suggests that he is a descendant from 
uleebalang, although as he later revealed, his uncle is an influential ulama 
leading his own pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in South Aceh.  Well-
articulated and diplomatic, he is one of few informants whose responses do 
not reveal a clear attitude towards Indonesia. He looked at the photograph of 
“Malingsia” and responded, 
It’s very clear that this (banner) is not made by an Acehnese (laughs). An Acehnese 
would not hold grudges against Malaysia. If you ask around, people in Sumatra 
generally do not dislike Malaysia because we all speak Malay here, especially in 
Aceh. The local government in Aceh is very close to Malaysia. Honestly, sometimes 
an Acehnese would prefer to go on holiday in Malaysia than in Java, it’s cheaper. So 
yeah, if you say “Visit Malingsia”, this is the manifestation of the anger of 
Indonesians. (Yusuf, 21 year old, student) 
 
His response suggests that Aceh’s relation to Malaysia is closer than to 
Indonesia, because of geographical and linguistic proximity. The concluding 
remark implies a conceptual separation between Aceh and Indonesia: 
“Malingsia” is an expression of Indonesians’ anger that is not felt by the 
Acehnese.  
In this section, I have addressed how Aceh is the governing point of 
reference for youth in Banda Aceh. There is a contestation against the idea of 
the peripheries as a negative space by showing that Aceh is more relevant than 
                                                 
143 Thus, whereas Kupang informants might not be aware of the ongoing dispute, youth in 
Banda Aceh are aware of it, but they do not fully take Indonesia’s side. 
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Indonesia. Whereas Jakarta or Java is perceived by youth in Kupang to be a 
more desirable place, this idea is largely absent in Banda Aceh.   
Although my informants seem to agree that the main concern and 
interest should be Aceh, the attitude translates into two different constructions 
of Indonesia144. The first one is the narrative of “Indonesia as the antagonistic 
other”, while the second imagining is the narrative of “Indonesia as a 
compromise”.  
 
6.3 Indonesia as Antagonism 
The first construction of Indonesia that emerges from the data is the 
positioning of Indonesia an antagonistic force. Following Laclau and Mouffe, 
antagonism here refers to the limit of all objectivity (Laclau and Mouffe 
[1985] 2001:122). It is the Other that “constitute the limits of society, the 
latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself” (Laclau and Mouffe 
[1985]2001: 125). In other words, in this construction, Indonesia is perceived 
as that which stands in the way of Aceh’s completion of its destiny. In 
highlighting the construction of the Acehnese identity that is oppositional to 
Indonesia, this section follows closely a line of argument that focuses on the 
role of various narratives in supporting Aceh’s ethno-nationalist sentiments 
(cf. Aspinall 2007; Drexler 2007). 
                                                 
144 With the data at hand, it is not possible for me to conclusively identify the demographic 
factors responsible for the diverging imaginations. Family background (e.g. parents in the civil 
service versus non-civil servant parents), ethnicity and region of origin (highlands versus 
coastal areas or non-Aceh versus Aceh) might be factors although it is not conclusive. 
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This construction of antagonism articulated in two ways. The first is 
the idealization of the Aceh-Indonesia conflict. By “idealization” I refer to the 
way conflict is represented as a fundamental incompatibility between two 
radically oppositional parties, eliminating details and “grey areas” that would 
provide complexity. Related to this, is the second articulation that expresses 
dislike to Indonesia and the absence of Indonesia as framework in interpreting 
their surroundings.  
Important to note is that this narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” 
provides the contrasting imagining against which the imaginings of Indonesia 
in the three other groups (i.e. in Jakarta, Kupang and in the narrative of 
“Indonesia as compromise”) emerge as a cluster/ensemble. There are three 
points of contrasts: compared to the three groups, the imagining of Indonesia 
here is limited to its antagonistic nature; interregional disparity is attributed to 
injustices; and the idea of the government as being responsible to maintain 
order and as source for resources is absent. 
6.3.1 Idealization of Aceh-Indonesia Conflict 
To perceive Indonesia as an antagonism, it is necessary to construct the 
conflict between Aceh and Indonesia in an idealized fashion. By idealization, I 
refer not firstly to the psychological phenomena where objects are perceived 
in an unrealistically positive manner, but to the term as used in the field of 
philosophy of science, i.e. a distortion in appraising objects by leaving out 
incidental and peripheral elements that heighten complexity, in order to have a 
better comprehension of the core elements of the objects.  
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A similar course is employed to frame the relation between Indonesia 
and Aceh. The two parties are imagined as fixed and unchangeable, causing 
the discordance between them to remain fundamentally unbridgeable. As 
Drexler (2007) noted, the stable binary positions of Indonesia and Aceh “...are 
created and consolidated through discourses and narratives that elide the 
dynamics that underlie their existence.” (p. 964) 
An important part of this idealization is the belief that Aceh is 
inherently great. In line with di Tiro’s mission to raise historical consciousness 
of the Acehnese, Aceh’s glorious past is used as a justification for sovereignty. 
An apt illustration is provided by the following response given to the 
photograph of Jakarta’s skyline by Ahmad. At the time of research, he was a 
freelance journalist. He argued that Aceh could and should be at least as 
developed and wealthy as the capital too, because the sophistication of the 
Aceh sultanate proves that it was possible. 
Infrastructure is one of the benchmarks of a nation’s development. I hope Aceh can 
be like this... Aceh’s infrastructure was actually very impressive. How could an 
architect redirect the river Krueng Daroy via the city center and the sultanate’s 
palace? It’s an architectural feat that is difficult to comprehend, but Aceh people 
made it possible. The ships from the Netherlands or Portugal who wanted to buy 
spices or salted fish could anchor in Kutaraja. We’re talking about concepts here, and 
to make it a reality we would have to go back to the past, but this (development) is 
definitely not impossible. (Ahmad, 23 year old, student/freelance journalist) 
 
Implied in Ahmad’s description is the imagining of Aceh people to 
have remained inherently unchanged for centuries. The Acehnese people of 
today or tomorrow have the same capability as their forefathers to build a 
region of glory and splendour. 
This idea of Aceh’s inherent grandness positions Indonesia as the 
obstacle that prevents this potential from being manifested. In terms of 
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historical moments, Aceh predates Indonesia. This idea is expressed by 
Amalia, a student originally from Langsa whose parents are both civil 
servants. As she told me, her understanding of the “real” nature of Aceh’s 
conflict with Indonesia only came when she went to college in Banda Aceh 
where she was exposed to anti-Indonesian notions. Responding to the 
photograph depicting school children saluting the national flag, 145 she listed 
the historical events that made a ceremony of Indonesian nationalism 
unsuitable for Acehnese. 
If you analyse history closely, we’re not part of Indonesia. President Sukarno wanted 
us to be Indonesians, but we have fought our own independence fight (against the 
Dutch). After that, Sukarno promised us many things, but we built everything 
ourselves. Sukarno once came to beg to Daud Beureueh and cried for help and, but 
after that Sukarno forgot us. I think Hasan di Tiro was also disappointed in 
him....Actually, you’re not allowed to take (over a region) without the people’s 
permission...And look, now, we’re disadvantaged. (Amalia, 22 year old, student) 
 
Like many informants in this group, Amalia traced the dispute between 
Aceh and Indonesia to the past. Aceh’s independence fight against the Dutch 
was not to free Indonesia, but to free Aceh. The subsequent inclusion in 
Indonesia is deemed as an unjustifiable act and a violation of human rights. In 
the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”, Indonesian/Javanese leaders 
146continue to deprive Aceh from its right to self-rule and from the revenue of 
                                                 
145 In Aceh, the weekly routine for school children throughout the nation was interrupted 
during the worse phases of the conflict, thus unlike in other places, the ceremony was not an 
unquestionable part of education. In this group, the photograph often elicits memories of the 
conflict and of the enforcement of nationalism by the state. 
146 Understandably, in this context, negative emotions towards Suharto run high. This was 
shown by Jufri, who is a dancer in his university’s traditional dance group and who has 
frequently performed in the welcoming events of many foreign dignitaries, and travelled 
substantially as representation of Aceh and Indonesia (at the time of research, he was getting 
ready for the China Expo). The following is his initial response after seeing the photograph of 
Suharto. 
“UGH! (Disgusted expression)...I’m annoyed....Just perfect. The photo should be (moved his 
hand to gesture stabbing). He is an absolute liar. Everything is bad about him. Aceh’s 
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its natural resources. The conflict between Aceh and Indonesia that could 
alternatively be perceived as separate power struggles, embedded in particular 
socio-historical concerns and contexts, is instead interpreted as a singular 
conflict that is definitive and forms the root of all other problems. 
In this narrative there are two fixed roles: Indonesia is the archenemy 
and Aceh as the protagonist, the victimized society, unjustifiably subjected to 
Indonesia’s repression. Ilham, a graduate from Unsyiah and a freelance 
journalist, captured this binary opposition concisely in his response to the 
photograph of the Timor Leste man. 
All Acehnese are victims of the conflict, they have undergone mental, psychological 
or physical violence...I remember how I was beaten up by a soldier back then.... 
People are witnesses to the torture and the killing of their family members. People in 
Aceh are now blissfully oblivious to the past, because of the peace. The wounds have 
been forgotten. Yet, I worry that these will be opened again one day because people 
cannot stand injustice.... (Ilham, 24 year old, student) 
 
In this idealization of the Aceh-Indonesia conflict, the peace agreement 
does not foreclose future clashes; it is a mere facade behind which latent 
mutual animosity simmers. Putting Amelia’s and Ilham’s comments side by 
side, the Aceh-Indonesia conflict stretches out uninterruptedly from the pre-
independence period to the imaginary future. This narrative has been 
identified as one of the most salient in Aceh ethno-nationalism. As argued by 
Aspinall (2007), “Acehnese identity became one founded in suffering at 
                                                                                                                                
(condition) was partly caused by him...I don’t want to look at him” (he put the photograph 
away). (Jufri, 22 year old, student) 
It is a very visceral hatred, physically expressed through facial expressions and the 
spontaneous holding away of the photograph. This strong hatred towards Suharto is not visible 





Indonesian hands. It was an identity based on victimhood, albeit not a silently 
reproachful and helpless victimhood, but one that stressed Acehnese resistance 
and heroism (p.962).  
Because Indonesia is firmly casted as antagonist, there is little 
alternative images of the country. In photographs where associations with 
antagonistic images of Indonesia is not self-evident, the informants either did 
not give elaborated responses (indicating a lack of interest or knowledge), 
shifted the focus to Aceh, or associated it with Indonesia’s antagonistic nature. 
This is exemplified in the following response from Ahmad on the photograph 
of komodo. 
Komodo. Yeah, in Aceh, we have lizards (laughs). Komodo is related to tourism, 
isn’t? The komodo island is one of the resources in tourism (industry) that has been 
officialised as one of the natural wonders...but I don’t know whether that (status)  has 
been decided or not. It might take a long time. Anyway, to return to Aceh, Aceh has a 
number of tourism spots that other countries, or other regions in Indonesia do not 
have. However, they have not been explored because of the 32 year long conflict. 
(Ahmad, 23 year old, student/freelance journalist) 
 
Even though the photograph does not relate specifically to Aceh, 
Ahmad associated it with Aceh’s unexplored tourism industry, a condition that 
is once again attributable to the conflict with Indonesia. In other words, in line 
with the idealization of the Aceh-Indonesia conflict, Indonesia is casted in the 
singular role of antagonism. 
6.3.2 Dissenting the Hegemonic Narratives of Indonesia 
Because “Indonesia” is casted in a singular role, the dislike towards the 
country is generalized to other aspects that are not immediately related to the 
Aceh-Indonesia conflict. In these instances, “Indonesia” is used 
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interchangeably with “Java” or “Jakarta”. This section will present how 
Indonesia (Java/Jakarta) is imagined as an antagonist not only in regards to 
Aceh, but to the other regions as well. In generalizing Indonesia’s 
(Java/Jakarta’s) antagonistic position to other regions, this narrative attributes 
the center-periphery disparity to wrongful acts of injustices. This is one of the 
key differences with how interregional disparity is imagined in Jakarta and 
Kupang (and in the narrative of “Indonesia as compromise”). In these three 
groups, the disparity is ignored or naturalized. 
The following is an excerpt from the interview with Faizal. At the 
time, Faizal was a student in the faculty of Economics. His deceased father 
had worked as a civil servant in the department of agriculture during his life.  
Yet, this link to the government has not led to a positive appraisal of 
Indonesia. When he saw the photograph of Jakarta’s skyline, he commented,   
One of the lecturers in my economic class said, ‘Think about the fifth principle of 
Pancasila; social justice for every Indonesian. Because there are more Indonesians 
living in Java, the welfare in Java is better than elsewhere’ (Faizal, 21 year old, 
student). 
 
The response subverts the state’s imagination of Indonesia as a 
community of equal members. The resources of the state are concentrated in 
Java, depraving other regions from what should be theirs too.  
Counter-narratives rejecting the importance of Java are found in 
regards to the official history of Indonesia as the continuation of the great 
Majapahit kingdom. Zahra, a student in Ar-Raniry and a radio announcer, 
repeatedly told me that Majapahit’s rule did not stretch over a territory as large 
as portrayed in Indonesia’s history books. As she pointed out, 
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 Majapahit was very small! It’s a historical lie! Majapahit was only the size of a 
district in Darussalam. That big was Majapahit! (Zahra, 23 year old, student) 
Criticisms of Java-centrism are prevalent in the narrative of “Indonesia 
as antagonism”. Java tends to be seen as the culprit behind Indonesia’s 
political and economic interregional disparity.  
The strongest marker of “Indonesia as antagonism”, unsurprisingly, is 
the opinion about Timor Leste’s secession. Young people who construct 
Indonesia as an antagonistic force generally perceive the secession positively, 
and argue that Aceh should have followed the same path to freedom. 
Such a stance is exemplified by Jufri’s response. When we discussed 
the photograph of Timor Leste, he argued, 
I think that you can say (Timor Leste) is a nation that has not been recognized (by 
Indonesia).... After Timor Leste (seceded), Aceh should (have followed). Habibie’s 
plan was like that. Aceh was so close to referendum. (Jufri, 22 year old, student) 
The sentiment is widely shared among this group of young Acehnese. 
Timor Leste demanded separation because they had been treated unfairly by 
Indonesia.  
As the previous chapter on Kupang has addressed, young people in the 
peripheries are aware of the fact that Jakarta and Java is wealthier and more 
powerful than other regions. What makes these informants in Banda Aceh 
different is hence not so much the awareness of disparity, but the attribution of 
this disparity to matters of injustice and inequality. In highlighting these 
aspects of Indonesia, they unravel the hegemonic notion of equality between 
Indonesians. 
This section has explored the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”. 
People in this group deconstruct the hegemonic chain of equivalence of 
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Indonesian nationalism. To appraise the significance of this viewpoint, it is 
fruitful to compare with the construction of “Indonesia as a compromise”. 
6.4 Indonesia as a Compromise 
Approximately half of my informants in Banda Aceh are content with 
the current arrangement between Aceh and Indonesia. In this narrative of 
“Indonesia as a compromise”, it is better for Aceh to remain with Indonesia 
because the current peaceful condition is conducive to economic growth. 
Thus, the region’s prosperity is not preconditioned on sovereignty. This is a 
little bit similar to the attitude in Kupang where belongingness to Indonesia is 
more instrumental than ideological.  
In my analysis, I have identified a number of ideas that construct 
Indonesia as a compromise. The first one is consent to nationalist narratives, 
and the second one is a pragmatic appraisal of Aceh’s relation with Indonesia.  
Before exploring them, it needs to be restated that in this construction 
of Indonesia, Aceh still is the most significant entity. It is precisely because 
staying with Indonesia is more advantageous to Aceh than secession, that the 
country is not imagined as an antagonistic force that threatens Aceh.  
6.4.1 Consent to Dominant Narratives of Indonesia 
In this narrative of compromise, there is consent with dominant ideas 
of Indonesia. The following excerpt reflects how the narrative of “Indonesia as 
compromise” is informed by the dominant discourse. Kamal commented on a 




In Indonesia, although there is a variety of ethnic groups, they all stay together (they 
do?) Yes, for example the people of Aceh, Medan, Jakarta. They stay together, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Kamal, 20 year old, student). 
 
Kamal explicitly evoked the nation’s slogan and drew a chain of 
equivalence between Aceh and two other Indonesian cities. He situated Aceh 
as one of the regions of Indonesia, conceptually imagined to be similar as 
Medan and Jakarta. This is a common imagining in the narrative of “Indonesia 
as a compromise” where mentions of other regions are more often made (e.g. 
Makassar, Jogjakarta, Medan, Padang). There is no aversion towards Jakarta 
or Java. In accordance, this group shows neutrality or consent towards various 
popular practices and expressions of nationalism. Yasin moved to Banda Aceh 
from Meulaboh to study computer science. He had worked for awhile for an 
international NGO. As he responded to the photograph of komodo, 
I also voted (in the New Seven World Wonder competition). But I didn’t vote for komodo, I 
voted for Toba Lake and Kelimutu Lake (and why is that?) Because Toba Lake is near here 
and I like Kelimutu Lake” (Yasin, 24 year old, student) 
In his response, there is a sense of ownership of these different natural 
resources. Unlike in the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”, it is possible 
for Yasin and Kamal to imagine themselves as Indonesians among other 
Indonesians, and this identity is not necessarily contradictory to being 
Acehnese. 
Overall, there is little antagonism against Indonesia. Comments elicited 
by photographs that could be interpreted in an antagonistic way remain 
positive towards the nation. This is the case with comments elicited by the 
photo of the flag raising ceremony. 
As stated earlier, the weekly ceremony was halted in Aceh at the 
height of the conflict. Although the photograph elicits stories about the 
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conflict years, informants do not express dislike of Indonesia (unlike in the 
general response in the narrative of “Indonesia” as exemplified by the 
interview with Amalia).  
Fitri, whose parents were civil servants, told me the following. 
I remember we did this in elementary school, this is one of the most boring activities. 
If we came late, we got punished...I tried to faint, but never succeeded (laughs). But 
in junior high, we stopped doing this because of the conflict....That was good, we did 
not have to rush to get to school on Mondays. (Fitri, 23 year old, student) 
 
For Fitri, the flag raising ceremony is not a symbol of Indonesia’s 
oppression but was merely an inconvenient part of schooling. 
Like the youth in Jakarta and Kupang, this group of informants is not 
hostile to Suharto. Indra is a young man who had finished his study in STT 
Telkom, Bandung. At that time, he was getting ready to leave for Jakarta to 
take preparatory German courses, before leaving for Germany to study for his 
Master’s Degree in Engineering on Aceh’s regional scholarship. His response 
to Suharto’s picture was positive and very similar to the responses of youth in 
the two other cities. 
I admit that he has succeeded in his endeavour. There used to be a repelita (five 
yearly development plan) every year, the five-yearly development scheme. There was 
a blueprint of development, what we have to do now, later and in the future. (Indra, 
23 year old, student) 
Due to Suharto’s controversial status in Aceh society, the positive 
sentiment is generally weaker in comparison with Jakarta and Kupang. The 
responses are shorter and less elaborate, indicating that this is a topic they are 
less ardent about. More importantly, although they share the same positive 
impression of Suharto as their cohorts in Kupang and Jakarta, no informant 
has argued that Suharto is a preferable leader to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
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a stance that is in stark opposition with that of the youth in Jakarta and 
Kupang. 
6.4.2 The Pragmatics of Pacification 
The second marker of the idea of “Indonesia as a compromise” is the 
pragmatist worldview regarding nationhood. This is somewhat similar to the 
inclination in Kupang, although neo-patrimonial logics are largely absent from 
the discourse. 
In the narrative of “Indonesia as compromise”, the current arrangement 
between the two parties is preferable to independence. Reconciliation has 
brought stability and security. Building a sovereign state would have required 
economic, political and social capitals beyond what Aceh possessed. 
The next extract is taken from Indra’s response to the photograph of 
the Timor Leste man. He explained why Aceh should not be sovereign. 
I think, it’s hard to build a country from scratch....Let’s say that we become 
independent, we do not have sufficient human resources to drive the economy. Aceh 
would need to take in workers from outside.  Aceh can be independent (in terms of 
official status), but in its actual operation, it would still be dependent on outside 
forces. Maybe we could be more independent one day, but we would need more time. 
(Indra, 23 year old, student) 
There are three ideas in this excerpt that are frequently expressed 
regarding separatism. The first one is the rationale for why Aceh should not be 
independent (yet).  It is a pragmatic take on the relation with Indonesia, 
drawing on what this group perceives to be a realistic assessment of Aceh’s 
condition. This pragmatic approach towards belongingness to Indonesia is 
shared with the youth of Kupang, addressed in the previous chapter. 
Belongingness to Indonesia is not first and foremost drawn by 
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primordial/ethnic ties, but by civic ties, that is, a common wish for progress 
and welfare (Geertz 1963). 
The second idea is the primacy of Aceh, as discussed earlier. Staying 
with Indonesia does not mean sacrificing Aceh’s interests for territorial 
integrity. On the contrary, it is a means to achieve Aceh’s prosperity by 
avoiding straining its existing capital. 
Significantly, in the narrative of compromise, Aceh is not only 
imagined as a people of great tradition and victims of injustices. As Indra’s 
comment suggests, it is possible for them to see Aceh’s lack of manpower. 
Another example is Iqbal’s comment about the post-conflict behaviour of 
former GAM members. Iqbal comes from an inter-ethnic family; his father is 
Acehnese and his mother is from Solo. 
 I think now, the demand to separate is gradually weakening ...those who had been 
disappointed by Indonesia are now occupying (important) positions....There’s a 
saying that goes, ‘the struggle ends with Innova (the brand of car used by Aceh 
officials)’...I’ve heard people, older people say that (the ex-combatant and current 
day officials) do not have the capacity (to build and manage an independent state). 
(Iqbal, 19 year old, student) 
In contrast with the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”, Aceh and 
Indonesia are not casted in fixed position and they both have strong and weak 
points. 
The acceptance of pacification does not mean that people are blind and 
ignorant of disparity. Like in Kupang, people are aware of geo-political 
inequality. In line with the pragmatic approach, this is tolerable as long as 
future improvement is plausible. This is illustrated in the following excerpt 
from a comment made by Yasin, also on the Timor Leste photograph. 
I’ve heard that Papua now also demands independence. It’s understandable, because 
if they stay with Indonesia, it will take some time before Papua is developed. 
Especially for the regions that are far away from the centre, development is a bit 
uneven thus, it will take longer for them (to develop). But there is no guarantee that 
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they will progress and prosper after separation, right? Just look at what happened to 
Timor Leste. (Yasin, 24 year old, student) 
There is awareness and, at the same time, deference to the prevailing 
geo-political constellation. He accepted that the distribution of economic 
resources is unevenly favouring the centre. Material capital trickles from the 
centre to the peripheries, and the farther one is located from the centre the 
longer it takes for the capital to reach them. Although Yasin understands why 
this is a valid reason for separatism, he preferred to endure the “wait” in return 
for guaranteed development.  
6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter concentrates on the imagining of Indonesia in Banda 
Aceh. Compared to the two other cities, regional/ethnic identity among the 
youth is very salient and strongly identifiable. The chief concern is Aceh’s 
well-being. 
This prioritizing of Aceh translates into two diverging imaginations of 
Indonesia. The first construction portrays Indonesia as an antagonistic force 
that stands in the way of the fulfilment of Aceh’s “real” destiny as a glorious, 
sovereign entity.  The Aceh-Indonesia conflict is idealized. It is imagined as 
consisting of two fundamentally different sides that negate each other. While 
Aceh takes the identity of victimhood, Indonesia is casted as treacherous and 
repressive. The peace agreement is a facade hiding the latent conflict. This 
image of Indonesia is generalized to issues outside Aceh-Indonesia conflict. 
Generally, people in this group do not use “Indonesia” as point of reference, 
let alone perceive Aceh as part of the country. Unlike in all other groups 
where there is an acceptance of inter-regional hierarchy in Indonesia, the 
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narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” attributes the hierarchy to practices of 
inequality and injustices that they strongly reject. This imagining of Indonesia 
is almost diametrically opposed to the imaginings in Jakarta, Kupang and in 
the narrative of “Indonesia as a compromise”.  
 The second construction imagines Indonesia as a compromise. 
Reconciliation with the country is perceived to be a better and more realistic 
option. Welfare will be generated, not by fighting for independence, but by 
remaining with Indonesia. A pragmatic approach on nationhood can be 
detected here, akin to what is also present in Kupang (although in Kupang, the 
benefit pursued is at the individual, and not regional level). This narrative 
agrees with articulations of Indonesian nationhood and implicitly consents to 
interregional inequality. Whereas the narrative of antagonism takes a more 
romantic/idealistic approach, the narrative of compromise is more pragmatic. 
The narrative of antagonism is not only oppositional to the narrative of 
compromise, but also to the imagining of Indonesia in Jakarta and Kupang. 
The similarities between the three latter imaginings become visible once they 
are contrasted to the narrative of antagonism: 147 in the three groups, the use of 
“Indonesia” or the nation as a framework to interpret the world is more salient 
and more varied (that is, not limited to antagonism), there is normalization or 
ignorance of center-periphery power disparity and hierarchy (thus, not 
rejection of it), and a valuing or prioritizing of the control and dependability 
functions of a government (over protection of rights).  
                                                 
147 The analytical construct that I have used to refer to this cluster of similarity is “regularity in 




In the concluding chapter, I will provide a short overview, followed by 
the implications of this thesis: the theoretical implications for the study of 






This research is an extension of Benedict Anderson’s concept of the 
nation as an “imagined community.” Agreeing with Anderson’s basic premise 
that the nation is a construct, imagined by its members, I have argued that 
these members have different imaginations of the same community. Taking 
Indonesia as the site of research, I have examined the various constructions of 
“Indonesia” in Jakarta, Kupang and Banda Aceh, and highlighted the various 
conjunctures and disjunctures in their imaginings of Indonesia. By comparing 
and contrasting these imaginings, I have identified a cluster of similar, but not 
identical, notions of the nation. The “ensemble of differential positions” is  
referred to in the works of  Foucault, and subsequently adapted by Laclau and 
Mouffe, as “regularity in dispersion” and will be dealt with in greater detail in 
a later section.  
This concluding chapter will highlight the contributions and 
implications of this thesis to the studies of nationhood, as well as to Indonesia 
and other area studies. In regards to the contributions to studies of nationhood, 
this dissertation asserts the importance of understanding the heterogeneous 
imaginations of the nation, including the various modes of counter-hegemonic 
constructions of the nation. As for the empirical contribution, the data 
obtained in this research indicate the continuing tension between unity and 
diversity in Indonesia, as well as the failure of reformasi to remain a relevant 
force for social change. Significantly,the data obtained from Kupang and 
Banda Aceh suggests that civic nationhood, that is oriented towards the future 
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and predicated on the desire for progress, might alleviate the two earlier-
mentioned problems in Indonesia. Before discussing the implications of this 
thesis in greater detail, I will start with a brief summary of the thesis. 
7.1 A Compendium 
This thesis is based on an empirical study involving “ordinary” 
individuals. This sets it apart from many other researches that examine the 
imagination about the nation as reflected in popular culture (cf. Billig 1995; 
Edensor 2002), literature (cf. Bhabha 1990; Bowman 1994), media (cf. Adam 
1995), or as conveyed by state institutions (cf. Wood 2005; McGregor 2007). 
To overcome the difficulty of persuading people to discuss abstract notions, I 
opted to do photo-elicitation interview method aside from participant 
observation (see Chapter 2). Photo-elicitation interview method provides a 
safe space and a grounded means to discuss abstract concepts like “the nation” 
or “Indonesia”. Importantly, photo-elicitation interviews dissuade the 
informants from simply repeating the official discourses and narratives learned 
in educational institutions.  
The analysis is based on discourse theories’ understanding of the 
construction of collectivities, in particular –although not exclusively- from 
Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptualization of the “chain of equivalence”, a 
temporarily fixed cluster of meanings that is the result of the “logic of 
equivalence” (see Chapter 1). This logic of equivalence unites various 
elements together by emphasizing similarities and downplaying differences. 
The chain of equivalence is structured based on difference with an exterior. In 
this research, the logic of equivalence refers to the homogenizing forces in the 
189 
 
hegemonic image of Indonesia (e.g. as a nation state based on shared history, 
traditions, cultures). In addition to the logic of equivalence, Laclau and 
Mouffe identified the logic of difference that provides disruptions to chain of 
equivalences by providing alternative discourses. In the context of this 
research, this refers to alternative allegiances such as ethnicity, alternative 
historiographies, local cultures etc. 
In the three sites, the dynamics between the logic of equivalence and 
logic of difference vary, and young people have dissimilar constructions of the 
idea of Indonesia. A summary of the contrastive imaginings from all three 
cities is provided in chapter 3, while detailed interpretations of the data are 
presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6, focusing on Jakarta, Kupang and Banda Aceh 
respectively. 
Compared to Kupang and Banda Aceh, the imagination of “Indonesia” 
is strongest and most salient in Jakarta. This is indicated by the frequent 
associations made to Indonesia and the use of “Indonesia” as point of 
reference to interpret the photographs (e.g. the common response to the 
photograph of komodo is to see the animal as a symbol and natural capital of 
Indonesia). The chain of equivalence that structures the idea of “Indonesia” in 
Jakarta is based on the notion of shared national culture and the downplaying 
and naturalization of regional differences and disparity. Two types of 
exteriorities provide the outline, i.e. the imaginary international world as a 
Lacanian Other –authoritative others that serve as model and constant points 
of comparison- and Malaysia as antagonistic other. Overall, compared to the 
two other sites, the imagination of Indonesia in Jakarta is more in line with the 
official discourse of nationhood. However, the chain of equivalence is not 
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absolute, and the logic of difference is present in the subtle distinction made 
by my informants between themselves (i.e. “kita”) –the supposedly modern 
and more cosmopolite urbanites- and other Indonesians (i.e. “orang 
Indonesia”) who are undisciplined and uncultivated.  
In Kupang, people make fewer associations with Indonesia or 
Kupang/NTT in their responses to the photographs. Instead, a wide array of 
sub-national entities, whether it is ethnic groups or smaller networks are used 
as points of references (e.g. the komodo dragon is less often framed as a 
symbol of Indonesia or NTT, but as an animal that lives in faraway Flores and 
that they have never seen alive). The official discourse about national culture 
is contested by the idea that cultures are located at the sub-national level 
(whether it is the ethnic group or region).  However, unlike in Banda Aceh, 
there is no privileged social collectivity that poses as contender to the nation. 
Young people tend to be instrumental and practical in their engagement with 
their social environment. Neo-patrimonial practices are prevalent. However, it 
is this practical, instrumental engagement with the nation-state that 
counterpoises the relatively weaker sense of Indonesia’s common “culture” or 
“tradition”. Breaking away from the nation to pursue sovereignty is perceived 
to be economically detrimental. Remaining with Indonesia is the logical 
option for young people in Kupang. The international world –including 
Malaysia- is less important.  
“Indonesia” is least salient for youth in Banda Aceh. There is strong 
allegiance to Aceh as an ethnic and territorial entity. Various photographs 
were interpreted in reference to Aceh (e.g. the photograph of komodo elicits 
comments relating how the animal does not live in Aceh). In 2010, there are 
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two identifiable imaginings of Indonesia among Banda Aceh’s youth that I 
have called in this thesis, “Indonesia as antagonism” and “Indonesia as a 
compromise”. While the latter is more similar to the construction of Indonesia 
in Kupang, the imagining of Indonesia as an antagonism is antithetical in 
various aspects to the other three imaginings of Indonesia (i.e. oppositional to 
the narrative of “Indonesia as a compromise” in Banda Aceh, imagining of 
Indonesia among youth in Jakarta, and in Kupang): it challenges many official 
discourses of Indonesia and reframes interregional disparity within Indonesia, 
attributing it to injustice instead of accepting it as normal way of being. 
These analyses have several implications for the wider study of 
nationhood, as the next section will discuss. 
7.2 Implications for Studies on Nationhood 
There are two contributions to the existing large body of work on 
nationhood that this dissertation proposes. The first one is an understanding 
that heterogeneity of imaginations about the nation is partly a consequence of 
the homogenizing tendencies in the process of nation-building, especially in 
what Anderson calls the “last wave” nations. The second one is another aspect 
of this heterogeneity that have emerged in the data, that is, that there are 
multiple modes of counter-hegemonic responses.  
7.2.1 Heterogeneous Constructions of the Imagined Community 
Prominent works on nationhood, like Gellner’s and Anderson’s, 
concentrate mainly on the homogeneity of the nation, and how it is shaped 
through modern institutions like industrialization, education, and the media. 
192 
 
This thesis aims to refine this understanding by examining the heterogeneity 
of the nation, sometimes formed by reactions to the homogenizing forces of 
the state.  
I have employed Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony together 
with premises from standpoint theory to argue that the construction of the 
nation is heterogeneous. The discursive formation of a nation necessitates a 
hegemonic chain of equivalence, this involves emphasizing similarities while 
de-emphasizing differences (Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2001). Nation-
building strategies, like the structure of standardized education, the choice of a 
national language, the narrative chosen as the national history, or the selection 
of events considered newsworthy, all generate inequality within a nation. 
Some identity markers (e.g. religion, gender, phenotypical features etc.) are 
negated and ignored, while others are acknowledged and privileged. These 
strategies construct hierarchy by distinguishing those who fit into the ideal 
image of members of the nation, from those deemed as outliers. In other 
words, hierarchic disparity and inequality are not consequences of the failure 
to assimilate “entropy-resistant” groups, as suggested by Gellner ([1983] 
2006), but are instead generated by the homogenization process itself in the 
shaping of an imagined community.  
Different hierarchical positions between youth in Jakarta, Kupang and 
Banda Aceh, lead to different imaginations of Indonesia. To quote Fredric 
Jameson (2004) on the relation between one’s position and understanding of 
the world; “...owing to structural situations in the social order and to the 
specific forms of oppression... each group lives the world in a 
phenomenologically specific way....” (p.144). In other words, the 
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homogenizing strategies in nation-building engender hierarchic structures that 
inform heterogeneous constructions of the nation. Divergences in the 
imaginations about Indonesia are instances of “situated knowledge” (Haraway 
1988) and “situated imagination” (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002). This 
research provides empirical support for this argument. Jakarta’s youth embody 
the “ideal Indonesian” of the official discourse: “modern” individuals whose 
first language is Indonesian and whose primary allegiance is not to ethnic 
groups but to the nation-state. Their imagination of Indonesia closely reflects 
the dominant narrative of a seamless, unitary state. On the other hand, young 
people in Kupang and Banda Aceh occupy peripheral positions in the official 
narrative of Indonesia; they are mostly non-Javanese, and use Indonesian as 
their second language. Standardized education ensures that all informants are 
aware of dominant narratives of a united Indonesia, yet at the same time, their 
daily experiences are in discordance with this dominant narrative. 
Interregional differences are more perceptible and more incommensurable 
with each other. However, these viewpoints from the peripheries “can be 
ignored by those who are comparatively privileged and that is systematically 
obscured (or inverted) by dominant world-views that legitimate entrenched 
hierarchies of privilege (Wylie 2004:347).” 
Despite the heterogeneity, it is obvious that there is a degree of 
correspondence in the constructions of Indonesia in the three groups. I would 
then suggest that the imagination of the nation can be framed in terms of 
“regularity in dispersion”, a term coined by Foucault, and subsequently 
adapted by Laclau and Mouffe. Regularity in dispersion refers to “an ensemble 
194 
 
of differential positions” that appears as a particular configuration in the 
context of their difference to another element (see Chapter 3 for elaboration).  
In this research, the ensemble is formed by the similar but not identical 
views about Indonesia in the responses from Jakarta, Kupang and the narrative 
of “Indonesia as compromise” in Banda Aceh. The similarities among them 
become visible in contradistinction with the narrative of “Indonesia as 
antagonism”. Thus, based on the analysis across all sites, it has become 
apparent that the prevailing narrative of being Indonesian approximately 
entails: 1) a relatively more salient and varied use of “Indonesia” as a point of 
reference in interpreting the world (because it is not reduced to a singular 
image of antagonism), 2) a naturalization/acceptance or ignorance of hierarchy 
between the center and the periphery, and the prioritizing of the control and 
dependability functions of power holders (over the function as protectors of 
rights). This prevailing, if differentially distributed narrative of Indonesia is 
found across Jakarta, Kupang and Aceh; and only substantively challenged by 
the counter-discourse of “Indonesia as antagonism” in Aceh. 
To restate, the current body of work on nationhood, exemplified by 
Gellner’s and Anderson’s, have mainly focused on homogeneous aspects of 
nation formation. The nation is an effect of the industrialization of society, and 
is homogenized through the standardization of education, of language and the 
media. In Anderson’s work, the nation is imagined as a community of “deep, 
horizontal comradeship”, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation” 
([1983] 2006:7). By contrast, this thesis has proposed, the construction of 
“deep, horizontal comradeship”, at times, fails to mask the inequality and 
exploitation, and in some instances, becomes precisely the tool of inequality. 
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By re-questioning the portrayal of nations as homogeneous 
constructions, this research supports the stances offered in the works of 
Chatterjee (1993) and Bhabha (1994) that have emphasized the heterogeneity 
of temporality that has been unrecognized in Anderson’s emphasis on 
“homogeneous, empty time”. Whereas these works have problematized the 
assumptions of homogeneous time, I have problematized the assumption of a 
singular imagination of a “horizontal comradeship”.  
7.2.2 Multiple Modes of Counter-hegemony 
Another point highlighted in this research is the range of possibilities of 
responses to domination.  Kupang and Banda Aceh are positioned at the 
peripheries but their responses to this marginalization are different. Here, I am 
especially comparing the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism” in Banda 
Aceh on one hand, with the narrative of “Indonesia as a compromise”  (both 
discussed in chapter 6) and among youth in Kupang (chapter 5) on the other 
hand.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, “Indonesia as antagonism” 
exemplifies a clear narrative of counter-hegemony. The narrative neatly 
divides the involved parties into two fundamentally oppositional sides -Aceh 
and Indonesia- perceived as inherently good and inherently bad, respectively. 
Aceh’s destiny to be a glorious, sovereign state is impeded by the latter’s 
oppression. This imagination of Indonesia generates a historical narrative that 
deconstructs the crux of the country’s existence. Thus in this narrative, 
Indonesia did not take shape when a group of people voluntarily decided to 
unite, but when one group of people manipulated other groups and forced 
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them to form a country. There is no middle ground between this stance and 
Indonesia’s hegemonic discourse of nationhood. 
The other mode of responding to hegemony is more complex. Young 
people in Kupang and those in Banda Aceh who express the narrative of 
“Indonesia as compromise”, show a higher degree of ambiguity regarding 
their peripheral positions. One the one hand, there are dissenting voices to the 
hegemonic narrative about Indonesia, e.g. it has no “national” culture, there is 
no shared tradition or culture, and obtaining international recognition is not a 
salient concern. In both groups, belongingness to Indonesia is instrumental and 
pragmatic.  
However, one can also detect compliance and support of the dominant 
system. The seizing of state resources for one’s own community (family, kin, 
and friends) as in Kupang, is an act of resistance that simultaneously comply 
with the common political practices in Indonesia. In this context, to frame 
Kupang’s youth political logic as pure acts of resistance would mean 
neglecting seeing them as reverberations of the overarching political logic. 
Youth in Kupang do exploit the gaps in governance to their own benefit, but in 
so doing, they perpetuate a system of governance where personal interest is 
above common interest, a system that has ironically marginalized them in the 
first place. Here, I agree with Hollander and Einwohner’s assertion of the 
complexity in theorizing resistance (2004). If anything, “resistance” is rarely 
pure, and often, it supports and maintains the domination (Hollander and 
Einwohner, 2004).  
This research indicates that responses to hegemony can take different 
articulations. One response is the formation of a solid antagonistic discourse of 
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Indonesia, like in Banda Aceh. It is structured based on a divisive narrative 
where Aceh and Indonesia are mutually exclusive: either Aceh becomes 
sovereign and prosperous at the expense of Indonesia’s unity, or, Indonesia 
remains united and refuses Aceh the development and welfare it is destined to 
have. A more common response to domination however is an ambiguous 
mode of resisting that at the same time upholds the dominating power, like in 
Kupang.  It is a more fragmented and consists of smaller scale acts of 
resistance. This mode is devoid of collective opposition either in the name of 
region (NTT or Kupang versus Jakarta), ethnicity (Timor versus the Javanese) 
or class (e.g. all peripheral regions in Indonesia against the central state) that 
would have crystallized an “us” versus the dominant power holders. In other 
words, the logic of difference is not strong enough to radically disrupt the 
logic of equivalence. This mode of response does not offer oppositional 
alternatives to the dominating system. 
7.3 Implications for Indonesia 
Aside from theoretical contributions, a number of inferences about 
Indonesia’s post-New Order condition, in particular how it is experienced at 
the grass-root level, can be made based on this dissertation. Three interrelated 
themes will be discussed here; the tension between unity and diversity, the 
failure of reformasi to continue to serve as meaningful signifier, and the 
possibility of emphasizing civic nationhood instead of the ethnic nationhood.  
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7.3.1 Indonesia: Unity or Diversity? 
The tension between unity and diversity in Indonesia has received 
significant attention in many academic endeavours (cf. Yampolsky 1995; 
Schefold 1998; Meuleman 2006).This research highlights the tension as 
reflected in the thoughts of young people. Although they all agree to the idea 
encapsulated in the national slogan “unity in diversity”, I propose that youth in 
Jakarta emphasize “unity”, whereas those in Kupang and partly in Banda Aceh 
put the emphasis on “diversity”. 
Comparing the data from Jakarta to those obtained from Kupang and 
Banda Aceh, the discrepancy in their imaginations of Indonesia is palpable. 
“Indonesia” is a salient entity for youth in Jakarta (although not necessarily 
one that is appraised positively) and along with the strong desire to be 
internationally recognized, nationalist sentiments ran high at the moment of 
my fieldwork, partly fired up by the dispute with Malaysia. The nation is 
imagined to be a seamless whole as interregional differences are ignored or 
naturalized. Differences in customs, world views and habits between regions 
and ethnic groups are sterilized and all are subsumed under the signifier 
“national culture”.  By contrast, in Kupang and Banda Aceh, the hollowness of 
this signifier is visible; culture is not primarily “national”, because habits and 
customs are embedded in social interactions in smaller scale collectivities, and 
can be incommensurable with each other. The chain of equivalence that 
upholds the idea of Indonesia is frailer, as the logic of difference shows the 
various internal differences. 
Although the heterogeneity of a nation is a logical consequence of 
homogenizing forces, the discrepancy between the views from Jakarta and 
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from other regions need to be addressed if one wants to end the perpetuation 
of interregional inequality. The inclination of nationalists to have a myopic 
view of Indonesia can be traced back to the pre-Independence period. Elson 
(2008) noted that Sukarno and Syahrir only became aware of different realities 
within Indonesia when they were in exile in Flores and Boven Digul. Elson 
concisely remarks, “Most of those who asserted (the idea of Indonesia) were 
only faintly familiar with the regions and peoples of the place they claimed as 
their own” (Elson 2008: 69). The same tendency continues to be reproduced in 
the present. Assuming that youth in Jakarta have more access to powerful 
positions in the country, the dominant discourse of nationalism in the years to 
come will continue to be based on the disregard of internal differences. As a 
later part will argue, a shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism 
should be considered as an alternative to alleviate the overemphasis on the 
invented, shared primordial characteristics. 
 
7.3.2 “Reformasi” as a Failed Empty Signifier 
 
Another interesting issue that has emerged from the research data is the 
failure of reformasi as the empty signifier to be filled with meaning. An empty 
signifier provides a singular identification to various interests/identities/forces. 
In the first few years after the fall of Suharto, many individuals and social 
movements identified themselves as “reformist”. However, lacking the 
necessary political capital and clear direction, the momentum did not last long. 
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Reformasi ceased to functions as the unifying cause and different interests and 
ideologies between various movements came to the forefront.  
In the interviews, it is apparent that what most young people want now 
is strong leadership that can put order back in society, even if the order implies 
inequality or even if it is at the expense of “liberty”, “democracy” and “clean 
government” 148. In Jakarta and in Kupang149, people express disappointment 
regarding democracy and reform. There is an excess of voices with vying 
opinions and ideologies in the name of democracy. As Laclau noted, when an 
empty signifier breaks down, the chaotic condition makes any form of order 
preferable, while the actual content, i.e. the ideology, mode of governance, 
becomes less important (Laclau [1996] 2007). I attribute the nostalgia for the 
New Order to the same social dynamics. The desire for order and stability 
caused young people in Jakarta and Kupang to favour the only alternative they 
know to the chaotic reform governments, that is, the authoritarian style of the 
New Order. In other words, if an alternative to a return to New Order 
governance is to be sought, there is a need to introduce a third alternative that 
could provide the stability and order without employing the extreme 
oppressive means associated with the New Order Regime of circa 1965 to 
1998. The following section will propose a possible alternative. 
                                                 
148 This calls for an extensive anthropological study on the understanding of these notions in 
Indonesia. A number of anthropological lenses through which democracy has been studied are 
“local meanings, circulating discourses, multiple contestations and changing forms of power” 
(Paley 2002: 470). 




7.3.3 Civic Nationhood: a Viable Alternative 
The interviews conducted for this dissertation suggest that at the grass 
root level, belongingness to Indonesia is not necessarily predicated on shared 
primordial givens. This is in contrast with the elite’s discourse where ascribed 
identities like ethnicity and religion occupy a crucial role in Indonesian 
nationhood.150 Ethnicity and religion are considered important identity groups 
that could pose as threat and need to be overcome (Bernard 2004), or could be 
manipulated and exploited to the benefit of power holders (Bernard 2004, 
Meuleman 2006, Hefner 2000).151 However, what this research shows is that 
for youth in Banda Aceh and Kupang, being Indonesian is not defined through 
shared culture, tradition or language. Incompatibilities between various 
cultures are visible and yet, are not the main threats to the nation.  
The interviews have shown that in Kupang and to a degree in Banda 
Aceh, young people engage with the state in a rational instrumental mode. 
Even in the narrative of “Indonesia as antagonism”, the conflict between Aceh 
and Indonesia is not first and foremost a result of differences in cultures, but 
due to perceived injustices and deceptions. People are more concerned about 
issues like distribution of resources than about “inherent” differences between 
cultures. Placing to the side, at least momentarily, the corrupt aspect of neo-
patrimonial practices in Kupang, and focusing on the instrumental side, it is 
                                                 
150 The importance of ethnoreligious identity is implied in the national motto “Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika”, Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, or Suharto’s prohibition to discuss SARA-related 
issues. These are strategies either to minimize or emphasize internal differences that are based 
on primordial givens. 
151 Studies by Hefner (2000), Meuleman (2006) and Bernard (2004) show how various forces 
have since long manipulated and exploited ethnoreligious differences to maintain power, their 




possible to grasp how these practices are at their core driven by a very 
common wish for welfare and improvement of the quality of life. In the case 
of Kupang’s youth, the instrumentality of belongingness to Indonesia is one of 
the factors why separatism has not gained ground.  
There are two important conjectures. The first is that weak symbolic/ 
ethnic nationalism does not necessarily lead to the disintegration of Indonesia. 
Secondly, instrumental logic provides sufficient reasons to remain with 
Indonesia. Based on these inferences, I suggest that a shift of discourse in 
nation building, from emphasizing ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism 
would not result in the breaking down of the nation state. Therefore, I propose 
that nation-building processes in Indonesia should address civic more than 
ethnic nationalism. 
Following Geertz (1963), I take civic nationalism to be based on what 
he calls the “civic tie” that binds members of a nation-state with an orientation 
towards progress, prosperity and equality. This is much more instrumental in 
nature in contrast to the more ideological “ethnic” or “primordial” ties.  Civic 
nationalism could alleviate the abovementioned tension between unity and 
diversity. Differences in customs, cultures, history and language of sub-
national groups would become less relevant than common progress and 
development. Importantly, because it is oriented towards progress, civic 
nationalism emphasizes more on the future, unlike ethnic/primordial 
nationalism that is based on beliefs of the past. In this regards, it is in line with 
what Shamsul (1996), in his study of discourses of the nation in Malaysia, 
terms as “nation-of-intent”, that is, “an idea of the nation that still needs to be 
constructed or reconstructed” (p. 485). Whatever form the civic tie would 
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embody, it should ideally provide another ideological alternative than a return 
to authoritarianism. At the same time, it should address that what made 
authoritarianism appealing for youth in Jakarta and Kupang, that is, the 
stability and relative prosperity. 
In arguing that civic nationalism is a viable option, I align the proposal 
with Anderson’s suggestion that instead of framing Indonesia as ‘inheritance’, 
one should perceive it as “a challenge or common project” (Anderson 1999), 
and with the conclusion reached by Elson in his treatise tracing the history of 
the idea of Indonesia that “shaping a…nation-state…is more than inventing 
romantic imaginings and gloried ideologisings…” but should rather be 
“…concerned with seeking justice and prosperity..” (2008: 322). My data 
obtained at the grass root level strongly supports these stances by showing that 
a weak or absent imagining of Indonesia as based on shared primordial givens 
does not necessarily indicate disintegrative aspirations. This fear exclusively 
exists in the minds of the elites and those deeply interpellated in the dominant 
discourse, like the young in Jakarta. For those in Kupang and, partly also, 
Banda Aceh, belonging to Indonesia can be based on instrumental and rational 
considerations, thus, they are open to the possibility of nation-building 
processes that are based on civic nationalism. 
Having argued for a change of paradigm in Indonesian nation-building, 
it needs to be admitted that a change this radical would require long-term and 
integrated planning from various institutions. In his seminal work on civil 
Islam in Indonesia, Hefner (2000) identifies three conditions for a civic 
structure: a political model based on social experience that emphasizes 
autonomy, mutual respect and volunteerism, the introduction of this model to 
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the public sphere and supporting institutions to maintain the structure.  
Building a civic nationhood is undoubtedly a big challenge, but it is a direction 
worth taking if reformasi is truly to take place. 
To briefly revisit the theoretical stance of standpoint theory employed 
in this thesis, the imaginings from the peripheries (Kupang and Banda Aceh in 
this context) not only deconstruct some dominant perspectives of Indonesia, 
but they also provide realistic alternative discourses (i.e. related to civic 
nationalism) to the prevailing primordial ethno-nationalism. 
 
7.4 Relevance for Future Studies 
Although the present study focuses on Indonesia, I would propose that 
the research could be extended to other countries, especially those that fall 
within Anderson’s category of the “last wave” nations. These are formed after 
World War II, based on modular structures of European nationalism and 
characterized by both a strong populist movement as well Machiavellian 
enforcement of nationalism (Anderson [1983] 2006; 113-114). The 
combination of a relatively short history as nation-state, together with a strong 
hegemonizing force to create a nation out of plural collectivities, would 
engender heterogeneous imaginations about the nations.  
Most Asian countries, with the possible exception of China, Korea, 
Thailand and Japan, 152 are “last wave” nations. Analyzing the last wave Asian 
nations, Mayall (2000) suggests that in the aftermath of colonization, there 
                                                 
152 Korea and Japan are relatively homogeneous, China contains many ethnic groups, but 
according to Mayall (2000) the Han are so dominant in terms of numbers and power that 
ethnicity was never part of the national identity. 
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was an urgent need for legitimacy. This caused the leaders to quickly erect 
symbols of nations without regarding cultural and ethnic-based rights of self-
determination (Mayall 2000). One can draw a relatively long list of nations in 
Asia where forces of homogenization produce obvious oppositional forces. 
Thus, the Philippines with a Filipino identity that is marked by Catholicism 
inadvertently alienate the Moro people (Putzel 2000). India’s Hindu 
domination 153  spurred the creation of Pakistan, from which Bangladesh 
eventually seceded, justified by linguistic differences and territorial distance 
(Desai 2000). 154  In a similar fashion, ethno-religious dissent in Myanmar 
surfaced in the aftermath of recent changes in 2012. 155 
Academic knowledge and interpretations of intra-national 
fragmentations like these are mostly based on macro-level study using 
historical/political approach. Very little study has been conducted to 
understand how “common” people experience and conceptualize the nation, 
                                                 
153 Of course, this was not an uncontested social fact and only started to crystallize in the last 
quarter of 19th century (Hussain 2000). For a detailed trajectory on the various contestations 
regarding India’s nationhood, see Desai (2000). Desai identified the current contending forces 
to take place between demands for representation of diverse groups versus the vision of a 
single nation, whether as a collectivity of religious groups or as one secular nation. 
154 In a way, the case of Indonesia presents a degree of exception. Whereas religion has played 
a significant factor in the examples I am touching on here (the Philippines, India and 
Myanmar), it has been less significant for Indonesia. At least until the time of fieldwork in 
2009-2010, power discrepancy predominantly takes place along the line of ethnicity and 
territory (Java versus the others), but less aligned to religious differences although the 
majority of people are Moslems. Religious dissent have escalated steadily since 1990’s (cf. 
Bernard 2004) but expressions of strong animosity to other religions as well as fanaticism to 
one’s own religion did not form identifiable patterns in my interviews. 
155 The Myanmar nation contains one major ethnic group (i.e. Barman) and seven relatively 
major minorities with their own state/territory (i.e. Karen, Kachin, Karenni, Chin, Mon, 
Rakhine and Shan). By the time Myanmar obtained independence in 1948, differences 
regarding visions of national identity and forms of union emerged (Gravers, 1992). Under the 
militaristic domination, the minority groups were oppressed in various ways (cf. Ekeh 2007). 
In 2012, as the military rule ended, problems that have been accumulated for decades 
surfaced; one of the most poignant being ethnic discordances (cf. Holliday 2013). Adversity 
between the minorities and the majority was already present during the British colonial period, 
often only to be aggravated by British forces, like in the case of Karen people155 (cf. Gravers 
1992, Rajah 2002). 
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including the internal dissents. 156 One cannot presume their imaginings to be 
mere echoes of the official discourse. The use of photo-elicitation methods, or 
variations of it that would facilitate discussions about abstract notions, could 
provide a means to grasp people’s imaginings of the nation. 
In short, as this dissertation has shown, examining the imaginings of a 
nation contributes at various levels. First of all, theoretically, it provides a 
platform to compare between imaginings in the center and peripheries. This 
would not only highlight hegemonic discourse, but also the heterogeneity that 
is hidden within and at the same time, produced by it. Secondly, it 
acknowledges peripheral voices. Thirdly, at a more practical level, these 










                                                 
156 Thus as an example; how do Myanmar’s young Karen, Rohingya and Barman perceive the 
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